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I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 inductive reasoning
Inductive reasoning is ubiquitous; both in science and in our daily
lives. A big part of our interactions with the world consists of ob-
serving objects, classifying them as belonging to a particular kind,
and forming beliefs about them based on that classification. Those
beliefs include general sentences like: cats purr when they are fed,
ravens are black, copper conducts electricity. Inductive reasoning is
often taken to be exactly the kind of reasoning that leads us from ob-
serving particular objects or facts, to forming generalizations about
whole kinds. It is the reasoning from the observed to the yet unob-
served; from the past to the future.
Consider the following scenario. I am lying on the grass in a park,
observing birds that fly over my head. In particular, I am looking at
the direction in which they are flying: east, west, and so on. After
seeing some number of birds flying past, I may notice some things
about the general pattern in their directions; for instance, that a
significant proportion of the birds are flying west, or that no birds
so far have been flying south. I may become interested in coming
up with a theory of where birds fly in this area. What is the chance
that a randomly observed bird in this park will be flying west? In
which direction will the next bird I see fly?
On the basis of my past observations, I may start forming beliefs
about the future ones — about the kind of things I’ve been observ-
ing. What factors will play a role in this process? What will my
eventual beliefs depend on? The first factor will surely be the obser-
vations themselves. If I see that a lot of birds are flying north and
none of them so far flew west, I will more readily come to the con-
clusion that the average bird in this area flies north with probability
80%, rather than that it flies west with probability 80%.
But the observations are not all that matters here. Another factor
is what could be called my inductive character. How eager am I to
jump to conclusions on the basis of my observations? For instance,
how many birds flying north does it take for me to form a belief that
all birds in this area fly north? The prior beliefs that I brought with
me into my ornithological investigation will also belong here. Did I
come to the park with a strong suspicion that most of the birds will
be flying south, say because it’s October and the migrations have
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started? If that’s the case, then it might take a significant number of
birds flying north to make me reverse that initial belief, compared
to a situation in which I did not have any earlier preconceptions.
In general, I could have brought all kinds of statistical assumptions
with me into the investigation.
Finally, the set of concepts, i.e. the labels I use to describe the ob-
servations, that I bring with me into the investigation, will also be
an important factor. The simplest example of that influence would
be me not even having the concept of west at my disposal; say, I cat-
egorize directions as “towards the church” and “towards the lake”
only. In that case I wouldn’t even be able to form a belief that the
next bird flying above me has a 60% chance of flying west.
Here is another example of the importance of labels. What would
happen if in fact there were two very different kinds of birds living
in that park; with birds of the first kind always flying west, and the
others always flying east? If the two kinds came in equal numbers,
and I failed to recognize the division — simply treating all birds
in the park as belonging to the same kind — I might come to the
conclusion that every bird in the park has a 50/50 chance between
flying east or west. It’s not that that belief would be false, but one
could say that I could have done better in terms of predicting the
behavior of the birds, had I only chosen the right concepts to label
the birds with in the first place.
The set of concepts that I bring into the investigation, like in the
examples above, in this thesis will be called a conceptual frame-
work; in the next section I will say more about what conceptual
frameworks are. The overarching question of this thesis is: how do
conceptual frameworks influence reasoning, and more specifically:
inductive reasoning? I am primarily interested in the normative vari-
ant of this question: given my choice of a conceptual framework,
how should I form beliefs on the basis of my observations? Hence,
I am interested in situations akin to the ornithological investigation
above, and I will be studying the effects that the choice of labels,
or concepts, together with some assumptions about rationality, will
have on the degrees of belief in some propositions about the future
observations.
The above scenario can also be seen as an inferential situation:
on the basis of a set of premises, consisting of some assumptions
(about what kinds of things there are, what the possible patterns
in the observations are, etc.) and the observed data, we come to
some conclusions about the future observations. The conclusions
are not certain, however, hence they are expressed as degrees of
belief in some propositions. One formal framework for these sorts of
inferences is inductive logic, and this thesis belongs to this tradition.
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Such an inferential view on inductive reasoning helps to us to
see the importance of conceptual frameworks, as the environment
in which the premises of inductive inference are formulated. One of
the conclusions I come to in this thesis is that we never come into an
investigation or approach the world and its objects — bare-handed,
so to speak. We always come equipped with a certain conceptual
structure or framework, within which our assumptions, observa-
tions, and conclusions are framed. To put it even more strongly:
I cannot even have beliefs without having some sort of a conceptual
framework first, that will frame those beliefs (at least in the case of
some interesting, non-trivial beliefs).
Within inductive logic, the question of how we should form be-
liefs on the basis of our observations, is spelled out as: which confir-
mation functions are rational? Confirmation functions assign num-
bers to pairs of propositions: the hypothesis and the evidence; those
numbers represent how likely the hypothesis is given the evidence.
In terms of the bird example above, the evidence are the observa-
tions I have made so far, and the hypothesis is a particular state-
ment about future observations; for instance that the next bird will
fly west, or that birds in this area are 60% likely to be flying east. I
will be studying how some of the values of the confirmation func-
tions are connected to certain features of the conceptual framework.
The starting point of my investigations is Rudolf Carnap’s “A Ba-
sic System of Inductive Logic” (henceforth the Basic System); his last
published work on the topic. In the elaboration of what is meant by
a conceptual framework, and which features of it influence induc-
tive reasoning, I will draw both from Carnap’s work, and the mod-
ern theory of conceptual spaces. In this thesis, conceptual frame-
works are taken to contain geometrical representations of their con-
cepts: multi-dimensional spaces, divided into regions correspond-
ing to different concepts. I will show how some properties of these
spaces, like the shape or structure of their regions, can be translated
into values of the confirmation functions. Eventually, I will go be-
yond Carnap’s original framework, and think of confirmation func-
tions and updates of them, as applying directly to the geometrical
representations of concepts used in the investigation.
In the rest of this introduction, I will give a brief overview of the
the building blocks of the thesis. First, I will discuss Carnap’s phi-
losophy of conceptual frameworks, and how their understanding
in this thesis relates to his earlier work. Then, I will provide the
reader with some background on inductive logic, including its evo-
lution before the Basic System. The third and final element are the
attribute and conceptual spaces, used here to represent concepts of
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a framework. The introduction will conclude with a short summary
of the other chapters of the thesis.
1.2 conceptual frameworks
What is a conceptual framework then? Carnap presented his early
position on conceptual frameworks in “Empiricism, Semantics, and
Ontology” (1956), where they were still called linguistic frameworks.
A linguistic framework is a language — “the system of linguistic ex-
pressions” (1956, p. 205) — chosen for a particular purpose, i.e. for
talking about or studying a certain type of objects. In that work, Car-
nap famously introduced the distinction between questions internal
and external to a framework. External questions consider the ob-
jective, framework-independent existence of the objects which the
language of the framework talks about (e.g., “Do numbers really
exist?”). Moreover, external questions are not answerable within a
particular framework, since the adoption of any framework already
presupposes the existence of the objects over which its variables
range.
The above means that the choice of a linguistic framework is not
a matter of matching the framework to the framework-independent
facts, but rather a matter of pragmatic considerations, such as how
well it serves the aims for which it was chosen. Such a view goes
hand in hand with Carnap’s principle of tolerance about the choice
of formal languages, introduced in “Logical Syntax of Language”
(1937, §17). In this thesis, I consider conceptual frameworks as tools
for inductive reasoning. This means that the main criterion for eval-
uating the choice of a framework is its inductive success: how well
it serves us in making predictions. The problem of the desiderata
for such prediction making will come up in section 2.3.2.
In the Basic System, linguistic frameworks of Carnap’s earlier
work became conceptual frameworks. Section 2.2 discusses this in
more detail. The most important aspect of it is that the particular
language form is no longer the defining feature of a framework. A
conceptual framework is not just a language; it is a set of concepts
— possibly labeled with a language — organized in a particular
way and used to define a set of propositions to which confirmation
functions apply. Hence, the language of a conceptual framework is
now considered to be partly interpreted; frameworks are no longer
purely syntactical things, but come with a set of models for their
language, as well as a structure that provides meanings for their
predicates: the attribute space.
While the expressions of the framework’s language did not have
any structure to them beyond their syntax, the concepts belonging
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to those new, conceptual frameworks do come equipped with a
structure; they are represented as regions in the so-called attribute
spaces. Attribute spaces are multi-dimensional, geometrical struc-
tures, whose dimensions correspond to particular features of the
objects that the framework is used to describe. For instance, if the
objects described by my conceptual framework were all rectangles,
the associated attribute space could have two dimensions: height
and width. Every point in such a space would correspond to a pos-
sible rectangle: a particular combination of a certain width and a
certain height. The concept of a square would correspond to the
line defined by the following “equation”: width=height.
However, it is important to stress that in no way are the attribute
spaces more epistemically basic than the concepts defined on them;
nowhere did Carnap indicate that. In particular, attribute spaces
also need to be chosen, in the same way that the language of a lin-
guistic framework had to be chosen. Moreover, no objective reality
of, say, the dimensions of the attribute spaces, is postulated: for in-
stance, we do not ask whether being a rectangle is really decompos-
able into the two above dimensions. This means that the attribute
spaces do not give us a privileged grip on reality that would, for
instance, allow us to tell apart the natural viz. projectible properties,
from the ones that are not good candidates for inductive reasoning
(see Goodman 1955) — at least they cannot have that role in the
Basic System.
Carnap suggests that the choice of attribute spaces should be
informed by our scientific theories; that itself makes the choice of
spaces relative to another, previously existing conceptual framework.
Hence, the choice of attribute spaces for a conceptual framework —
over which then the concepts of the framework are defined — is
as much a pragmatic choice as the choice of the language form in
Carnap’s original proposal on linguistic frameworks.
Throughout this thesis, I will be focusing on different aspects of
the question of what our degrees of belief in certain predictions
should be, given a particular choice of a conceptual framework. I
will always treat the framework with all its elements, including the
concepts and their associated attribute spaces, as a given. I will not
try to answer a related, but very different question of how to choose
a conceptual framework in the first place. The main reason for that
choice is that I am interested in doing inductive logic, and inductive
logic conceived of in a particular way — as a study of relations be-
tween certain kinds of statements. I want to look for correct patterns
in reasoning from a set of assumptions — given, for instance, by the
conceptual framework — and observations, to conclusions about fu-
ture observations. In this perspective the question of whether the
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assumptions are justified or correct in any way, is not relevant. This
does not mean that the question of how to justify a particular choice
of a framework is not an important one; it just belongs to a wholly
different investigation than the one undertaken in this thesis.
In other words, I am not interested in how to choose conceptual
frameworks, but in how to use them. Ultimately, the answers I pro-
vide could be useful for approaching the choice problem, by provid-
ing us with more ways of judging how well our chosen conceptual
frameworks serve us as a basis for inductive reasoning. As I men-
tioned above, the starting point of my investigation is Carnap’s own
Basic System of inductive logic. In order to set it in its own context,
in the next section I will briefly discuss Carnapian inductive logic
in general.
1.3 inductive logic
In the Basic System, Carnap makes essentially two proposals. The
first one belongs strictly to the field of inductive logic; namely, it
contains new suggestions on which confirmation functions are ratio-
nal, extending his earlier work on that topic. The second proposal
relates to his philosophy of conceptual frameworks; Carnap puts
forward a particular idea about how conceptual frameworks should
be represented. The most important part of that second offering are
the above-mentioned attribute spaces; I will come back to them in
the next section. In this section I will situate the Basic System in the
wider context of Carnapian inductive logic. There are two reasons
for presenting the overview of the pre-Basic System formalisms in
this introduction: not only will I refer back to Carnap’s early induc-
tive logic at later points in the thesis; I also do not want to alienate
from the start a reader who might not be fully familiar with it.
Carnap’s work on inductive logic can be roughly divided into
three parts, corresponding to his three main publications on the
topic: “Logical Foundations of Probability” (1950), “The Continuum
of Inductive Methods” (1952), and the Basic System (1971; 1980).
Other authors, such as Zabell (2011), are more likely to divide Car-
nap’s inductive logic into two periods, the early one corresponding
to the Foundations, and the late one starting with the Continuum;
the distinguishing factor being the move from one to many admissi-
ble confirmation functions (see below). However, given my interest
in conceptual frameworks and the significant novelty of the inclu-
sion of the attribute spaces in the Basic System, it makes sense to
distinguish here the three parts in Carnap’s work.
Inductive logic is for Carnap the study of confirmation; we’re in-
terested in assessing the degree to which some propositions — the
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evidence — confirm others, i.e. the hypothesis. Ultimately, of course,
we are interested in the kinds of hypotheses and evidence that are
present in proper scientific theories, that is ones containing a very
strong vocabulary that also includes theoretical terms. However, the
formal systems developed in the publications cited above worked
with a much simpler language, to which I will also keep in this
dissertation (see section 2.2.1).
In Foundations (1950, §110J), Carnap describes inductive logic as
a project in rational reconstruction; what is being reconstructed are
the inductive practices of scientists. He also famously considered
inductive logic an exercise in explication (1950, §2-3). In section 2.5
I will look closer at the goals of explication and whether the Basic
System meets them, considering the developments it proposes for
inductive logic, as well as some factors coming from the outside of
inductive logic.
The degree of confirmation is meant to be captured using confir-
mation functions. They are conditional probability functions, assign-
ing real values ranging from 0 to 1 to pairs of propositions, i.e. the
evidence and the hypothesis. In Foundations Carnap often stresses
the fact that he is interested in the logical concept of probability; de-
gree of confirmation is seen as an objective relation between proposi-
tions. However, in his later work he moved further and further away
from such a perspective. In the Basic System, confirmation functions
are taken to model rational initial credences; i.e. the degrees of be-
lief that an agent should have before collecting any evidence, given
only her conceptual framework. However, I will continue to call this
approach to confirmation inductive logic, following Romeijn (2005)
in highlighting its aspect of looking for connections between sets of
assumptions and the rational conclusions they lead to.
1.3.1 Carnap’s continua
One of the characteristic features of the progression from Carnaps’
early to late work on probability, is the widening of the class of
rational confirmation functions. The more of the additional variety
in admissible confirmation functions Carnap allows for, the larger
his need seems to be to connect the new parameters with something
in a meaningful way, providing them with an interpretation. For
instance, in the case of the λ-continuum below, the new parameter
was interpreted as a measure of a particular feature of the reasoner’s
inductive character. In the Basic System, such anchors are provided
by the conceptual framework itself, and more precisely, the attribute
spaces belonging to the conceptual framework: the values of some
of the parameters are read off the spaces.
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Particular confirmation functions can be determined in a number
of ways, the most prevalent being the axiomatic approach and the
method of characteristic functions, i.e. prediction rules. A singular
prediction rule is a formula that provides for each possible sequence
of observations and a single next observation, a way to calculate the
degree of confirmation for the corresponding pair of propositions.
The developments over the three phases may be traced along the
changing prediction rules that can be associated with the subse-
quent proposals. Assume that our language consists of one family of
k mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive predicates P1 . . . Pk. Let
E be the proposition corresponding to the gathered evidence, i.e. a
sequence of observations, each recording an individual possessing
one of the properties Pi; assume that E consists of N observations, n
of which were of type Pi. The degree of confirmation of the hypoth-
esis Pia, saying that the next observed individual will be of the Pi
sort, by the evidence E, is denoted by C (Pia|E). This degree of con-
firmation, as noted above, can be understood as the rational agent’s
degree of belief — probability — that the next observed individual
will be Pi.
Starting with the Foundations, where only one confirmation func-
tion was taken as rational — as the inductive probability function —
the prediction rule took the following form:
C (Pia|E) = 1+ nk + N . (c
∗ function)
In case the evidence is empty (N = 0), the a priori probability for
observing any of the Pi is 1/k; none of the predicates are treated
differently than others. Note also that in the above rule, as well as
in the following two, the probability for observing a Pi object, does
not depend on which other predicates have been observed before; it
is the possible ways of relaxing this requirement that section 4.2 of
this thesis discusses.
In the Continuum, Carnap allows for more prediction rules to
be classified as rational. He appreciated that not all of the features
of inductive reasoning are settled by the requirements of rational-
ity and that some of those features can be a matter of subjective
choice, without deeming them irrational. Hence, he introduces an
additional parameter, the λ > 0, whose value is meant to be freely
chosen by the user of the inductive method. The predictive rules
have the following form now:
C (Pia|E) = λ+ nλk + N . (λ-continuum)
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Finally, the λ-continuum was further generalized in the Basic Sys-
tem. “A Basic System of Inductive Logic” was a two-part paper pub-
lished partly after Carnap’s death (1971; 1980). Carnap concluded
Foundations with an exposition of the contents of the future second
volume of that book. In the course of the 1960s it became clear that
his plan was not going to be realized and that the scope of another
volume would have to be different. The Basic System is the result of
those years’ work and the system presented there was supposed to
serve as a foundation for future inductive logic (see “Introduction”
in Carnap and Jeffrey 1971). The Basic System differs from the ear-
lier work in its semantic focus; confirmation functions apply now
to set-theoretically modeled propositions rather than sentences of
the object language (see section 2.2.1 of this thesis). The treatment
of confirmation functions is mostly axiomatic, and prediction rules
are provided only for the λ-γ system, which does not exhaust all
the functions deemed rational in the Basic System (see section 2.3).
In the Basic System (1980, sec. 19), the rules from the λ-continuum
are modified to include the possibility of uneven priors for different
predicates. The a priori expectation for each predicate Pi no longer
equals 1/k, but can have any value γi; as long as all γi for the whole
family sum up to 1: Σiγi = 1. The prediction rule takes the following
form:
C (Pia|E) = λγi + nλ+ N . (λ-γ-continuum)
The higher the λ, the less willing the agent is to learn from expe-
rience. That this is the case can be seen from the way the predictive














The weight of the first of these factors, n/N — the empirical fac-
tor — initially rather small, grows with the growing sample size N.
The weight of the other factor, the logical factor 1/k, starts out as
1 and tends to 0 with the growing number of observations of the
type Pi. We can see from the above formula that low values of λ
will give more weight to the empirical factor from the very begin-
ning. This is why the λ parameter is sometimes referred to as the
measure of the agent’s inductive character: the higher its value, the
less willing the agent is to learn from her observations, keeping to
her a priori beliefs for longer. Note that, however, for all values of
λ less than ∞, the weight of the logical factor eventually becomes
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negligible and the predictions converge to the observed frequencies
of the predicates.
However, the above set of rules is not Carnap’s last word on
which confirmation functions are admissible. A lot of what happens
in the Basic System has the form of initial proposals that did not be-
come formalized enough to guarantee the formulation of a yet an-
other continuum. For some new parameters it was unclear how one
could incorporate them in a fully general prediction rule. But the
fact that Carnap’s proposals on, for instance, statistical dependen-
cies between predicates belonging to the same family (see sections
2.4 and 4.2 here), are not giving rise to precise prediction functions,
seems like an intrinsic feature of the matter we are dealing with
here, rather than an explicit weakness of the formal system. Spec-
ifying wider and wider classes of confirmation functions requires
introducing even more parameters to the system, aiming to make
certain assumptions explicit; it could happen that the rigid system
of simple rules is not enough to do that. Hence, in the Basic System,
instead of formulating the new continua in this rule-based manner,
Carnap axiomatically defines sets of confirmation functions, and
then further pins down some of their values, using the features of
attribute spaces.
For instance, while allowing for variability of the values of γi, he
makes a proposal for how to pin them down, by equating them with
the sizes of the relevant regions of the attribute space (see section
2.4 of this thesis). It is developments like that that give rise to the
main themes of this dissertation. Most of the work presented here
consists of extending Carnap’s ideas for how to connect certain el-
ements of the conceptual framework to particular values of either
the confirmation function, or its parameters. The most important
element here is the geometric representation of the concepts of the
framework, which is what I will turn to now.
1.4 attribute and conceptual spaces
Attribute spaces were introduced in the Basic System as a means
to represent concepts and the relations between them. A conceptual
framework is no longer thought of as just a language; it comprises
additional elements, like the attribute spaces (see sections 2.2 and
2.2.2). In this dissertation, I focus on the spaces as I approach the
main question I posed in the beginning of this introduction, namely:
what should our beliefs be — how should we reason inductively —
given our chosen conceptual framework? Throughout the following
chapters, this question becomes narrowed down to: what should our
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beliefs be, given that the concepts we bring into the investigation
have this-and-this structure, represented as an attribute space?
However, my interest extends beyond the way Carnap conceived
of the geometrical representation of concepts; I am also considering
the theory of conceptual spaces, which has been developed within
cognitive science. Carnap’s attribute spaces are multi-dimensional
geometrical structures divided up into regions corresponding to the
concepts of the framework — and so are the conceptual spaces. Con-
ceptual spaces have been proposed as a framework for modeling
cognitive representations of both existing agents (like humans) and
constructed ones (like robots). They have also been used as a basis
of a general theory of meaning (Gärdenfors 2014).
The idea that such geometric structures could be introduced to
model meaning relations between predicates, was not entirely novel
at the time when Carnap presented the Basic System, nor was it
nonexistent before psychologists and linguists became interested in
such structures. Van Fraassen (1967) already introduced what he
called a logical space – essentially a set of points representing some
(not necessarily all) possible objects (which Carnap would think
of as objects of a particular investigation) — used to model inten-
sions of predicates. In this setting predicates correspond to regions
in the space (or, rather, subsets of the set of points of the space)
and hence intensional relations such as synonymy or inclusion of
meaning can be read off directly from the space, without the need
for meaning postulates. Van Fraassen used such semi-interpreted
languages to extend Beth’s semantic approach to scientific theories
(see Van Fraassen 1970). Stalnaker (1981) uses the same structures
as the ones provided by Van Fraassen in order to define properties
without the use of possible worlds.
The modern theory of conceptual spaces gained a lot of momen-
tum after the publication of Peter Gärdenfors’ book “Conceptual
Spaces: The Geometry of Thought” (2000). Gärdenfors sees concep-
tual spaces as a level on which concepts can be represented without
recourse to symbolic means of representation (like for instance for-
mal languages). The theory is supposed to have empirical import,
providing testable predictions on human reasoning, especially cate-
gorization. The theory of conceptual spaces is introduced in more
detail in chapter 3. What is important to mention here is that con-
ceptual spaces have been over the years studied and developed in
much more detail than Carnap’s attribute spaces; they have been
postulated to have a more sophisticated structure. This makes them
available as models of, for instance, vague concepts, or concepts
defined on the basis of prototypical instances. It is that additional
12 introduction
structure of conceptual spaces that I will be exploring in sections 3.4
and 3.5, in connection to inductive logic.
When using the theory of conceptual spaces to inform the investi-
gations belonging to inductive logic, one has to bear in mind that in
spite of the structural similarity, the two projects have very different
aims. This will influence what can be done in terms of exchanges
between the two theories. Carnapian inductive logic is a normative
project; it is not concerned primarily with how people do reason in-
ductively, but with how they should do it in order to avoid mistakes,
and further the sciences. From such a perspective a perfect match of
the way conceptual frameworks are represented in the Basic System
with what we take humans to actually be doing in their daily reason-
ing is not an absolute must; especially given that Carnap’s original
inspiration was scientific, as opposed to everyday, reasoning.
However, some descriptive accuracy is needed in order to claim
that the system proposed can serve as a guide for inductive reason-
ers out there (Romeijn 2005, p. 40). And in that sense employing
conceptual spaces in inductive logic can eventually be worthwhile.
For instance, consider the case of vague concepts. When discussing
the requirement of fruitfulness of an explication, Carnap (1950, §5)
admitted the possibility of situations in which introducing more pre-
cise concepts does not facilitate the formulation of laws. Therefore
there might be good reasons to include a non-sharp concept in our
linguistic framework, and the formal model of vague concepts devel-
oped within the theory of conceptual spaces might prove useful in
setting up attribute spaces for such concepts. Developing the idea of
applying confirmation functions to vague concepts could, moreover,
prove useful to the independently motivated project of representing
credences using imprecise probabilities (see e.g. Bradley and Steele
2014; Joyce 2011).
The ambition of the theory of conceptual spaces is, on the other
hand, primarily descriptive; it aims to create a model of cognitive
representations that will correctly predict known features of (hu-
man) reasoning such us categorization or the emergence of concepts.
Interpreted in this latter setting, Carnap’s postulates such as the γ
and η rules (see section 2.4) —which each prescribe a particular
connection between rational expectation and the structure of the at-
tribute space — would turn into empirical statements, that could
be tested against actual human reasoning. We could ask: is it really
the case that human agents match their initial expectations for ob-
serving an object to how large the relevant region is in the space? —
a question that Carnapian inductive logic did not raise, for it was
interested in giving prescriptions, not checking if they are adhered
to in real life.
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However, when we focus on the constructive goal of cognitive sci-
ence and think of designing artificial agents who are able to reason
inductively in a correct way while using conceptual spaces to rep-
resent concepts, the principles they would operate on could come
from inductive logic, since here the question of correctness is also
applicable.
The original descriptive focus of the theory of conceptual spaces
can cause some tension, when the theory is applied to contexts other
than strictly empirical studies; for the instance philosophy of sci-
ence. Some proponents of the theory of conceptual spaces, while
treating their theory as just a model, devoid of an evaluative as-
pect, approach with this tool the problem of rational theory choice,
which by its very own nature, is a problem in which values, and not
just descriptions, will play a pivotal role. In chapter 5 I discuss this
issue in detail, showing some limitations of the conceptual spaces
approach to conceptual frameworks.
1.5 putting it all together
The attribute spaces of the Basic System have not been discussed a
lot in the literature, since Hilpinen (1973) reported on the two pa-
pers by Carnap. Moreover, the connections with the current work
done in cognitive science have not received due attention; Gärden-
fors (2000) mentions Carnap’s work only in passing. People work-
ing on inductive logic proper tend to overlook the role that attribute
spaces play in the Basic System, focusing on the properties of the
confirmation functions, and they are not concerned with where
some of those properties are coming from. This is understandable,
insofar as they are mostly interested in prediction systems, rather
than the wider question of conceptual frameworks and their influ-
ence on inductive reasoning, that I am interested in.
The problem of reasoning on conceptual spaces is still very open
in the theory of conceptual spaces; that extends also to inductive rea-
soning, especially inductive reasoning of the form I study here, i.e.
concerned with the evaluation of propositions in light of observa-
tions, rather than conceived of simply as concept formation. So far
the proposals of the conceptual spaces community, regarding the
more traditionally constructed inductive reasoning, concerned only
the problem of projectibility and natural properties. But we should
not only know which concepts are fit for induction, but also how
to actually use them to make predictions. Considered as a first step
in the direction of a full-fledged theory of inductive reasoning on
conceptual spaces, in chapter 4 I propose an account of observation-
making and prediction-forming in a non-linguistic setting, where
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the conceptual space is the only environment for the inductive rea-
soning to take place.
While granting the need to formulate a theory of inductive reason-
ing on conceptual spaces, the reader might wonder why inductive
logic should be a good starting point in such an investigation. After
all, already Lakatos (1968) claimed to have had conclusively shown
that inductive logic was a degenerated research program, unable to
reach its goals. However, it has recently been argued (Groves 2016)
that Lakatos was too quick in his pronouncements, which rested on
him misunderstanding the aims of the whole program. Even more
importantly, I already mentioned in this introduction that the pop-
ular view of inductive logic, based on the way Carnap states his
goals in Foundations, does not reflect the changes that Carnap’s po-
sition — and with it, inductive logic — underwent in the decades
following the publications of Foundations. Moreover, that evolution
did not end with Carnap’s death; inductive logic keeps on chang-
ing, with its connections to statistics proving a very fertile ground
(see e.g. Romeijn 2005; Skyrms 1996). It is no longer unusual to
consider inductive logic as a branch of Bayesian epistemology, con-
cerned with formal modeling of inductive reasoning as going from
a set of assumptions — statistical assumptions, the choice of a con-
ceptual framework, etc. — to conclusions that follow from them
by virtue of the formal system. This is the attitude I also assume
throughout this thesis.
1.6 the contents of this thesis
Throughout the thesis, I do not assume a lot of background knowl-
edge from my reader. The formal apparatus of inductive logic and,
later on, Bayesian prediction, is introduced in detail, before it is used
in my own investigations. The same goes for the theory of concep-
tual spaces, which is discussed on its own before I apply some of
its elements to inductive logic. All of that should ensure that both
philosophers interested in prediction or, more broadly, philosophy
of science, and, possibly, cognitive scientists interested in the philo-
sophical applications of the theory of conceptual spaces, could read
this thesis without too much effort. I hope it will be interesting for
them both.
Chapter 2 provides a critical overview of the Basic System, fo-
cusing on the two elements mentioned in this introduction: the
proposal on conceptual frameworks, and the one on confirmation
functions. The part dedicated to conceptual frameworks contains,
most importantly, the discussion of attribute spaces. When exam-
ining parts of the Basic System related to confirmation proper, I
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focus on three elements. First, the axioms of inductive logic as ex-
pressing rationality constraints on credences. Second, the necessary
assumptions of inductive learning. Third, the additional rationality
constraints motivated by attribute spaces. This chapter has two main
arguments. The first one concerns the purported validity of the prin-
ciple of induction in inductive logic. The second argument regards
Carnapian inductive logic as a project in explication. I argue that
the changes to the notion of the conceptual framework, that Carnap
introduced in the Basic System, were in line with the goals of induc-
tive logic as a project in explication; the inclusion of attribute spaces
did bring the project closer to its desiderata.
Chapter 3 introduces conceptual spaces, starting with an over-
view of those of their features that distinguish them from Carnapian
attribute spaces. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to the two ge-
ometric rationality constraints of the Basic System. I show how the
constraints can be reinterpreted in a setting where attribute spaces
are enriched with elements taken over from the theory of concep-
tual spaces. While making the two main proposals of this chapter,
concerning Carnap’s γ and η rule respectively, I also develop a new
understanding of observations, based on the attribute spaces. This
new understanding is then carried over to the next chapter.
Chapter 4 is a first step towards answering a question motivated
by the theory of conceptual spaces, namely: can we skip the lan-
guage altogether and still do inductive logic? The starting point is
Carnap’s proposal on analogical reasoning using conceptual spaces,
and the understanding of observations developed in the previous
chapter. I develop an initial understanding of reasoning directly on
the conceptual space, by placing probability distributions over the
space itself, rather than a set of propositions. As a first step in that
direction, I provide a simple, one-dimensional model, based on the
Bayesian modeling of predictions. I conclude with some remarks
about the interactions between the conceptual space and statistical
hypotheses put over that space, regarding the concept of similarity.
Finally, chapter 5 talks about conceptual spaces in a different way,
namely as models for conceptual frameworks themselves. A pro-
posal to this end was made in the conceptual spaces community,
together with a claim that such a representation can alleviate the
problem of incommensurability of scientific theories or frameworks.
I analyze those claims and come to a conclusion that they are un-
founded, even under an assumption that every scientific framework
could be represented as a conceptual space. Moreover, in this chap-
ter I do touch upon the question of how to choose a conceptual
framework, albeit giving only a negative account of what cannot
be done; namely, we cannot choose a completely new constitutive
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framework without first framing the choice problem in yet another
framework.
The concluding remarks that follow the four main chapters come
back to the main theme of the thesis, namely how the choice of a
conceptual framework influences inductive reasoning. I finish off
with mentioning some further questions that the investigations of
this thesis have left unanswered.
2
T H E B A S I C S Y S T E M
2.1 introduction
“The Basic System of Inductive Logic” has two main threads to it.
First, it makes a particular proposal on which confirmation func-
tions should be considered rational. Second, it offers a certain way
of representing conceptual frameworks: by adding geometrical rep-
resentations of meaning. These two topics are tightly connected, of
course. Developing a new system of inductive logic means propos-
ing a set of criteria for determining which values of confirmation
functions are rational. However, every confirmation function is de-
fined on a particular set of propositions, which in turn are specified
by which concepts are used in the reasoning task: in short, by the
features of the conceptual framework assumed for the purpose. In-
ductive reasoning never takes place in a vacuum: it is always done
within a chosen conceptual framework.
Hence, the second big theme of the Basic System is the role that
conceptual frameworks — a familiar feature in Carnap’s work, e.g.
“Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (Carnap 1956) — play in de-
termining the admissible confirmation functions. What belongs to a
conceptual framework, how should its concepts and relations be-
tween them be represented? Given the choice of a conceptual frame-
work, are there any beliefs that one should hold prior to obtaining
any evidence? The main part of Carnap’s proposal here is the intro-
duction of the attribute spaces: a geometric mode of representation
of concepts of a particular framework.
When it comes to inductive logic proper, that is specifying ratio-
nal confirmation functions, two elements of the Basic System will
be discussed in this chapter: the axioms for confirmation functions,
and two special rationality constraints, the γ and the η rules, which
I will introduce in this chapter and further elaborate on in chapter 3.
Each element gives rise to two questions that need to be answered
in order to have a clear picture of Carnap’s project. First, what rea-
sons can we provide for the choice of a particular constraint? Sec-
ond, what are its presuppositions: what are we assuming about the
world when adopting a constraint?
The two extra rationality constraints mentioned above tie some
of the values of the confirmation function to particular features of
attribute spaces that belong to the conceptual framework. In con-
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sidering the factors connected to the geometry of attribute spaces,
as influencing the rational confirmation functions, Carnap allows
for what some might deem to be non-logical factors in what is still
called inductive logic. This is not a radical break with the past on
his side, but rather a natural feature of the development of his work
on confirmation functions. From the moment that more functions
than the original c∗ (see section 1.3) were admitted into the system,
factors that were not strictly logical — i.e., derivable only from the
properties of the object language — started creeping into inductive
logic, starting with the λ. This chapter shows how the Basic System
belongs to that progression.
The aim of this chapter is twofold: historical and systematic. The
historical part is meant as a comprehensive presentation of all ele-
ments of Carnap’s late inductive logic, relating them to his earlier
work. The systematic part shows how and to what extent conceptual
frameworks can be expected to determine empirical confirmation,
and what role the notion of an attribute space plays there. Addition-
ally, I discuss inductive assumptions of the Basic System. Reflecting
these aims, this chapter consists of two parts: an expository and an
evaluative one. The exposition regards the notion of a conceptual
framework developed in the Basic System. I introduce the formal
machinery and clarify some issues arising from Carnap’s text. Ad-
ditionally, I review the axioms of inductive logic proposed in late
Carnap’s work. Section 2.2 discusses conceptual frameworks of the
Basic System and section 2.3.1 presents the set of axioms for induc-
tive logic.
The evaluation in the second part of this chapter concerns the
fit of late Carnapian inductive logic to its envisioned purposes. I
discuss the notion of confirmation that the Basic System models,
focusing on the problem of induction (section 2.3.2). I present the
constraints that the geometrical elements of the conceptual frame-
work are supposed to pose on the confirmation functions available
for it. I discuss the two new rationality constraints and analyze their
conceptual origin (section 2.4). Finally, in section 2.5 I turn to the
original purpose of the inductive logic project — explication of the
notion of confirmation — and evaluate whether the new way of
representing conceptual frameworks, with the inclusion of attribute
spaces, has brought this project further towards its goal.
2.2 conceptual frameworks in the basic system
Conceptual frameworks are a recurring theme in Carnap’s writing
and a lot of his work can be seen as a gradual elaboration of this
notion. In the most general way conceptual frameworks can be de-
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scribed as different language systems adopted for a particular task.
Early on, Carnap stressed that a conceptual framework is a purely
linguistic entity, i.e. the things that the language is supposed to talk
about were not themselves taken to be a part of the framework:
“the term “framework” is now used only for the system of linguis-
tic expressions, and not for the system of the entities in question”
(Carnap 1956, p. 205). That is, a conceptual framework provides a
certain way of formulating statements about a particular domain,
for instance for asserting that individual a has the property P — but
it does not give us access to the extra-framework reality of things-
as-they-really-are, i.e. outside of being described by any particular
framework. That is, the only questions that can be meaningfully
asked about the framework concern the choice of language and its
form, but not the nature and existence of objects that the terms of
the language were meant to refer to in the actual world. Those latter
kinds of questions Carnap called external questions and dismissed
as meaningless metaphysics.
In the Basic System the domain of individuals is now a part of the
framework, but that does not mean giving up on the idea that ex-
ternal questions of a framework cannot be answered within it. The
domain of individuals that is the part of the framework is simply
the domain of the models for the language of the framework. Basi-
cally, the language of the framework now comes with its intended
models. Moreover, in the Basic System the concepts that the predi-
cates refer to are given an explicit representation. The concepts of
the framework no longer have to necessarily be thought of as predi-
cates belonging to any language; the models for the framework can
be defined using just the concepts and not the predicates that name
them.
The closest Carnap comes in the Basic System to defining a con-
ceptual framework is the following: “[a conceptual system is] a uni-
verse of objects and a system of descriptive concepts that charac-
terize the objects” (Carnap 1971a, p. 47). A conceptual framework
is no longer just a language in the sense of a vocabulary and a set
of rules governing the formation of expressions. Rather, it consists
of many additional elements, namely a geometrical system of con-
cepts (possibly, though not necessarily, supplied with a language)
to be used for studying and describing a set of individuals, together
with the said set of individuals, and a number of meta-constraints
and rules that determine the admissible confirmation functions for
propositions about those objects. Later on it should become clearer
what is meant by a “geometrical system of concepts”; for now it
suffices to say that in a conceptual framework the concepts are rep-
resented geometrically, and that in virtue of this representation the
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relations between concepts are derived from topological and metric
properties of such a “concept space”.
Conceptual frameworks are set up for the purpose of, among
others, conducting scientific investigations. Carnap describes the
paradigmatic case of such activity as follows: “The person X wishes
to assign rational credence values to unknown propositions on the
basis of the observations he has made” (1980, p. 106). To make
clearer the subsequent exposition of what such frameworks consist
of, here is a simple example of such an investigation.
Assume that Margaret, a botanist from Munich, wants to study
a new type of hydrangeas: the Hydrangea Carnapi that grow on the
alpine meadows in Bavaria. She might go on an expedition to col-
lect and record the data one specimen after another. But before the
investigation can start, a number of decisions must be made as to
the properties of these hydrangeas that are of interest, and in what
form the observations will be recorded. If Margaret wants to record
the color of specimens, for instance will a simple categorization of
white/non-white suffice, or should she use a richer set of predi-
cates? Will she record the location of each specimen, or only the
color and measurements? These are decisions that must be made
prior to embarking on the investigation itself; every answer to such
a question specifies a different part of the conceptual framework
that Margaret will use in her study.
2.2.1 Language and semantics
Although Carnap puts some stress onto the idea that concepts in
a framework do not need to belong to a language, it still aids the
clarity of exposition to present the formal apparatus of the system
using the notion of a formalized language whose predicates corre-
spond to the relevant concepts. “In this article the signs, formulas,
and sentences do not play an essential role (. . . ) at some occasions
a reference to linguistic entities is made in order to facilitate un-
derstanding” (Carnap 1971a, p. 47)1. Hence the notion of a formal
language is still present. In the Basic System Carnap works with the
same kind of formal language we recognize from his earlier works
on probability. L is a monadic predicate language with (usually
infinitely) countably many individual constants (a1, a2, . . . ), and a
standard logical vocabulary (connectives, identity, quantifiers, indi-
vidual variables). The logic of L is classical, as is the metalogic of
1 See also: “For the purposes of our system of inductive logic it is not necessary
to speak about sentences. But I think it is sometimes useful to do so, especially
for those who are more familiar with logical language systems than with the set-
theoretic system of models and propositions (events)” (Carnap 1971a, pp. 56–57).
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the system. The object language is chosen for a particular investi-
gation and therefore the choice of its particular characteristics will
depend on the nature of the investigation and its goals.
The basic predicates of the language represent primitive attributes
(properties) of the objects: “observable properties of observable ob-
jects”
(Carnap 1971a, p. 43). They are ordered into finitely many fami-
lies (although most results presented in the Basic System concern a
single-family case). Two properties belong to the same family if they
belong to the same general kind, here called a modality — for in-
stance a modality of color or age2 (see figure 1). The families are dis-
joint, i.e. it is logically necessary for any object to have at least one of
the attributes of the family and it is inconsistent for it to have more
than one of these properties. Thus, any object is fully described by
what is called a Q-predicate: a conjunction of basic predicates, one
from every family. The division of predicates into families was al-
ready mentioned in the Logical Foundations of Probability (1950,
§18c), where Carnap speaks of families of related attributes. However,
it wasn’t until the Basic System that the modalities were introduced
as the factor determining the families.
Modalities are vital for the structure of the framework, since the
division of the language into families is governed by them. As to
what they are, Carnap only says that modalities are “general kinds”
to which predicates of the same family belong, and that they can
be qualitative (e.g. color, shape, substance) or quantitative (e.g. age,
height). The best way to think about modalities is as those respects
in which objects can be judged similar or different. Another feature
of modalities is that while the attributes subsumed under them are
comparable (e.g. we can say that red and orange are more similar to
each other than blue and red), the modalities themselves are not (e.g.
it is not immediately meaningful to say that shape is more similar
to color than color is to sound).
Models for the object language are interpretation functions assign-
ing attributes (properties) to individuals from the chosen domain.
The domain is assumed to be always countable, and usually infinite,
and for every individual there is exactly one constant denoting it. If
there is more than one family of predicates in the language, models
are in fact collections of interpretation functions Z(m)L for each family
Fm. So if there are n families in the language, then each model is a
list of n functions, each assigning exactly one attribute from a given
family to every individual. The initial set of all models — that is,
2 In modern linguistics such families of predicates are referred to as domains, as in
Langacker (1987, ch. 4).
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Figure 1: Predicates and modalities
A family of predicates A modality
e.g. color names e.g. color
⇓ ⇓
Predicates Attributes
R B G . . . Red Blue Green . . .
of all the possible ways of assigning predicates to the individuals —
can be further restricted by meaning postulates assumed for a given
investigation (different kinds of postulates are discussed in sec. 5 of
(Carnap 1971a), and an example of the restriction procedure can be
found on pp. 82–83). As we will see shortly, the set of models for
a given investigation is the basis for the sample space over which
conditional probability functions representing confirmation will be
assigned.
The kinds of things that are taken to make up the domain depend
on whether we carry out an actual investigation — therefore using
applied inductive logic — or give an abstract analysis of the lan-
guage of inductive logic and thus practice pure inductive logic (see
Carnap 1971a, sec. 4). Possible domains in applied inductive logic,
for example, are the set of inhabitants of Munich at a given point
in time (finite), or the set of possible tosses of a particular coin (in-
finite). When it comes to specifying the set of individuals assumed
by pure inductive logic, Carnap is not explicit on what it consists
of. It is mentioned that in pure IL “we merely deal with unspecified
individuals a1, a2, and so on” (Carnap 1971a, p. 70). The discussion
of variable domains in model theory that can be found in section 3A
of Carnap (1971a) and its conclusion — that in inductive logic the
domain, once chosen, should be fixed and not subject to changes
of the size — suggest that within pure inductive logic the general
statements and results should be read as quantifying over all pos-
sible domains of individuals; that is that the theorems established
in pure inductive logic are supposed to hold in every domain of
applied IL.
Propositions are sets of models, that is events on the sample
space for the confirmation measures. Atomic propositions on L
correspond to atomic sentences of L , which are of the form Pjai
2.2 conceptual frameworks in the basic system 23
(where ai is an individual constant). Hence atomic propositions are
sets of those models in which Pjai holds. The class of all proposi-
tions, denoted EL , is a σ-field on the set of all models, generated
by the collection of atomic propositions (Carnap 1971a, p. 37). The
latter means that EL is closed under complementation and finite
and countably infinite unions. EL is very rich: for each class of sen-
tences of the language, there is a corresponding proposition in EL
(Carnap 1971a, p. 60). However, many propositions in EL do not
correspond to any single sentence of L . For instance, in case there
are infinitely many objects in the domain, the proposition that spec-
ifies for each object which property from a given family that object
has (also known as a state description) does not correspond to any
sentence in L , since it corresponds to an infinite conjunction of for-
mulas of the form Pjai.
Such richness of the algebra of propositions is needed in order
for it to serve its main purpose, that is serving as a base for making
predictions. Notice that because the class of propositions is defined
purely set-theoretically on the basis of the set of basic propositions,
the system of concepts can be viewed as being independent of the
syntax of the chosen language. Carnap hints at this view as well:
“Instead of saying that any particular system of inductive logic ap-
plies to a certain language, we might just as well say that it applies
to a certain conceptual system” (1971, p. 47). Once the basic con-
cepts of the investigation are given — either as predicates of the
language, or otherwise — and the set of individuals is chosen, the
set of all propositions is fully specified. For instance, the atomic
proposition Pjai is the set of all functions from the domain of indi-
viduals to the set of attributes, each function assigning the attribute
Pj to the individual ai. Even if only the set of atomic propositions
was given (rather than the sets of individuals and properties), some
infinite sequences of those could be used to represent models as
previously defined, the set-theoretical union of which would then
provide the basis for the full σ-field of propositions.3 Of course, the
set-theoretical constructions used in the process are strongly con-
nected to operations known from languages whose logic is classical.
Nevertheless, the Basic System can be viewed as Carnap’s final di-
vorce from the focus on syntax so characteristic of his early work
(and, at least partly, of his early work on probability).
Finally, connected to the issue of which models for the language
L are to be considered in a specific investigation is the concept of
basic assumptions of an investigation. Those are the assumptions
3 Note that this particular construction was not provided by Carnap, and there
certainly are other possible ways to reconstruct the set of propositions on the
non-syntactic basis of concepts.
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that a scientist makes at the beginning of an investigation and does
not question within that investigation (“He may be convinced of
their truth, or he may just accept them hypothetically; at any rate,
within this investigation he does not question them.” (1971, p. 77)).
The question of justification for these assumptions comes from out-
side of the investigation and is therefore not asked within it: once
taken on board, the assumptions are simply taken to hold. Some
such assumptions, like the A-postulates mentioned below, can be
thought of as being constitutive of the meanings of the terms used
in the object language. Others, like the statements about similarity
between the studied properties of individuals, reflect presupposi-
tions about the structure of the framework’s concepts.
Based on the discussion in section 5 of the Basic System (1971), a
rough classification of the basic assumptions would be the follow-
ing. First, there are the very specific assumptions that are incurred
for one particular investigation, and there are those made for all
possible investigations carried out in a given language — this sec-
ond kind Carnap calls the basic principles, or B-principles. The most
fundamental B-principles are those of deductive logic, that are pre-
supposed in the definition of the set of propositions for instance.
Next, there are the meaning postulates, also called the A-principles,
which are sentences true in virtue of the meaning of terms occur-
ring in them. Finally, there are principles that are more specific to
inductive logic which talk about relations between the elements of
the conceptual framework (figure 2).
Figure 2: Basic principles/B-principles
Example:
L-principles Principles of deduc-
tive logic.
The truth table for
classical conjunction.
A-principles Meaning postulates. All dogs are animals.
B-principles proper Postulates express-
ible in L : about
individuals, predi-
cates, identity.
∀x(P1x ∨ . . . Pnx)
(where P1, . . . , Pn are
all predicates of a
family F)
Postulates not ex-
pressible in L , e.g.
about similarity, dis-
tances, propositions.
Green is similar to
Blue.
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Basic assumptions may also be classified depending on whether
they can be expressed in the object language or not. The resulting
two classes of assumptions have a different effect on the structure
of the conceptual framework considered for a given investigation.
Assumptions expressible in L can be evaluated to hold or not to
hold in a model, for instance the statement that the extensions of
“red” and “orange” are disjoint (¬∃x(Rx ∧Ox)). Assuming such a
postulate amounts to taking into consideration only those logically
possible models for L where it holds — hence the postulates can
be viewed as tools for restricting the set of models for L .
The postulates of the second kind, in contrast, are not expressible
in the object language, and so cannot have such direct influence on
which models are to be considered. But such assumptions still have
an effect on the conceptual framework, for they can express facts
about the elements of the framework that L is unable to express,
for example relations between the properties (attributes) that pred-
icates of L denote (since L itself can only talk about properties
of individuals, not of attributes). Such assumptions may concern,
for instance, similarities between properties, which further on will
be seen to determine the geometrical representation of concepts of
the investigation used in determination of some of the values of the
confirmation function. Assumptions of the second kind, then, can
be thought of as providing an intended interpretation of the object
language, as well as the structure of attribute spaces for an investi-
gation.
Going back to the previous example of Margaret studying Hy-
drangea Carnapi, let us see how she goes about deciding on a lan-
guage for her study. She can chose to record the color and diameter
of flowers of each specimen she encounters, using five color predi-
cates and three predicates describing the size of the diameter. Her
object language will therefore consist of two families of predicates:
a family of color names (B, M, P, V, W) and a family of size predi-
cates (S, N, L). To each family corresponds a modality; to the first
one, the modality of color, and to the second, what we can here call
the modality of size. The predicates thus correspond to different at-
tributes: bright blue (B), medium blue (M), periwinkle (P), violet
(V), white (W), having a diameter of less than 5 cm (S), between 5
and 10 cm (N), and more than 10 cm (L). The set of individuals in
Margaret’s investigation is the set of all specimens of H. Carnapi in
Bavaria. Within the models for the language, each specimen will be
assigned one color predicate and one size predicate.
If Margaret already commands some knowledge about the plant
she studies, she might want to accept some basic principles specif-
ically for her current investigation. For instance, she might already
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know that only the smallest flowers of H. Carnapi are white; she
would therefore only consider models of her object language sat-
isfying the sentence ∀x(Wx → Sx). She might also make assump-
tions about how similar different colors are to each other, e.g. that
medium blue is more similar to bright blue than to white. This latter
principle is not expressible in the object language of Margaret’s in-
vestigation, but it will be important when she chooses the attribute
spaces to be assigned to each family of predicates.
2.2.2 Attribute spaces
Once the set of individuals and the concepts or predicates that de-
scribe them are given, the investigator faces one more choice to
make: the choice of attribute spaces that accompany the concepts.
Before the Basic System, in Foundations (1950), the language and
its semantics as described above would provide the only structure
that accompanied the confirmation functions. The Basic System in-
troduces a new element: attribute spaces. They are structures that
model the meaning of predicates, that is their intensions4. However,
Carnap does not explain why he chose this particular way of repre-
senting meanings of the predicates; the examples he provides in the
text suggest that he was familiar with the developments of similar
techniques in psychology.
There are two uses of these structures within the Basic System.
First, they encode some assumptions about the meaning relations
between predicates in a family, like the fact that predicates within
a family are supposed to be mutually exclusive. In this capacity
then attribute spaces can encode some of the meaning postulates.
The second use of the attribute spaces is in informing the choice of
some of the values of the confirmation functions.
An attribute space is “an abstract, logical space whose points rep-
resent the elementary (i.e., most specific) properties of the modality
in question” (Carnap 1971a, p. 43). Each family of predicates (at-
tributes) of the language is assigned its own space. An attribute
space for a family of predicates then is a set of points, each of
which represents the most specific value of the modality underly-
ing the predicates. For example, in the case of the family of color
names, its space will consist of points that are thought of as the
4 Using Carnap’s own words, we can say that attribute spaces provide a (partial) in-
terpretation for the language: “It is important to make a clear distinction between
models and interpretations. (. . . ) While an interpretation assigns a meaning (in-
tension) to a predicate, the models assign merely various possible extensions (sets
of individuals) to the predicate, without changing its meaning” (Carnap 1971a,
p. 56).
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most specific colors. To each predicate a whole region of the space
is assigned (there are many points that can be examples of red). Since
the families consist of mutually exclusive and logically exhaustive
predicates, every family determines a partition of its space, called
an attribute partition.
Carnapian attribute spaces can have any number of dimensions.
Carnap is not concerned with the issue of whether the dimensions
of attribute spaces have a clear interpretation. However, for all of
the examples he discusses it is in fact the case that the dimensions
can be interpreted in a natural way, for instance as width or length
in case of spaces for physical objects, or, say, scariness in a space for
representing different kinds of films.
Consider one of the simpler examples of an attribute space, a ver-
sion of which can be found in sec. 2 of the Basic System (1971): an
interval of real numbers ranging from 0 to 120. For an actual inves-
tigation about, say, the population of Munich in 2014, it can be used
as a one dimensional space for a family of predicates containing
the predicates younger than 18, 18-24 years old, 25-55 years old and at
least 56 years old. It is clear that the “resolution” of these predicates
is much less fine-grained than that of the real interval; therefore
to each of the predicates there will correspond an interval of our
one-dimensional space. Care must also be taken to ensure that the
predicates are mutually exclusive and exhaustive in the space —
which in this case would amount to, e.g. deciding where the cutoff
points between pairs of neighboring predicates lie.
Figure 3: The color space
(Image source: Wikimedia Commons)
Another, more elaborate example of an attribute space is the well-
known three-dimensional color space (figure 3), already discussed
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by Carnap in the Aufbau (1967, §90 and §118). Every color can be as-
signed a value on each of the three dimensions: hue, brightness, and
saturation. The color space then is roughly a three-dimensional dou-
ble cone, its two spikes corresponding to black and white, and the
circular cross-section in the middle being the familiar color circle.
Here, again, individual points in the space correspond to specific
shades of specific colors. No scientifically useful set of color pred-
icates will have enough names to cover the space point by point
(not only for reasons of cardinality, but also because of the proper-
ties of human perception and the available methods and devices for
measurement) — so again the names of colors assumed for a given
investigation will be assigned regions in the space. For example, the
predicate red will be assigned a region roughly neighboring to the
region corresponding to orange.
While Carnap does not give a specific recipe for choosing the par-
ticular shape of attribute spaces, the number of dimensions of an at-
tribute space seems to depend on what kind of modality that space
corresponds to, and since “the classification of attributes into differ-
ent modalities is not unique but can be made in various ways” (1971,
p. 71), there can be multiple ways of dividing an attribute space
into dimensions. For instance, the color space can be either seen as
a three-dimensional space based on the modality of color (which
is the most common interpretation), or as three one-dimensional
spaces based on three modalities of hue, brightness and saturation.
This picture in fact shows a very Carnapian approach to such issues:
choose the shape of your spaces as it suits your scientific goals.
The shape of the space and the resulting distances between points
in it can also be influenced by the theoretical basis of the language
used or the lack thereof. On the side of his discussion of using in
inductive logic a language with theoretical terms, as opposed to a
strictly observational one, Carnap provides an example of how the
introduction of theoretical language can influence the structure of
attribute spaces:
Suppose, the observer, a botanist, has so far used ILO
[inductive logic with a purely observational language].
A physicist instructs him in ILT [IL with a theoretical
language]; he explains to him the basic physical magni-
tudes, among them the frequency of light waves. He tells
him that the colors are no longer primitive attributes, as
they were in ILO, but are now defined in terms of fre-
quencies of light waves. (Carnap 1971a, p. 52)
The change of language described above brings about a change
in the shape of the attribute space. The space originally used by the
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botanist in the example was the standard three-dimensional space
based on the perceptual dimensions of hue, brightness and satura-
tion. The only dimension in the new space is the positive half-line
corresponding to different frequencies of light waves. The change
has a direct bearing on which regions are close to each other — and
hence on which predicates are judged similar to each other. For in-
stance, in the original color space regions corresponding to red and
purple were relatively close to each other, while in the new space
they are much farther apart. For Carnap the move towards using the
second space is a clear improvement; in the first place, the botanist
was not getting some things right, and then he is getting them bet-
ter.
The regions corresponding to predicates are characterized by two
magnitudes: their size and the distances between pairs of them
(both these values are calculated from the sizes of, and the distances
between, collections of minimal “building blocks” of the regions,
but this is a technicality going well beyond the scope of this paper).
Later on (see section 2.4) I will discuss how those magnitudes are
used in inductive logic to derive constraints on values of the confir-
mation functions for some simple propositions. The available notion
of distance between points of the space can be qualitative, although
quantitative, normalized distance measures — metrics — are to be
preferred: “Sometimes it is possible to go beyond merely compar-
ative judgments and make quantitative judgments. In the most fa-
vorable case one can define a quantitative (or metric) concept of dis-
tance” (Carnap 1980, p. 10). A quantitative distance measure, that is
one specifying for each pair of points an exact number representing
the distance between them, provides a more straightforward trans-
lation of its relevant values into probability assignments. Moreover,
the preference for such a quantitative concept of distance on an at-
tribute space over a comparative one (that only allows judgments
of the kind: x is closer to y than z is) fits Carnap’s general dictum
that quantitative concepts are the most powerful ones in science,
especially because they allow for formulating more general laws
(Carnap 1950, p. 12)
The concept of distance in an attribute space is tightly connected
to similarity judgments. Similarity is a relation that is, as a mat-
ter of degree, assumed to hold between attributes in the attribute
space, that is between the properties studied in a given investiga-
tion. Therefore statements about how similar two attributes are can-
not be a part of the object language L (since the latter can talk only
of which individuals in the domain have which properties). Hence
the similarity judgments belong to the metalanguage of inductive
logic.
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On the basis of the distance function on points of the attribute
space, Carnap defines distances between regions, i.e. predicates (1980,
p. 25). Note, however, that the assumption that similarities between
predicates behave like distances is a strong one, for it follows from
it that the numerical representations of similarities satisfy the condi-
tions satisfied by distance functions, like symmetry or the triangle
condition (an assumption challenged by e.g. Tversky (1977)).
Carnap’s text suggests that one may think of the relation between
the concepts of similarity and distance between predicates as being
related to each other in the same way as temperature and the com-
parative concept warmer are (see Carnap 1950, §4). In this latter case,
the comparative concept warmer than is explicated by the quantita-
tive concept of temperature, which allows for assigning numerical
values quantifying, so to speak, how warm an object is. X is warmer
than y in turn becomes the temperature of x is higher than the tempera-
ture of y.
A similar picture can be extracted from the Basic System, pertain-
ing to the relation between similarity and distances. According to
Carnap, judgments about similarity can be purely comparative or
more quantitative (1980, sec. 14). The simplest examples of compar-
ative similarity statements would be for instance “Blue is similar to
green”, or “Blue is more similar to green than red is”. Comparative
judgments about the degree of similarity include e.g. “The degree
of similarity of blue and green is equal to the degree of similarity be-
tween red and yellow”. This last statement can be also understood
as saying that the distance (in the relevant attribute space) between
blue and green is the same as the distance between red and yellow.
Once we find a way to express these distances numerically as a met-
ric on the attribute space, comparative similarity judgments can be
explicated as statements about measurable differences in distance
between regions in the space.5
Statements of similarity are one kind among the basic postulates
of the theory. The latter are the statements that are assumed within
an investigation and are not questioned throughout, regardless of
their perceived epistemological status and the reasons for accept-
ing them. That status is of no interest to the inductive logician —
see Carnap (1971a, p. 81): “With respect to any given B-principle,
we need not decide the questions whether it is analytic or not, and
whether it is a priori or not”). But it is still interesting to note that
similarity judgments can be theory-dependent rather than being
based only on directly observable properties. An example of this
5 Note also the following sentence, which concludes the section on comparative
similarity judgments: “These are comparative judgments on distances, that is,
similarities” (Carnap 1980, p. 10).
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dependence is how a botanist investigating some flowers may, on
the basis of her perceptions, judge some shades of purple and some
shades of red to be similar. But a physicist, who conceives of colors
as the visible part of the spectrum of electromagnetic waves, will
judge purple and red highly dissimilar, since they are placed at the
opposite ends of the spectrum (Carnap 1971a, p. 52).6
Where do the similarity judgments come from then? Unlike the
Aufbau, where the basic relation Rs of (recollection of) similarity
holds between elements of the “autopsychological” domain of pri-
vate sense experience (Carnap 1967, §78), the Basic System does not
mention similar restrictions on the origin of the statements of sim-
ilarity used in the construction of an attribute space. In the most
basic case similarity seems to be similarity as perceived by a single
agent, but Carnap does not seem to exclude cases of aggregation
of judgments of groups of people: in section 14 of the Basic System
(1980), metric scales for sensory qualities are mentioned, that have
been constructed by psychologists; and the methodology involved
there is usually based on investigating groups of subjects.
However, intersubjective similarity is also deemed possible. For
some investigations the similarity judgments will be informed by
the background theory — especially when it comes to highly theo-
retical enterprises — although such a situation presupposes a move
into inductive logic for a theoretical language (which in the Basic
System is only mentioned as future work): “The basis of ILO is dif-
ferent for a person of normal color vision and one with a specific
color blindness (. . . ). In contrast, theoretical physics supplies an
intersubjective basis” (Carnap 1971a, p. 52). When the underlying
modality is itself quantitative and measurable, like age or length,
the metric on such a space is immediately given by the standard
scale used to measure the magnitude in question. In this case the
statements about similarity of attributes are not needed as a prethe-
oretical basis for the quantitative concept of distance, on the con-
trary: they can be straightforwardly derived from statements about
distances.
Coming back once more to the example investigation of Margaret,
consider a possible attribute space she could choose for her frame-
6 Note, however, that the similarity judgments based on theoretical concepts like
wavelength only seem to be allowed once the transition is made from inductive
logic for observational languages to IL for theoretical languages, as described
by Carnap (1971a, sec. 2B). At another place Carnap writes: “The assignment of
points in Um to elementary properties is assumed to be such that the more similar
two qualities P and P′ are to each other (in their subjective appearance, not with
respect to their physical substrata, e.g., frequencies or electromagnetic waves or sound
waves), the nearer to each other [they are] (. . . )” (Carnap 1971a, 44, emphasis
mine).
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Figure 4: An attribute space
work. Each of the two families in Margaret’s object language comes
endowed with an attribute space. Figure 4 presents a possible space
for the family of color names used by Margaret. Unlike the full color
space, it is one-dimensional, with the colors arranged from bright
blue to white according to their white content; every point in the
space corresponds to a particular shade of blue (for presentation
purposes, the space on the picture is shown as a two-dimensional
rectangle rather than a line). Such a space can be seen as a subspace
of the full three-dimensional color space. Because it is isomorphic
to a finite interval on the real line, introducing a metric and calculat-
ing the respective sizes of regions corresponding to color predicates
is very easy; in figure 4 each region is labeled with its normalized
size in the space. We can see that the basic postulates of Margaret’s
investigation pertaining to how similar different colors are to each
other are reflected in the distances between the relevant regions in
the space. For instance, medium blue is located closer to bright blue
than to white; this fact reflects Margaret’s earlier basic assumption
that medium blue is more similar to bright blue than to white.
2.3 inductive logic of the basic system
In the remaining part of this chapter I discuss the basic machinery
of inductive logic developed in the Basic System, concerning the
assignments of degrees of confirmation to pairs of propositions: ev-
idence and hypotheses. I begin with the basic definition of a confir-
mation function and the axioms of the Basic System. Then, I discuss
Carnap’s approach to the problem of justification of inductive rea-
soning, and the status of the Principle of Instantial Relevance within
the system. Then I move on to discussing rationality constraints on
confirmation functions that are not imposed as axioms of induc-
tive logic, but rather as rules for connecting certain values of these
functions with features of the attribute spaces. Finally, I assess the
addition of attribute spaces to the project of inductive logic, seen —
in accordance with its original goals — as a project in explication.
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2.3.1 Confirmation functions
Setting up a conceptual framework, as described so far, occurs with
one goal in mind: to perform scientific investigations. The kind of
activity that this formal setup aims to model consists of gathering
observational data and forming beliefs regarding future observa-
tions. Recall the following quote:
The person X wishes to assign rational credence values
to unknown propositions on the basis of the observations
he has made. It is the purpose of inductive logic to help
him do this in a rational way; or, more precisely, to give
him some general rules, each of which warns him against
certain unreasonable steps. The rules do not, in general,
lead him to specific values; they leave some freedom for
choice within certain limits. What he chooses is not a cre-
dence value for a given proposition, but rather certain
features of a general policy for determining credence val-
ues. (Carnap 1980, p. 106)
The above contains the essence of Carnap’s opinion on, first, what
confirmation functions defined by the axioms of inductive logic rep-
resent, and second, how the axioms themselves come about.7 Con-
firmation functions are supposed to be formal representations of
“rational credibility functions” — that is (conditional) credence func-
tions that are rational to have before any evidence is accumulated.
According to Carnap, while credences may reflect temporary opin-
ions of an agent, a credibility, or initial credence, function, is “a trait
of his underlying permanent intellectual character” (1971, p. 19).
Inductive logic, then, is meant to restrict the range of possible con-
firmation functions to include only those that correspond to ratio-
nal credibility functions. Therefore each of the axioms of IL reflects
some rationality condition on credibility.
In the Basic System confirmation functions (C -functions) are con-
ditional probability assignments of real values to pairs of proposi-
tions, with the second proposition being nonempty. These values are
meant to represent degrees to which the second proposition (the ev-
idence) confirms the first (the hypothesis): a formula C (H|E) = 1/3
says that E confirms H to degree 1/3. Unconditional probability (M -
functions) is defined in a standard way as probability conditional on
tautological evidence, M (A) = C (A|>), which gives one uncondi-
tional probability function for each conditional one. The axioms of
7 Compare also (Carnap 1963b, p. 971), and (Carnap 1968), where the same view
can be found.
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the Basic System, summarized in figure 5, are the basic axioms for
Carnap functions plus symmetry with respect to individuals and
regularity. Reichenbach’s axiom of convergence is also included in
the system.
Figure 5: Axioms of the Basic System
(Second argument of C (H|E) always assumed nonempty)
A1 Axiom of the lower bound C (H|E) ≥ 0
A2 Axiom of self-
confirmation
C (E|E) = 1
A3 Axiom of the complement C (H|E) + C (−H|E) = 1
A4 General multiplication
principle
If E ∩ H is possible,
C (H ∩ H′|E) =
C (H|E)C (H′|E ∩ H)
A5 Axiom of regularity C is regular
A6 Axiom of symmetry C is symmetric (wrt individu-
als)




[C (Pjas+1|Es(Z))− rsj (Z)]
exists and is 0 for all Z in Z.
The first four axioms define conditional probability functions (see
also Zabell 2011, p. 267). Firstly, they require the values of C (H|E)
to be nonnegative (the upper bound, C (H|E) ≤ 1, is a consequence
of A1 and A3). Every nonempty proposition confirms itself to de-
gree 1 (self-confirmation). The complement axiom states that the
degree of confirmation of a hypothesis and its complement sum to
1. And finally, the general multiplication principle says that, pro-
vided the hypothesis H and evidence E are consistent with each
other, the degree of confirmation of a new, more specific hypothesis
H ∩ H′ is a product of the degree of confirmation of the initial hy-
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pothesis H and the degree to which E ∩ H confirms the restriction
H′. Note that these four axioms do not exclude cases in which the
proposition that we conditionalize on has (unconditional) probabil-
ity 0: the only assumption made is that E in C (H|E) is a nonempty
proposition, but from that alone it does not follow that only empty
propositions (that is, contradictions) will be assigned probability 0.
This latter requirement is known as regularity and I will discuss it
shortly. Given the subjective interpretation of probability functions
mentioned above, it comes as no surprise that the justification given
for the probability axioms relies on Dutch book arguments (Car-
nap 1971a, sec. 8). The rationality condition that is supposed to give
rise to the first four axioms is coherence: having a probabilistically
incoherent credence is irrational, because it commits the agent to
accepting bets that guarantee a loss.
The Carnapian statement of the axiom of regularity differs slightly
from what is more commonly known under that label, namely the
requirement that only logical falsehoods are assigned probability 0
(and, as a consequence, only logical truths can have probability 1).
Kemeny’s formulation (Kemeny 1955, p. 266) of regularity in terms
of conditional probability assignments, rephrased in the language
of the Basic System, would read: C (H|E) = 1 iff E ⊆ H, that is:
the only hypotheses confirmed to degree 1 by the evidence are the
logical consequences of the evidence (and the only hypotheses with
degree of confirmation 0 are the ones that are logically incompatible
with the evidence). In the Basic System, though, Carnap allows for
additional cases in which C (H|E) = 0 (D7-1 in Carnap 1980). First,
this can happen when the propositions in question are mutually
exclusive, which amounts to Kemeny’s regularity. Second, when H
and E both fail to be molecular propositions (which means they can-
not be constructed from atomic propositions by complementation
and finite unions). Third, when some family of predicates involved
in those propositions is infinite. The latter two cases cover the case of
propositions that correspond to quantified sentences and sentences
that in a sense are like quantified sentences.
Carnap’s rationale for assuming regularity is based on a Dutch
book style argument for strict probabilistic coherence as a rationality
requirement for credences. An agent whose credence function is not
strictly coherent — that is, not regular — can be presented with a
finite series of bets each of which she will accept, the bets being such
that no possible outcome will result in a gain for the agent; only
losses and zero gains are possible. According to Carnap, an agent
accepting such a system of bets can be deemed irrational, because
“It is clearly unreasonable to enter a contract involving the risk of
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a loss which is not balanced by the possibility of a gain” (Carnap
1980, p. 114).
The axiom of symmetry requires confirmation functions to be in-
variant under finite permutations of individuals in the domain (this
condition is also called exchangeability). Assuming individual sym-
metry amounts to saying that it does not matter for the confirma-
tion function whether a1 or a3 have the property P — it only mat-
ters how many individuals have that property. A symmetric con-
firmation function then will assign the same values to the propo-
sitions with the same corresponding structure description (given
the same evidence). A structure description is a tuple of numbers
that represent the numbers of observations of each type. Assum-
ing that the number of predicates in the only family in some lan-
guage L ∗ is n, a structure description for that language is an n-
tuple of numbers 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 in which each number si represents
how many individuals have the property Pi. A structure descrip-
tion takes note only of how many objects of each type have been
observed, not of which objects they were. Therefore each structure
description represents more than one model; for instance, the struc-
ture 〈1, 2, 1〉 — which says that there was one object of type 1,
two objects of type 2, and again one object of type 3 — represents
models where P1a1, P2a2, P2a3, P3a4 hold, as well as models where
P1a3, P2a1, P2a4, P3a2 hold.
As for the reason for accepting the axiom of symmetry, the way
Carnap talks changed between the “Logical Foundations of Proba-
bility” and the Basic System, due to a changed perspective on the
supposed logicality of the confirmation functions. In the Founda-
tions (Carnap 1950, §90) it is said that logic should not discrimi-
nate between objects, since their different empirical characteristics
are irrelevant for it, and so the confirmation function should not
care which particular individuals any proposition is concerned with.
However, in a later text that accompanies the Basic System, the
stress is shifted from logicality to rationality of confirmation func-
tions. The confirmation function is now supposed to be a formal
representation of a rational credibility function, that is: credence
prior to collecting any evidence. Since no evidence is available that
could inform us about the differences between particular individ-
uals, we should treat them equally when it comes to beliefs about
them; in particular, we shouldn’t expect any of them to have a given
property any more than other objects to have that same property
(Carnap 1971b, p. 23). Thus, the axiom of symmetry is one way of
applying the principle of indifference — which says that whenever
we do not have information distinguishing between a set of given al-
2.3 inductive logic of the basic system 37
ternatives, we should assign the same probability to each alternative
— in formulating inductive logic.
Finally, there is the axiom of convergence. While being mentioned
only briefly by Carnap (and, moreover, in the largely unedited part
of the manuscript, (Carnap 1980, sec. 20)), it will play an important
role in the subsequent discussions of the justification of induction.
Informally, the axiom can be spelled out in the following way: as
the evidence grows, the expectation for observing a Pj-object, Pjas+1,
given evidence consisting of s observations, should converge to the
relative frequency of Pj type observations among the total evidence.
In the notation of figure 5, Ez(Z) is the proposition corresponding
to the sentence that says which property Pi each of the first s in-
dividuals (a1, . . . , as) has in the model Z. Furthermore, rsj (Z) is the
relative frequency in Z of Pj objects among the first s individuals.
The axiom says that for each model Z, in the limit those two values
are equal. The axiom of convergence ensures that, loosely speaking,
regardless of what the world is like, e.g. which objects are in fact P,
the expectation for observing a P thing will converge to the actual
proportion of the Ps in the observed sample, as the sample grows
larger and larger. In other words, experience will always eventually
trump any beliefs held prior to obtaining the evidence; the agent
cannot indefinitely resist learning from experience.
2.3.2 What the axioms say: Induction
By expressing certain rationality requirements on reasoning, the ax-
ioms of inductive logic are also meant to help us in answering the
question of why is it rational to reason inductively: whether we
are justified in basing our reasoning practices on the principle of
induction. The core of what it actually means to be reasoning induc-
tively is expressed by the so-called principle of instantial relevance
(PIR). This principle spells out what it means to perform inductive
reasoning: that the more objects of a certain kind we encounter, the
stronger our expectation of encountering another such object grows.
Before I move on to the discussion of Carnap’s position on the PIR
and the justification of induction, some terminological issues should
be resolved. In the different versions of the PIR two values of a con-
firmation function are compared. Let E be the available evidence, a
and b two different individual constants, and P a predicate. Then the
relevant C -values to be compared are C (Pa|E) and C (Pa|E∩ Pb) —
the probability of observing a P-object given some evidence and
the probability of the same event given the same evidence plus
the additional observation of another P-thing. Now, to use Hum-
burg’s terminology (Humburg 1971), the requirement of positive
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relevance states that C (Pa|E ∩ Pb) should be strictly greater than
C (Pa|E). Nonnegative relevance, in contrast, requires only nonde-
creasing probability when more confirming instances are found:
Positive PIR: C (Pa|E ∩ Pb) > C (Pa|E),
Nonnegative PIR: C (Pa|E ∩ Pb) ≥ C (Pa|E).
What Carnap calls the principle of instantial relevance is Hum-
burg’s positive relevance. However, it seems that the distinction
between the two versions of different strength is not always rec-
ognized within the inductive logic community. Paris and Water-
house (2009) ascribe to Carnap an interest in merely nonnegative
relevance, as per the following quote: “It was one of the most pleas-
ing successes of Carnap’s Inductive Logic programme for attempt-
ing to base beliefs on purely logical or rational principles that In-
stantial Relevance was shown to follow from the readily acceptable
Constant Exchangeability Principle” (Paris and Waterhouse (2009,
p. 313); Constant Exchangeability Principle is the same as Carnap’s
axiom of symmetry). As we will soon see, their claim only holds for
the weaker form of the PIR.
In Foundations, Carnap (1950, §41f) formulates an argument to-
wards the justification of induction, making an attempt to diffuse
a popular argument against it. He starts by noting as a fairly com-
mon the belief that in order to justify our inductive inferences, we
have to justify a particular assumption that these inferences rely on,
namely that the degree of uniformity of the world is high. Such a
principle is definitely a synthetic one, but nevertheless very differ-
ent from the usual scientific laws. The laws of science can be tested
and confirmed, while the principle of the uniformity of the world
itself cannot be tested, for it is constitutive of what it means to em-
pirically confirm a hypothesis; therefore no testing of it is possible
without presupposing it.
Carnap claims that his inductive logic can resolve this conun-
drum. He starts by noting that contemporary philosophers agree
that a high probability of the world having a high degree of unifor-
mity, as opposed to full certainty of that statement, would suffice to
justify induction. This is because basing decisions (like the decision
to use the inductive method, which means accepting the statement
that the world is uniform) on high-probability statements is still ra-
tional; certainty of a statement is not a necessary condition for it
being rational to base a decision on it. And the problem of justify-
ing the inductive method reduces to answering the question of why
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we are rational in using induction in our reasoning and decision
making.
While for most people this reformulation does not remove the vi-
cious circle mentioned above, it does so for Carnap. According to
him, since his theory of confirmation is based on axioms that are
analytic, all of its statements are, if true, analytic. Therefore no em-
pirical confirmation is required for the theorems of IL. One of the
statements of inductive logic is in fact a formulation of the assump-
tion of uniformity of the world: “On the basis of the available evi-
dence it is very probable that the degree of uniformity of the world
is high” (Carnap 1950, p. 180) — call this last statement PU. Such an
analytic, logically true statement, taken together with the available
evidence, thus provides a rational basis for decision making based
on inductive inferences.
The reasoning above is flawed. Carnap bases his claim that PU
is an analytic statement on the fact that it follows from the axioms
of his system of inductive logic (It is a separate issue whether that
statement could be derived from the axioms at all. For instance,
what language would have to be used? I will grant Carnap this as-
sumption here, but the worry remains.). However, one of Carnap’s
own axioms before the publication of the Basic System was the Prin-
ciple of Instantial Relevance — a principle formalizing the idea of
inductive reasoning (Carnap 1963b, p. 976). The PIR is exactly the
kind of statement that presupposes some form of the principle of
the uniformity of the world: without uniformity, the PIR simply
would not be a rational rule to have. What Carnap then claims to
have proven is a presupposition of the PIR, using the PIR itself.
What we need, then, is clarity about what is it that our system
of inductive logic presupposes: so that we can check if we are not
assuming what we set out to prove. Hence, the reason for adopting
the specific axioms of inductive logic such as the PIR itself (although
in the Basic System it no longer figures as an axiom), or axioms that
entail it, need to be made explicit. Later on Carnap (1963b, p. 978)
refines his arguments in that very direction, on the assumption that
the problem of the justification of induction reduces to what reasons
can be given for accepting the axioms of inductive logic. Accord-
ing to him, however, any such reason has to be “based upon our
intuitive judgments concerning inductive validity, i.e., concerning
inductive rationality of practical decisions” (Carnap 1963b, p. 978).
Carnap 1968 postulates the faculty of inductive intuition, akin to de-
ductive intuition, that gives us insight into intuitively deductively
valid principles. Moreover, according to Carnap, the reasons for ac-
cepting particular axioms of inductive logic are a priori, that is: “in-
dependent both of universal synthetic principles about the world
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(. . . ) and of specific past experiences” (Carnap 1963b, p. 979). Thus,
for instance, we cannot quote uniformity of the world or our past
betting success as a reason for adopting a certain axiom.
Let us now take a closer look at the axioms and compare the
position of the Principle of Instantial Relevance against them. As I
mentioned above, in his earlier work, Carnap assumed the PIR as an
axiom, but did already then consider the possibility that it might be
derivable on the basis of other axioms of inductive logic and some
extra assumptions (Carnap 1963b, p. 976). Later on (1971), he quotes
a result of Gaifman (1971) that the positive PIR follows from the ba-
sic probability axioms plus the axiom of symmetry and an extra as-
sumption which itself is a consequence of the axiom of convergence.
Without the axiom of convergence nonnegative instantial relevance
can be proven, which is the result that the above-mentioned paper
of Paris and Waterhouse discuss.
From a philosophical point of view it is positive instantial rele-
vance that we should be interested in having as a valid principle, not
just its nonnegative variant. After all, the core of inductive reason-
ing lies not in the fact that more observations of a certain kind won’t
cause our expectation of another such observation to decrease, but,
rather, that the evidence will always eventually trump prior beliefs.
Gaifman’s result shows that there are two properties of probability
assignments that jointly entail positive instantial relevance: symme-
try (exchangeability) and convergence. What is it that these axioms
presuppose that is strong enough to guarantee inductive learning?
In the case of symmetry this issue has been discussed at length
by Finetti (1980) and Zabell 2005. We decide to treat a series of out-
comes as exchangeable because we see enough similarity between
them to decide that they will behave in analogous ways. And since
the axioms concern the initial credence function, where no informa-
tion is given about the nature of the individuals, they can be treated
as sufficiently similar. After all, in the absence of information about
the individuals other than that they are denoted by a set of con-
stants of our language, it makes perfect sense to assume they are
exchangeable; what we know about them makes them very simi-
lar to each other indeed. This entails that future outcomes will be
highly similar to past ones, since all of them are exchangeable. And
so the relative frequency of one kind of outcome in the past should
be a predictor of its frequency in the future: thus instantial relevance
follows. This is a very Humean picture of induction, since the adop-
tion of instantial relevance follows from the patterns among the set
of outcomes.
Sometimes, expecting any conceptual framework to allow only
for symmetric confirmation functions can look like too strong a re-
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quirement. If the framework is set up for the sake of investigating
objects of which anything is known beforehand, exchangeability
might not be a safe assumption to make and could sometimes be
replaced with partial exchangeability (see Finetti 1980). A series of
outcomes is partially exchangeable when we have reasons to treat
only some groups of outcomes as exchangeable, but not all of them.
Naturally, under partial exchangeability, instantial relevance does
not hold unrestrictedly.
If it is the idea of similarity of the past and the present that the
assumption of individual symmetry conveys, what does the axiom
of convergence contribute to the picture that allows us to strengthen
the principle of instantial relevance to its positive version? The ax-
iom of convergence says that in the limit our expectation of observ-
ing a Pj object is the same as the relative frequency of Pj (if there is a
limit to that). That is to say, our beliefs and actual frequencies will be
the same after a sufficiently long round of observations; eventually
our beliefs will converge to how the world really is.
Recall that the principle of nonnegative instantial relevance, which
is implied by the axiom of symmetry, can be expressed by the follow-
ing formula: C (Pa|E ∩ Pb) ≥ C (Pa|E). It still allows for functions
for which, as the P-related evidence grows, the expectation of P
does not change (Gaifman (1971) provides an exact characterization
of those cases) — the two values will forever be equal. This would be
the case of a very stubborn agent who refuses to change her beliefs
in the face of any amount of evidence. Nevertheless, one can never
say that she commits the mistake of treating some instances of P as
disconfirming future P observations. But still, if her expectation for
P does not change with the incoming evidence, in the limit it may
fail to match the relative frequency of P — which is a violation of
the axiom of convergence.
Therefore it is convergence that puts a limit to the agent’s stub-
bornness in holding on to beliefs and pushes her to change them in
face of evidence. Since the axioms are also supposed to correspond
to rationality requirements on initial credence, it seems that being
able to learn from experience — being able to reason inductively —
counts as a rationality requirement for Carnap. What is being said
is in fact the following: if you refuse to change your initial beliefs
no matter what evidence comes along, you are being irrational. But
can such a requirement be a priori, given that Carnap expects all
reasons for accepting the axioms of IL to be a priori? While the idea
that we should always try to match our beliefs to the actual state of
the world could maybe be argued to be an priori statement, the as-
sumption that relative frequencies in sample series of observations
are a good predictor of how the world actually is can not be an a
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priori statement: this is a statement of the high uniformity of the
world, after all. Hence, we run into circularity again.
The question is: is such a circularity as damaging to the whole
project as the Carnap of Foundations would probably see it? It does
not seem so to me. Carnap’s move from the logical conception of
probability towards one that stresses the interpretation of inductive
probabilities as rational credences, seems to have come from an un-
derstanding that inductive reasoning is something done by agents
who make certain assumptions about the world. The assumptions
of the ideally rational agents might be less substantive — or, rather,
less language-specific — than assumptions of actual reasoners, but
they are still present. It seems that one of those assumptions that is
always present, whenever we try to model an agent that will, in fact,
learn from experience, is the PU or some form of it; this makes any
possible derivation of PU in the system of inductive logic much less
interesting than Carnap would originally expect.
Moreover, in the Basic System there are other places where quite
substantive assumptions about the world creep into the system; this
time from the conceptual framework itself. The geometric rationality
constraints, presented in the next section, bind some values of the
confirmation function to features of the attribute spaces. However,
attribute spaces are far from what the Carnap of Foundations would
deem logical; they carry very specific assumptions about the rela-
tions between properties in the world. Hence, in more than one way
can the Basic System be seen as relaxing strict aprioristic require-
ments of the early Carnap’s inductive logic, in favor of essentially
an approach focused more on studying the relationship between the
assumptions made about the world, and the degrees of belief that
should follow from those assumptions.
2.4 additional rationality constraints
So far I have focused on explaining the roles that the different el-
ements play in a conceptual framework and identified the restric-
tions placed on the confirmation functions by the axioms of the
theory. It is time to turn to the question of whether and how other
constituents of the framework can determine the values of rational
confirmation functions. Since the axioms of the Basic System were
supposed to correspond to rationality constraints on initial credence
functions, I will also try to identify the corresponding conditions in
case of the other elements of the system that restrict the ranges of
values for the admissible confirmation functions.
Once the whole conceptual framework is in place — that is, a lan-
guage, its semantics, and the attribute spaces related to its families
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— there are some values of the confirmation functions that will be
determined by the framework itself. That means: given your con-
ceptual system, there are certain beliefs that are rational for you to
hold. This focus of the conceptual framework is particularly salient
in Basic System; the degrees of confirmation really depend on how
the framework is set up in all its aspects, not just in terms of what
language it uses. The structure of the language is no longer the only
assumption made by the agent; the language is to some extent inter-
preted, i.e. some of the meaning of the terms is made explicit in the
framework, through the attribute spaces.
In order to say which values of the confirmation functions can be
deduced from the attribute spaces and what the form of the ratio-
nality constraints is, some further formal concepts need to be intro-
duced. In “The Continuum of Inductive Methods” (Carnap 1952),
the expectation for observing one object of any given kind did de-
pend only on the number of predicates in the language (or a given
family, if there is more than one in L ). The values of the uncondi-
tional probability assignmentsM for all propositions Pja (the belief
of observing an object of the kind Pj prior to acquiring any evidence)
were taken to be the same and to be equal to 1/k for predicates
belonging to families of k predicates: M (Pja) = 1/k. In the Basic
System that assumption was lifted, and the values of the uncondi-
tional probability function for a single observation are now tied to
the geometrical structure of the attribute space underlying a family
of predicates.
Carnap introduces two new sets of parameters, γ and η. The two
kinds of parameters are the values of the confirmation function for
some specific, simple propositions. The γj for a predicate Pj is the
unconditional probability of observing a Pj object — the prior ex-
pectation of an outcome of the type Pj: γj = M (Pja). Parameters
of the type ηjl concern pairs of predicates Pj, Pl; ηjl measures how
much the knowledge that an object of type Pl was observed influ-
ences the belief that a Pj will be observed. Hence ηjl is the ratio of
the probability of observing a Pj thing given the evidence consisting





M (Pja ∩ Plb)
M (Pja)M (Plb)
.
The ηjl is supposed to measure the strength of the analogical effect
between Pj and Pl: whether and how much our expectation for a
Pj observation changes after observing a Pl object when no other
evidence is available. Another way to think about the η’s is as a
coherence measure (Shogenji (1999) proposes the same formula to
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measure pairwise coherence of beliefs). Under this interpretation ηjl
measures the extent to which Pjb and Pla cohere with each other, in
other words: how surprised we are to see Pjb after observing Pla; the
higher the ηjl, the less surprising the second observation. Note that
once the values of all ηjl’s are given, other values of the confirmation
function need not be uniquely specified.
The new parameters are used to describe a wider class of confir-
mation functions: the λ-system known from the Continuum turns
out to be a special case within the Basic System. Now the λ-parameter
can be specified only for languages in which the ηjl values are the
same for all pairs of predicates, leading to the λ− γ continuum, a
further generalization of the λ continuum. The prediction rule of the
λ− γ continuum was already shown in section 1.3; the γi parame-
ter there is the same γi as here. The Basic System not only allows
for different priors for different predicates; it also specifies exactly
what those values should be, which is what I will turn to now.
2.4.1 The γ rule
Can there be any rational requirements or suggestions as to which
γ and η values one should choose for specific predicates given one’s
conceptual framework? Recall that each family of predicates comes
equipped with its attribute space consisting of points representing
the most specific properties of the modality associated with that
family. The space is a geometrical representation of the concepts
that belong to the family. Moreover, as we saw, the notion of distance
in the space was derived from certain judgments on the similarity
of concepts, which means that concepts that are considered similar
will be closer to each other in the space than the dissimilar ones. The
same holds for points: in the color space two distinct shades of red
(represented by two points) may be closer to each other than they
are to some green point, because they are considered more similar.
Now assume that the only information we posses about the con-
cepts in question is whatever is given by the space. Assume, more-
over, that every collected piece of evidence will thus correspond to
a point in each space (for each family of predicates). Say, an object
is observed that is of this specific shade of red, that specific length,
and that specific age such that these characteristics correspond to
particular points in the color, length and age spaces. Are there any
specific qualities that we can expect to occur in the observed sam-
ples more often than others? The principle of indifference (see sec-
tion 2.3.1) suggests that this should not be the case, for we just as-
sumed to know nothing specific about the objects of our investiga-
tion. But then, if no point of the space is more likely to occur than
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any other, what should our expectation be for an observation to fall
into a given region (say, a region corresponding to the predicate
red)? It should be proportional to the size of the region itself. And
the simplest form of such a dependence would be to have the initial
expectations equal the normalized sizes of the regions.
Should the use of indifference considerations in the above argu-
ment make us feel uneasy? The well-known objections to the princi-
ple of indifference (see Gillies 2000, ch. 3) concentrate on the prob-
lem of there being too many alternative ways to carve up the prob-
lem space. To illustrate, consider the question of which color a ball
randomly drawn from an urn of unknown composition is. Well, it
can be either red or non-red, say, and since we have no reason to ex-
pect either of these alternatives more than the other, the probability
of the ball being red would be 1/2. But there is also no reason to
prefer any of the following mutually exhaustive sets of possibilities:
that the ball is red, blue, or neither red nor blue. Therefore the prob-
ability of the ball being red would be 1/3. Which set of alternatives
should be the privileged one?
In the case of the present indifference considerations concerning
attribute spaces and the distribution of the possible evidence, how-
ever, such worries do not arise precisely because the space and the
way it is divided by its attribute partition do offer a particularly
privileged set of mutually exhaustive alternatives. Granted, those
alternatives have most probably not been chosen in a purely a pri-
ori way; after all, languages and their spaces are set up pretty much
freely by their users, more often than not on the basis of some more
general theories. Hence, there could be other attribute frameworks
chosen for the same quality, with regions of different sizes, lead-
ing to different probability assignments. But relative to the choice of
the conceptual framework, indifference considerations still dictate that
the prior expectation for any given observation should be somehow
related to the size of the region corresponding to the relevant pred-
icate.
The attribute space is supposed to offer a privileged set of indivis-
ible alternatives — i.e. particular qualities associated with a given
modality — which can be later on divided into a family of predi-
cates in various ways via attribute partitions. For example, the color
space provides all the possible ways in which an object can have
a color — be colored, so to speak — the ways that are considered
possible within the chosen conceptual framework. In this sense at-
tribute spaces are a constitutive a priori (in the sense discussed by
Friedman (2001)) element of a conceptual framework: they define
what is empirically possible at all. And in that sense they provide
all the alternatives — relative to the choice of the conceptual frame-
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work. The space then can be divided into an attribute partition in
any way, the flat prior over the points translating into different as-
signments of probabilities for different predicates.
In the Basic System two rules are presented that connect certain
features of attribute spaces with the values of the γ and η parame-
ters. The first, called the γ rule, specifies the exact connection that
I have concluded the above argument with. It relates the size of
the region corresponding to a predicate Pj with the prior proba-
bility M (Pja) of observing an object of this type. The larger the
region, the higher the probability, and because the attribute spaces
can come with a metric on them or not, the γ rule covers a number
of cases (note also another application of the principle of indiffer-
ence, in part (a)):
Rules for γ, based on width. Let F be a family of k attributes;
let Pj and Pl be two distinct attributes in F.
a. Suppose that we have no quantitative concept of
width for the space U, but we see no reason (with
respect to the attributes Pj and Pl themselves, dis-
regarding any knowledge about their distribution
among the individuals) for expecting the occurrence
of one of these attributes more than that of the other,
then we take γj = γl. It follows that, if the described
relation holds for each pair of distinct attributes in
F, we take each γ = 1/k.
b. If we have no quantitative concept w but are able
to make the comparative judgment that Pj has a
greater width than Pl, then we take γj > γl.
c. If we have a quantitative (not necessarily normal-
ized) width function w, then we take γj = aw(Pj),





d. If we have a normalized width function w, then we
take γj = w(Pj).
(Carnap 1980, p. 34)
The indifference considerations that led us to the γ rule had the
following form: because we have no reason to think that certain
kinds of outcomes will occur more often than the other, the chances
should be equally distributed over the points of the space. And as-
suming that no point in the space is more likely to occur among the
evidence, the chance of the first observed object to correspond to
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a point falling into any given region should be proportional to the
size of that region. But what would happen if we did in fact have
reasons to expect some of the points in the space to be represented
in the evidence more often than others?
Let us assume that I am about to commence an investigation con-
cerning the age of customers in a certain bar on Thursdays. Prior to
the investigation, I might have some idea as to what kind of people
visit bars on Thursdays. It does not seem unreasonable to expect to
see more people of age between 19 and 24 than people between 50
and 70 years. But the structure of the age space — a real interval
ranging from 0 to greater than 120 roughly — and the natural met-
ric on it are such that that the second age interval, the 50–70 one,
is wider than the first. And so the γ rule would prescribe a higher
expectation for observing a person from the second age group.
However, what if I chose for the age space in the bar investigation
not the “natural” interval, but something derived on the basis of
similarity judgments? Given my preconceptions about Thursday bar
customers, when asked to compare people of different ages, I would
probably think that, say, two people aged 20 and 30 are less similar
to each other than two people aged 40 and 50, when it comes to
properties such as being regular bar customers on a week night.
And so the distances and widths in a space resulting from these
kinds of judgments would be different than in the original simple
interval, and the γ rule would no longer tell me to expect seeing a
student in that bar less than seeing an older person.
What the above argument really shows is how important the pro-
cess of choosing an attribute space is. Our preconceptions and pre-
vious knowledge about the objects of the investigation — including,
for instance, some beliefs about how dominant some properties are
in a population, or hidden shared properties — are reflected in what
space is chosen for that investigation. The shape of the space will
in turn influence the values of the confirmation function resulting
from applying the γ rule to the chosen space. One has to be very
careful about making explicit the choice of the attribute space and
the reasons for that choice. The current example illustrates as well
that just because the attribute space provided a set range of alterna-
tives for the application of the principle of indifference, it did not at
all make the whole procedure fully objective.
The idea behind requirements like the γ rule (and the η rule to
be discussed next) is that one should match one’s beliefs to the
structure of one’s concepts. But where does the conceptual structure
come from in the first place? Well, some beliefs one has prior to em-
barking on a specific investigation. Only in the idealized case can
there be an agent whose conceptual framework is given prior to pos-
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sessing any other knowledge or presuppositions about the features
of the world. In real life rather we encounter an ever-descending
chain of conceptual dependencies, with one investigation after an-
other shaping our conceptual frameworks, which in turn are used
again and again to gather more knowledge. Objective expression of
ignorance is impossible; ignorance can only be stated with respect
to some previously specified set of possibilities, like in the above
discussed cases of applications of the principle of ignorance. And
so eventually we must stop at an arbitrary point in the chain and
ask: relative to this particular conceptual framework — wherever it
may come from — what should my beliefs be? It is that question
that the γ rule provides a part of the answer for.
2.4.2 The η rule
As for the way the values of the ηjl parameters should be tied to
any feature of the space, we have already mentioned that the ηjl’s
are supposed to measure the analogy effects between pairs of pred-
icates in the presence of rather limited evidence. Hence, the η rule
is supposed to enable the confirmation functions to capture induc-
tive reasoning that uses analogy by similarity between predicates
belonging to the same family. The general idea behind such reason-
ing is that if two predicates are similar to each other, observing an
object of the first kind will to some extent raise not only our expecta-
tion of observing another one of the same kind (instantial relevance),
but also the expectation of observing an object of the second kind.
For instance, consider a family of predicates Hippie, Hipster, and
Businessman, partitioning the set of possible humans. If I take hip-
pies to be more similar to hipsters than to businessmen, upon seeing
a lot of hippies in a bar, I will expect to see more hipsters than busi-
nessmen in there as well. Notice, however, that if similar predicates
were to receive such an “analogy boost” every time a relevant ob-
servation was made, we would run a risk of violating the axiom
of convergence. Carnap’s solution to this problem was to limit the
analogy effect to cover only the cases in which one observation is
made – hence the introduction of the ηjl parameters
8 – and to let the
effect fade out as more evidence is considered (the rate at which it
would diminish was left as an open question (Carnap 1980, p. 45)).
Carnap’s way of spelling out this notion of similarity of predi-
cates proceeded through the use of attribute spaces. Recall that what
the distances in a space are capturing is exactly the similarity be-
8 It is worth noting that some authors choose to give up convergence rather than
restrict analogy (Costantini 1983; Huttegger 2016). See also Niiniluoto (1981), who
however retracted that position (Niiniluoto 1988).
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tween different qualities. Hence analogical reasoning and distances
between predicates could be somehow tied to each other. Which
is what the η rule, the second space-related constraint in the Basic
System, specifies:
Rules for the similarity influence. Let F be a family of k
basic attributes; let Pj, Pm, Pn be three distinct attributes
in F. If we have a quantitative distance function d for the
attribute space U of F, let djm =D f d(Pj, Pm).
a. Suppose that we have no quantitative distance func-
tion for the attribute space U of F, but we see no
reason for regarding the attribute Pj as more simi-
lar or as less similar to Pm than to Pn, then we take
ηjm = ηjn.
b. If we have no quantitative distance function, but are
able to make the comparative judgment that Pj is as
similar to Pm as to Pn, then we take ηjm = ηjn.
c. If we have no quantitative distance function, but are
able to make the comparative judgment that Pj is
more similar to Pm than to Pn, then we take ηjm >
ηjn.
d. Here (and in the subsequent rules (e), (f), and (g))
it is assumed that we have a quantitative distance
function d for U. If djm = djn, then we take ηjm =
ηjn.
e. If djm < djn, we take ηjm = ηjn.
f. If djm = dln, then we take ηjm = ηln.
g. If djm < dln, then we take ηjm = ηln.
(Carnap 1980, p. 42)
Another rationale for adopting the η rule can be spelled out in
the following way. If the outcomes so far were concentrated in one
region of the space — whether it be one that corresponds to one or
more predicates — then it seems reasonable that also in the whole
population that kind of concentration will occur. Therefore we will
expect future outcomes to fall close to the region into which the
previous observations tended to fall as well.
While the γ rule gives a straightforward recipe for establishing
the values of γjs, in the case of connecting conditional probabilities
to distances between regions, to Carnap, introducing a straight nu-
merical constraint on the values of C (Pjb|Pma) given the distances
between regions for Pj and Pm seemed too arbitrary. Therefore he
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formulated only a qualitative constraint, which he called the η rule:
if the attribute Pm is closer to Pj than Pn is, evidence of the form Pma
will have a greater influence on the posterior for Pjb afterwards than
observing Pna. Thus the rule does not say how much our expecta-
tions should be influenced given the distance between two predi-
cates. Rather, the rule gives a comparative restriction: different dis-
tances should lead to different analogical effects, and the ordering
of magnitudes should be preserved. Hill and Paris (2013) accuse
Carnap of including extra-logical information into inductive logic
through the introduction of the η parameter. However, Carnap is
quite clear in the Basic System about what the main project there
is: assigning rational degrees of belief to propositions, given the
agent’s conceptual framework — and now attribute spaces are part
of the conceptual framework, just as previously only predicates of
the language were there.
One might ask whether the η rule models the kind of reasoning
by analogy that is most commonly known under that term. At first
glance it does not seem so, since Carnap’s version of such reasoning
is concerned only with analogy within single families of predicates.
The most straightforward example of analogical reasoning, however,
would be rather different. Usually after concluding that two things
agree on a number of (sufficiently relevant) properties, we predict
that the first object will agree with the second on yet further prop-
erties. We therefore learn new things about a lesser known object
through its similarity to an object that is better known to us. In the
Carnapian setting, on the other hand, we predict properties of ob-
jects entirely unknown to us beforehand.
There are quite a few works in inductive logic that tackle anal-
ogy, both in the Carnapian and the more classic versions, e.g. (Hill
and Paris 2013; Kuipers 1984b; Romeijn 2006; Skyrms 1996) Hill
and Paris introduce their own Analogy Principle which is a some-
how more general version of Carnap’s η rule. Carnap considers only
the probabilities given very scant evidence, and the Analogy Prin-
ciple states that the analogical effect should be present regardless
of what the evidence consists of. However, those authors prove that
for languages with more than two predicates and a specific way of
calculating the degree of similarity between the Q-predicates of the
language, such a stronger principle gives rise to a very uninterest-
ing range of confirmation functions, that moreover violate regularity.
Another proposal in which relevance between predicates is taken to
imply influence in expectations no matter what the size of the evi-
dence, can be found in Romeijn (2006, p. 256). For a full overview
of literature on analogy in inductive logic, see section 4.2.
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We saw that the γ rule was ultimately based on indifference con-
siderations regarding the distribution of possible observations on
the attribute space. That is, once we conclude that our expectations
should be distributed evenly over the attribute space, the expecta-
tion for an observation to fall into any given region will depend on
the size of the region, which is what the γ rule prescribes. In the
case of the γ rule then, the reasoning was the following: because
I know nothing about whether this shade of red is more likely to
be observed than that shade of red, I will assume they are equally
likely to be observed. In the case of the η rule, such considerations
can no longer be applied. That is because we do have information
that distinguishes between some points: I observed this particular
shade of red, and other shades of red differ with respect to how far
from the observed one they are located in the space.
The present discussion will now be concluded with one last obser-
vation regarding the Carnapian space-based rationality constraints
on confirmation functions. One might ask to what extent should an
attribute space determine the values of rational confirmation func-
tions. The γ and η rules talk only about expectations given scant
evidence (none in the case of the γ and one data point in the case
of the η rule). Naturally, as the evidence grows, it will be harder to
estimate the effect of the analogy influence. For example, consider
a one-dimensional attribute space with seven linearly arranged re-
gions of the same size corresponding to the predicates P1 to P7 in
their natural ordering. In that space P7 is slightly closer to P5 than
P2 is, which means that observing a single P7 object should have
a stronger effect on the expectation for P5 than observing a single
P2 object. But how should we adjust our expectation for P5 once we
make more P2 and P7 observations, and what to do more specifically
if we observe significantly more P2s than P7s? The P7s are closer, but
the P2s are more numerous — which factor should have more influ-
ence on our beliefs?
Contrary to the approach of Hill and Paris, it seems that as the
evidence grows, we should rely less and less on our initial precon-
ceptions about the concepts involved (which in our case are given
by the structure of the space), and more on the power of experi-
ence — which is also what the axiom of convergence requires in the
long run. This is a familiar picture: recall how, in the λ-continuum
of inductive methods, different confirmation functions were given
by varying the parameter λ that measured the agent’s readiness to
learn from experience, by assigning weights to the “logical” and
“empirical” components of the confirmation function. Perhaps an-
other continuum-like system is looming behind the attribute spaces
in which the strength of analogical effects would diminish as the
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sample grows? A proposal to this extent, although having its own
problems, will be mentioned in section 4.2. However, the complexity
of the situation does not really allow for having only one parameter
govern such analogical functions — if it is possible to formally han-
dle such a picture at all. I will come back to these issues in chapter
4.
2.5 attribute spaces as a part of an explicatum
After investigating the use that Carnap puts attribute spaces to, we
can ask more generally whether the addition of the spaces brings
his inductive logic project closer to its goals. Some authors, most no-
tably Hill and Paris (2013, p. 1296), criticize Carnap, stating that the
addition of attribute spaces meant introducing non-logical elements
into inductive logic, therefore abandoning the project of developing
pure inductive logic based on an uninterpreted language. However,
instead of thinking of inductive logic as an attempt to establish a
purely logical theory of confirmation, in this section I focus on look-
ing at the Basic System as proposing an explication of the concept of
confirmation and on how the addition of attribute spaces influenced
that project.
Carnapian inductive logic was from its start a project in explica-
tion (Carnap 1950, §1). The main target of the explication was the
concept of confirmation, and through clarifying that concept also re-
lated concepts, like probability and inductive reasoning, were to be
analyzed. It seems fitting then to ask the following question: if and
in what ways did the addition of attribute spaces to the system of
inductive logic accord with the goals that inductive logic conceived
of for itself? The talk about the increase in the success of Carnap’s
inductive logic project can be a red flag to some, since Carnapian in-
ductive logic had been subject to a lot of criticism aimed at its very
core, voiced for instance by Lakatos (1968). Here is not the place to
get involved in this discussion; the aim of this section is much more
modest. I am not trying to say whether Carnapian inductive logic
was successful as a whole; right now I am only evaluating what role
attribute spaces can be seen to play in the explication that inductive
logic aims at.
To this end, we can evoke Carnap’s own four criteria for eval-
uating explications, i.e. similarity, exactness, fruitfulness, and sim-
plicity (Carnap 1950, §3). The explicandum in this case is the “in-
formal”, “everyday” concept of confirmation (as used by scientists
rather than laymen). The explicatum — the formal concept of con-
firmation — is built using a whole range of notions, like conceptual
framework or models for a formal language. And in that sense at-
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tribute spaces are part of the explication of confirmation. The Basic
System tells us that confirmation is a relation between propositions
spelled out within a conceptual framework; and that the meaning
relations between the concepts in the framework can be represented
geometrically via attribute spaces.
To start with, consider the desideratum of simplicity. At the first
glance one might think that it was negatively affected by the in-
troduction of attribute spaces into the system: even more confirma-
tion functions are now deemed rational by the system than it was
the case with the Continuum, which required an addition of more
parameters. Moreover, the notion of a conceptual framework was
made more complicated by the addition of attribute spaces. Never-
theless, there is an obvious trade-off with the positive impact of the
changes to the system on the other desiderata, and the inevitability
of such trade-offs had been already acknowledged by Carnap him-
self (1950, p. 7). Given what the additions to the system are achiev-
ing in terms of making it more precise and more general, they are
actually a surprisingly simple means to do so.
Although Carnap (1963b, p. 936) mentions precision as possibly
the most important of the requirements for explication, Justus (2012,
p. 168) argues that the importance of precision lies in the fact that
it tends to increase fruitfulness. Hence in cases when introducing
more precise concepts doesn’t increase fruitfulness, the requirement
of precision can be relaxed. Carnap’s mentioning how a precise, nu-
merical statement of the η rule would be undesirable is a good ex-
ample of such a possibility of tension between precision and fruit-
fulness.
A fruitful explicatum is one that facilitates the formulation of
“universal statements” (Carnap 1950, p. 7), i.e. empirical laws or
(in case of purely formal explicata) logical laws. Does the addition
of attribute spaces increase the Basic System’s power to formulate
general statements about confirmation? Yes, since the γ and η rules
are a generalization of sorts, spelling out a universal connection
between meaning relations among predicates and features of the
confirmation functions. Moreover, the addition of attribute spaces
opens inductive logic up into a number of new themes and appli-
cations, making possible the formulation of general principles con-
cerning extra concepts like analogy. Attribute spaces are also a more
principled framework for meaning postulates than simple sentences
of the object and metalanguage of inductive logic.
The desideratum of exactness demands the explicatum to be for-
mulated in such a way that it fits “into a well-connected system of
scientific concepts” (Carnap 1950, p. 7). Outside of purely formal
sciences, this requirement does not mean fitting into an axiomatic
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system, but rather connecting to other established scientific theories,
as well as increasing the precision of the target concept (Justus 2012,
p. 165). Speaking most generally, explication is understood as re-
placing an imprecise concept with a precise one. How the attribute
spaces can be seen to increase the precision of the Basic System is
most immediately seen in the case of the γ rule. The γ rule specifies
exactly how to choose a priori probabilities for each predicate. The
connection between the meaning of terms used in inductive reason-
ing and the confirmation of (at least some of) the statements of the
language has been made more precise, while the scope of the expli-
catum is now also broader because of the acceptance of uneven γ
values for different predicates.
When it comes to connecting the explicatum to a broader network
of scientific concepts, it turns out that attribute spaces serve induc-
tive logic well again. If there was a well-established scientific theory
that employed structures similar to attribute spaces and, of course,
employed them to the same purpose, i.e. modeling the meaning of
terms, then the exactness of the Basic System could be said to have
increased through the addition of the spaces. And in fact the theory
of conceptual spaces, which will be properly introduced in section
3.2, does provide a model of meaning in terms of geometric repre-
sentation of concepts.
Finally, the question of how similar the explicatum is to the con-
cept being explicated, that is the concept of confirmation proper,
and the auxiliary notions like conceptual framework, or, most im-
portantly, attribute spaces. When it comes to confirmation proper,
the introduction of the attribute spaces into the system does work
towards making the explicatum more similar to the “everyday” con-
cept of confirmation. Atrribute spaces provide an exact way to mea-
sure relevance between predicates, therefore enabling the Basic Sys-
tem to approach the problem of analogical reasoning. This means
that the new explicatum can cover more cases in which the expli-
candum might have been used; the old explicatum (i.e. the one in
Foundations) deemed statements concerning confirmation via anal-
ogy as improper. This means that the similarity of the new expli-
catum to the “informal” concept of confirmation is greater that the
one of the explicatum that can be found in Foundations or even the
Continuum. A similar thing can be said of the introduction of the
γ rule and the idea that the initial probabilities can be different for
different predicates. The addition of this rule allows the system to
cover cases in which scientists have reasons to start with uneven
initial probabilities, for instance as a result of earlier studies.
The similarity of conceptual frameworks in the Basic System to
the thing they are supposed to represent could be lower, if the re-
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sulting concept of confirmation was very satisfactory. This is be-
cause similarity is not a very tight desideratum for confirmation;
if precision and fruitfulness of the explicatum less similar to the
explicandum are higher, then the less similar explicatum can be pre-
ferred. That comes from the fact that the explicandum is always a
vague or imprecise concept, and sometimes also an incoherent one,
and a very tightly fitting explicatum might inherit those undesirable
qualities.
However, if there was a proof or a good reason to think that con-
ceptual frameworks of the Basic System were a particularly good
model of the conceptual structures used by actual scientists, then it
would be an argument in favor of greater similarity of the concepts
of the Basic System with what they are supposed to explicate. It
would be the case even more so if we found that the way that the
attribute spaces predict the concepts used by agents relate to each
other, is actually a good representation of how they relate in real
life.
Not only similarity would be influenced then; we have noted
above that other desiderata would also be positively affected if there
was a reason to believe that actual conceptual frameworks look
somewhat similar to what Carnap proposes, or that human con-
cepts are structured somewhat like attribute spaces, and if there was
a well-established theory where notions like attribute spaces were
already put to use. And as a matter of fact, we do have such a rea-
son, provided by recent developments in cognitive science, under
the theory of conceptual spaces.
At the time when Carnap was introducing them, the attribute
spaces might have seemed a bit ad hoc, in spite of the earlier use
of them by van Fraassen and Stalnaker. The recent developments in
cognitive science provide us with an argument that as far as the ex-
plicative project of Carnapian inductive logic goes, attribute spaces
do make a positive contribution within it. In spite of the differences
between conceptual and attribute spaces, which I will elaborate on
in the next chapter, there is a clear correspondence which allows
us to draw the conclusion about the explicative success of the Basic
System brought about by the inclusion of attribute spaces.
2.6 conclusion
In order to introduce and critically analyze the rationality require-
ments that Carnap puts on the confirmation functions in regard to
the attribute spaces, I presented a brief overview of the late Car-
napian notion of a conceptual framework as developed in the Ba-
sic System. I analyzed the different roles that the elements of the
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framework play and the connections between them. I argued that
inductive logic as a project in explication did in fact benefit from
the introduction of attribute spaces. Another important conclusion
of the exposition in this chapter is that the new additions in the late
Carnapian inductive logic could be characterized as non-logical, i.e.
not related solely to the formal characteristics of object language
on which confirmation functions are defined. In the Basic System
Carnap continues to allow for more elaborate specifications of the
initial conditions in which a confirmation function is defined. We
are no longer asking: what should my beliefs be, given that I use
five predicates to label my observation, but rather: what should my
beliefs be, given that I use those five predicates, and they mean this-
and-that, and they are related to each other in this-and-that way.
In other words, Carnap allows for more, and more substantive, as-
sumptions about the world to creep into the way the confirmation
function is defined.
The main topic of this chapter was to present and analyze the
Basic System on its own, rather than to engage with possible im-
provements on Carnap’s proposal. The question of how to further
build on Carnap’s use of geometric representations of concepts will
be approached in the following two chapters. There are many loose
threads in those parts of this project that are concerned with the
more classical approach to inductive logic, i.e. one that does not
make use of attribute spaces. However, in this thesis I am concerned
with what can be done once the spaces are included in the concep-
tual framework used to perform inductive reasoning.
3
T H E B A S I C S Y S T E M O N C O N C E P T U A L S PA C E S
3.1 introduction
Carnapian inductive logic was a project in explication, its explica-
tum being the notion of confirmation of a hypothesis by evidence.
In the previous chapter I argued that, as far as that project was con-
cerned, and given Carnap’s own criteria for what makes an explica-
tion a good one, the introduction of geometric representation of con-
cepts into inductive logic did in fact contribute to the project getting
closer to its goal, which was developing a good explication of con-
firmation. What aids this conclusion is the fact that there is another
well-established theory, the theory of conceptual spaces, which man-
ages to connect the kind of geometrical structures used by Carnap
in the Basic System, to a number of results in cognitive science, psy-
chology, and linguistics.
This chapter elaborates on this connection between the Basic Sys-
tem and the theory of conceptual spaces. On the superficial level,
the parallel is obvious: both theories make use of geometrical repre-
sentations of concepts. On the other hand, the two approaches are
very different when it comes to their overarching aims and methods.
The latter means that we need to exercise caution when implement-
ing any elements of the conceptual spaces theory in inductive logic.
Some of it can, nevertheless, be achieved, and this chapter develops
some proposals in this direction.
In section 3.2 I briefly discuss the theory of conceptual spaces and
compare conceptual spaces to Carnap’s attribute spaces. Section 3.3
elaborates on the comparison between the two approaches, start-
ing with the conception of the three levels for cognitive representa-
tions. After discussing possible ways in which the theory of concep-
tual spaces and inductive logic could connect, I turn to developing
two proposals for such interaction. Section 3.4 analyzes Carnap’s
γ rule in a setting where the underlying conceptual space is di-
vided into regions with vague, thick boundaries. Section 3.5.1 elabo-
rates on Carnap’s suggestion on how to interpret his own analogical
constraint on confirmation functions applied to a one-dimensional
space: the η function (section 3.5.1). I introduce the idea of point-
sized observations to the Basic System (section 3.5.2), and after a
few motivating examples (section 3.5.3) and modeling choices (sec-
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tion 3.5.4), I define the new η function in section 3.5.5. Section 3.6
concludes the chapter.
3.2 conceptual and attribute spaces
On the face of it the Carnapian attribute spaces and Gärdenfors’ con-
ceptual spaces are the same kinds of entities: geometrical structures
consisting of a set of points organized along a number of dimen-
sions. However, the details of the proposals differ, as well as the
use that is made of these structures. Some differences result from
different goals that the projects pursue. Others stem from the fact
that the theory of conceptual spaces is more developed than the at-
tribute spaces within the Basic System. For instance, Carnap’s gen-
eral goal — developing inductive logic, that is an analytic theory
of confirmation — did not allow for using the empirical resources
that cognitive science can rely on. Therefore Gärdenfors’ project is
very different from Carnap’s, which perhaps is why the connections
between these two lines have not been discussed.
The theory of conceptual spaces is a framework for cognitive rep-
resentations, which postulates that concepts are modeled as regions
in multi-dimensional spatial structures. This kind of approach to
representing concepts has been previously put to various uses in
psychology, cognitive science, and linguistics. The recent efforts by
Gärdenfors (2000, 2014) have stimulated some interest in the theory
also among philosophers (see Douven and Decock 2015). Concep-
tual spaces are meant as a level of representation that belongs in
between the associationist and symbolic levels. These three levels of
representation will be discussed in the next section, for now what
needs to be said is that the conceptual level is postulated to be en-
tirely independent of any linguistic forms of conceptual representa-
tion: conceptual spaces are meant to be “ontologically prior to any
form of language” (Gärdenfors 1990, p. 83).
Conceptual spaces are primarily collections of domains — that
is sets of dimensions that relate to each other in a particular way
— rather than just collections of points. According to Gärdenfors
(2000, p. 24), a “conceptual space is defined (. . . ) as a set of quality
dimensions with a geometrical structure.” It is more important that
a space spans over a number of dimensions, and what dimensions
these are, than what points exactly it is built from.
The dimensions of a space are called quality dimensions. Within
this program, there is a strong tendency to expect the dimensions
of various conceptual spaces to have a natural interpretation, as op-
posed to reflecting arbitrary ways of organizing points that repre-
sent possible combinations of qualities. Just as in Carnap’s attribute
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spaces, “the dimensions correspond to the different ways stimuli are
judged to be similar or different” (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 6). However,
where Carnap allowed for a lot of freedom in choosing the shape of
the attribute space to model a given modality, conceptual spaces are
subject to more requirements. If the Carnapian investigator chose to,
she could have assigned, say, a two dimensional space to the modal-
ity of color, and cut it into the concepts needed for her investigation.
The theory of conceptual spaces, on the other hand, would require
those two dimensions to have a clear and natural interpretation, just
as hue or brightness had in the three-dimensional color space.
Moreover, for Carnap, what comes first is the concepts — predi-
cates of the chosen language — and only once they are given and
divided into families, can attribute spaces be assigned to them. Even
if we don’t think of concepts as being represented in any language,
it is still the case that an attribute space is chosen for a given family:
family of concepts or a family of predicates. It is not the case that
an attribute space is given prior to the set of concepts to be used in
the investigation, for the concepts to be created by partitioning the
space. In the theory of conceptual spaces this direction is reversed;
rather than the space being assigned to a given set of concepts, the
concepts are carved up as regions of a given space. Thus, the space
and the dimensions over which it spans are more basic than the con-
cepts. Moreover, it is possible that not every region in the conceptual
space will be part of a specific concept; in other words, the theory
of conceptual spaces does not require the spaces to be partitioned
into concepts in an exhaustive way.
Dimensions that the conceptual spaces span over are not made
equal, either. Gärdenfors introduces a distinction between phenom-
enal (psychological) and scientific (theoretical) interpretations of di-
mensions (Gärdenfors 2000, pp. 8–9). This distinction is correlated
with two different aims of cognitive science, namely modeling con-
ceptual structures of existing agents, and creating conceptual struc-
tures for artificial agents. Once such a distinction is in place, we
can look in a different way at Carnap’s example of the botanist
who, informed by a physicist, switches from the perceptual color
space to one based on lengths of light waves. Now that situation
can be described as moving from a phenomenal conceptual space
(of either just the botanist, or the intersubjective space of, say, the
English-speaking population) to a theoretical one. In the beginning
the botanist was modeling his own perceptual concepts. In the sec-
ond part of the story there is a switch towards a scientific conceptual
space; the theory of light waves is being modeled via a conceptual
space.
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Depending on whether a conceptual space is constructed for an
artificial agent, or it is meant as a reconstruction of the concep-
tual structure of particular (groups of) subjects, the dimensions of
the space will be specified using entirely different procedures. In
the first case, the dimensions can simply be chosen, in a way sim-
ilar to the one postulated by Carnap. In the second case, when
our goal is to represent concepts used by actual agents, the di-
mensional structure of the conceptual space will have to be recon-
structed from the agents’ behavior. In most applications, construct-
ing conceptual spaces using data consisting of similarity compar-
isons between qualities or objects — candidate points in the con-
ceptual space — is done with the use of multi-dimensional scaling
(MDS) techniques (see Borg and Leutner 2010). MDS takes as in-
put (ordinal or numerical) similarity ratings on pairs of stimuli sup-
plied by an agent or a group of agents (in the latter case the average
of the individual ratings can be used). A conceptual space is con-
structed in which each of the stimuli is assigned a point, and the
distances between them are matched to the similarity ratings. The
main difficulty in the search for such a conceptual space is striking
the right balance between how well the distances represent the sim-
ilarity data, and how many dimensions the resulting space has. The
fewer dimensions, the more easily they can be assigned a natural
interpretation. On the other hand, more dimensions usually means
more accuracy.
When it comes to similarity and distances between points and re-
gions in the spaces, in the theory of conceptual spaces as well as
for Carnap these two notions are tightly connected in the same way:
the more similar two concepts are, the closer their corresponding re-
gions will be to each other in the space. Also, the more similar two
objects falling under such concepts are, the closer the points that
represent them will be in the space. Gärdenfors adheres to the psy-
chological tradition and takes similarity to be a notion that can be
derived from distances in the attribute space (See Gärdenfors 2000,
pp. 20–21, 44). However, he stresses that similarity measurements
should always be understood as relative to a particular cognitive
model (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 110). There are no similarity judgments
that would be absolute in the sense of not being formed against
a particular (model of) conceptual representation. Reconstructing a
conceptual space from a set of similarity judgments can be therefore
thought of as revealing that very conceptual structure against which
the similarity judgments were formed.
Conceptual spaces are assumed to have much more structure to
them than Carnap’s attribute spaces. An attribute space in the Basic
System is a collection of points divided up into an attribute par-
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Figure 6: Voronoi and collated Voronoi diagrams of a two-dimensional
space
tition, and that is virtually all we know about it. Attribute spaces
are homogeneous in the sense that no points in them are desig-
nated in any way. The regions in conceptual spaces, on the other
hand, are assumed to not be homogeneous. Within the conceptual
spaces program there have been proposals to introduce designated
points (paradigm cases) and even designated regions (paradigmatic
regions; see Douven et al. 2013). These developments are motivated
by the prototype theory of categorization in the semantics of natural
language, which states that some members of a category are more
representative of it, and that the evaluation of category membership
occurs on the basis of comparison to these prototypical examples
rather than lists of necessary and sufficient conditions.
The division of the space into regions is then determined by a
Voronoi tessellation that matches each point in the space with the
prototype closest to it. A Voronoi tessellation (see figure 6) is a
way of partitioning any space into regions, on the basis of a distin-
guished set of prototypical points. All other points in the space are
assigned a region on the basis of which prototype is closest to them.
The underlying metric need not be Euclidean. Douven et al. (2013)
proposed a construction that generalizes Voronoi diagrams, based
on the idea of prototypical regions rather than points. The resulting
diagram is in effect a collection of standard Voronoi diagrams, each
corresponding to a case when every prototypical region was repre-
sented by a single point belonging to it. This leads to the regions
in collated Voronoi diagrams having thick boundaries (see figure
6), since points lying on those boundaries are closer to one or the
other prototypical region, depending on which point of the latter is
taken to represent it. The authors proceed to base their account of
vagueness on this construction.
A Voronoi tessellation of a space with a euclidean metric on it di-
vides that space into convex regions, i.e. regions such that whenever
two points are in them, all points lying in between those initial two
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will also belong to the same region (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 88). This
fact is used as an argument in favor of the prototype-based division
of conceptual spaces into concepts, for convex regions have a privi-
leged status in the theory of conceptual spaces. In his book, Gärden-
fors (2000, p. 71) formulates the criterion P, which states that natural
properties are the ones that are assigned a convex region in a con-
ceptual space.1 Having such a clear criterion for natural properties
is supposed to be one of the main strengths of the theory, allowing
for instance a principled approach to the problem of projectibility:
on this account, only the natural properties, represented by convex
regions, are available for inductive inferences. Of course this pro-
posal in itself does not constitute the final answer to the problem
of projectibility, for it is always the case that a conceptual space can
be constructed that will make the concept in question correspond
to a convex region. Rather than completely solved, the problem of
which properties are natural, then, has been reduced to the problem
of which conceptual space is natural for a given set of qualities.
In the Basic System the attribute spaces were freely chosen by the
investigator. For Gärdenfors this kind of freedom is only possible
when we are constructing a conceptual space for a scientific theory
or an artificial agent. When the task is to represent conceptual struc-
ture of a nonconstructed agent, e.g. to model the perceptual space
for human color vision, staying close to the data is the more im-
portant goal. This example, already discussed above, illustrates an
important difference between the goals of the two theories.
Carnap’s program is prescriptive, focusing on recommending a
range of rational confirmation functions, while Gärdenfors’ goal is
to provide a platform for describing cognitive representations: “The
epistemological role of the theory of conceptual spaces (. . . ) is to
serve as a tool in modeling various relations among our experiences,
that is, what we perceive, remember, or imagine” (Gärdenfors 2000,
p. 5). Hence, conceptual spaces are to be mainly used to form em-
pirically testable predictions regarding human cognition.2 Moreover,
they are to be used as a tool for constructing conceptual structures
of artificial agents. Interpreted in a comparably empirical setting,
Carnap’s postulates such as the γ and η rules, which each prescribe
a particular connection between rational expectation and the struc-
ture of the attribute space, would turn into empirical statements,
testable against the behavior of actual agents.
1 To be precise, the exact formulation of the criterion involves the notion of a do-
main of a conceptual space, but this distinction is inessential to this thesis.
2 Mainly, but not exclusively, as the wealth of applications in philosophy, machine
learning, and linguistics shows (for a good selection of examples, see Zenker and
Gärdenfors 2015).
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This comparison provokes a question of whether and how the
two theories — the theory of conceptual spaces and Carnap’s in-
ductive logic enriched with attribute spaces — should interact, or
inform one another. One of the main topics of this thesis is precisely
these kinds of interactions. An example was already given in section
2.5, where I showed how the empirical success of the theory of con-
ceptual spaces, even in spite of its different goals, supplies a good
reason to regard Carnap’s own addition of the attribute spaces to
inductive logic as a felicitous move. The rest of the thesis will de-
velop a few other examples, based on the general idea of replacing
attribute spaces in Carnap’s system with conceptual spaces, that is,
for instance, spaces with a richer structure to them. From now on, I
will drop the terminological distinction between attribute and con-
ceptual spaces, using the two terms interchangeably. Whenever it is
relevant whether the space used is thought of as a representation of
cognitive structure of actual agents or not, it will be disambiguated.
However, when developing the ideas pertaining to “plugging in”
conceptual spaces into inductive logic, we have to be mindful of how
far one can go without contradicting the main tenets and goals of in-
ductive logic. For instance, it was mentioned in the previous section
that while regions in Carnapian attribute spaces are homogeneous,
conceptual spaces (at least for certain kinds of modalities) have been
proposed as structured around a set of prototypical points or re-
gions. Such an assumption is very well supported by studies on
human categorization (e.g. Lakoff 1987), but it is not entirely ob-
vious whether we should take this as a reason to jump right into
reformulating the Basic System to cover this insight.
Our course of action here should depend on the kind of project
that we are involved in — and in this thesis, that project is pri-
marily inductive logic in the Carnapian spirit. As mentioned above,
conceptual spaces (at least for certain kinds of qualities, like the per-
ceptual ones) have been proposed to be structured around a set of
prototypical points or regions. Such an assumption is very well sup-
ported by studies on human categorization (e.g. Lakoff 1987), but
it is not entirely obvious whether we should take this as a reason
to jump right into reformulating the Basic System to cover this in-
sight. Inductive logic is ultimately interested in conceptual spaces
that scientific theories are based on, not necessarily the ones that
best approximate human cognition. And for the most part scien-
tifically useful concepts will be sharp and defined with the use of
necessary and sufficient conditions rather than by the similarity to a
prototype. However, when vagueness is essential to a scientific con-
cept, conceptual spaces with prototypes could still be useful, and
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section 3.4 presents a proposal on how to accommodate this kind of
spaces for the γ rule.
In conclusion, the theory of conceptual spaces differs in some
crucial respects from the way that Carnap utilizes similar structures
in the Basic System; both in terms of the structural properties of
spaces, and the general aims of the whole project. However, as I
hope to have shown in this section, a cautious approach to enriching
Carnap’s project with the insights brought from cognitive science,
can be developed. The rest of this chapter, as well as the following
one, constitute the current attempt to substantiate this claim.
3.3 three perspectives on inductive reasoning
The theory of conceptual spaces is a proposal on how to model rep-
resentations used by cognitive systems. As already mentioned in the
previous section, conceptual spaces are supposed to provide a mid-
dle ground level for representations, lying in between the symbolic,
language-oriented level and the associationist approaches usually
based on neural networks. Hence, there are three ways to model
cognitive representations: the symbolic, the conceptual, and the sub-
conceptual (for a more thorough overview, see Gärdenfors 2000, ch.
2).
Within the symbolic paradigm, information in cognitive systems
is represented as symbols and information processing as symbol ma-
nipulation. A good example of this kind of approach are research
programs in which agents’ belief states are modeled as sets of sen-
tences of a formal language, and changes in belief states as opera-
tions on those sets. Modeling inferences is one of the main applica-
tions of the symbolic paradigm, and Carnapian inductive logic can
be thought of as belonging to that tradition as well, since it aims at
representing inductive inferences using a formal language.
In the subconceptual, or associationist, paradigm, it is the associa-
tions between various kinds of sensory inputs that form the base for
cognitive representations. The dominating approach in this vein is
connectionism, which uses artificial neuron networks as the systems
carrying out the representation tasks. Cognitive processes are repre-
sented through patterns of activities in the networks rather than as
symbol manipulation.
Finally, there’s the middle level postulated by Gärdenfors. At the
conceptual level, the representations are to be modeled by means of
multi-dimensional geometrical structures: the conceptual spaces, as
introduced in the previous section. The spaces are meant to be “on-
tologically prior to any form of language” (Gärdenfors 1990, p. 83),
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while languages belong to the symbolic level as they represent con-
cepts by means of linear combinations of symbols.
Each of these three levels offers a perspective on the way in which
information from the world is represented in a cognitive system.
We talk of perspectives here for a reason: they are different ways of
modeling the same phenomena, rather than three completely sepa-
rate systems. We can approach many different aspects of cognition
with this sort of three-perspective view, including the question of
induction. One way to think of inductive reasoning is as the kind of
reasoning that takes us from observations to predictions: from the
observed to the yet unobserved. What does “the observed” mean
on each of the three levels of representation?
On each level, observations are represented in a different way (see
Gärdenfors 1994). On the subconceptual level the observations are
inputs from sensory receptors. The information provided by the re-
ceptors is thought of as uninterpreted data within which similarities
need to be identified in order to distill information and prepare it
to be processed by the conceptual and symbolic modes of represen-
tation. The way the observed is recorded on the symbolic level, on
the other hand, is as expressions of a language. For instance, in the
Basic System, observations are recorded using primitive expressions
of the language, that is sentences containing basic predicates refer-
ring to “observable properties of observable objects” (Carnap 1971a,
p. 43).
On the conceptual level “observations are not defined in relation
to some language but characterized by an underlying conceptual
space” (Gärdenfors 2000, p. 204). Recording an observation means
assigning a point in the conceptual space to the observed object.
However, the claim that the conceptual level does not depend on the
linguistic one does not amount to saying that it would be impossible
to describe making observations as assigning points in the space to
objects with the use of formal, symbolic means. What is claimed (see
Gärdenfors 2000, p. 43) is that cognitive systems are be capable of
representing qualities of objects without presupposing a language
to describe them in.
We can think of inductive logic simply as a way of describing in-
ductive reasoning, that fully belongs to the symbolic level of repre-
sentation. Basic System is a set of rules that prescribe certain con-
straints on one’s beliefs, given the structure of one’s conceptual
framework. In spite of the fact that some parts of the conceptual
framework, i.e. the conceptual spaces, do not fully belong to the
symbolic level, the formalization of the inductive process as such —
recording the observations, making predictions — is done in a fully
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symbolic way, spelled out in terms of propositions and sentences of
a formal language.
By broadening the notion of a conceptual framework to include
geometric representation of its concepts, Carnap has taken the first
step towards employing the conceptual level in the formal explica-
tion of inductive reasoning. However, what the current proponents
of the conceptual spaces approach have to say about induction is
not fully relevant to what the Basic System started; there are two
different projects involved here. Again, the difference boils down
to the normative and descriptive goals of the two proposals. The
question that Gärdenfors wants to answer using conceptual spaces
is: how do people reason inductively? If cognitive representations
are modeled by conceptual spaces, how to describe actual inductive
reasoning in the same terms? The original Carnapian project was
stronger than that. Explication has a necessary normative compo-
nent; the new, sharper concept is supposed to help us correct our
previously faulty and misguided reasoning, where it was indeed
faulty and misguided.
There are multiple ways in which I can conceive of continuing the
Carnapian program while taking into account what we have learned
about conceptual spaces. I will list a few of them now, and explore
some of those in the remainder of this thesis. The first would be a
rather minimal type of interaction. Keeping the Basic System as it is,
the theory of conceptual spaces could simply be used to inform the
choice of spaces for the chosen language, especially concerning the
choice of natural predicates (and, hence, natural spaces). Of course,
this kind of approach would only work for someone subscribing
to a more “naturalized” view of epistemology, who would agree
with Gärdenfors that there is in fact a way to pin down the right
conceptual spaces, i.e. the ones which lead to picking out the truly
projectible properties. Those conceptual spaces are supposed to be
the ones that match human perceptual apparatus. I will not explore
this line of thought in this thesis.
Secondly, we could keep the Basic System as it is, with its lan-
guage, spaces, and geometrical constraints on confirmation func-
tions, and simply add more structure to the spaces, following the
findings of the theory of conceptual spaces that I reported on in the
previous section. Section 3.4 is an example of a project in this vein,
investigating what degrees of belief would the γ rule prescribe if the
underlying conceptual spaces were divided into vague concepts.
The third project would be to modify how observations are ac-
counted for in the Basic System, and recording them directly on
the conceptual space, in the spirit of the conceptual level of repre-
sentation. This means that instead of, say, recording an observation
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by means of a sentence The first observed object was red, we would
record it by specifying which exact shade of red — corresponding
to a single point in the conceptual space — was observed. A sim-
ple proposal belonging to this category will be developed in section
3.5, where I study the impact of such a fine-grained view of the
observations on Carnap’s own η rule.
The fourth way of making a move outside of the Basic System
towards an inductive logic that takes seriously into account the
middle level of representations, would be try to answer the Car-
napian question: what should my beliefs be, given my conceptual
framework? — in a setting where the conceptual framework is rep-
resented solely in terms of a conceptual space, without the accom-
panying language. In this setting, there would be no more confirma-
tion functions as we know them from the standard inductive logic,
for the belief functions would now be defined over the conceptual
space itself, rather than the propositions. Chapter 4 is an investiga-
tion of this line of thought.
3.4 the γ rule on conceptual spaces
The γ rule is one of Carnap’s two geometric rationality constraints
introduced in the Basic System. The prescription given by the rule is
that prior to obtaining any evidence, our expectation for observing
an instance of a predicate should be proportional (and in case of
there being a normalized distance measure on the space, equal) to
the size of the region corresponding to that predicate in the attribute
space.
In section 2.4 I argued that the formulation of the γ rule is an
effect of Carnap’s applying indifference considerations to the set of
points of the attribute space — the set of the most specific ways of
realizing a quality in question — and concluded that one should
assume what ultimately amounts to a flat prior over the attribute
space. Given a normalized measure over the attribute space, such a
prescription translates into the expectation for any given predicate
being equal to the size of the corresponding regions in the space.
Now, following one of the above leads for continuing Carnap’s
program while taking into account the theory of conceptual spaces,
I will consider the question of how the prescriptions would change
if the γ rule was applied to spaces with a richer structure than
Carnap’s attribute spaces, for instance spaces where boundaries be-
tween predicates are thick, due to them having prototypical regions
rather than just prototypical points. Since the regions have thick
boundaries, we need to find a new way of calculating their size,
which will then be used in the calculation of prior degrees of belief,
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in accordance with the γ rule. The general idea behind the solution
presented below is that the borderline cases of a concept belong to
that concept only to a degree (graded membership), therefore they
contribute to the resulting probability mass also only to a degree.
The results presented below are a formal elaboration of this idea.3
A conceptual space is the same kind of object as an attribute space,
i.e. a set of points spanning over a number of dimensions, and in this
respect nothing changes when it comes to the prescription given by
the γ rule: once a normalized measure is introduced over a concep-
tual space, the sizes of regions can be expressed in terms of that mea-
sure, and degrees of belief in the corresponding propositions can be
calculated directly. Decock, Douven, and Sznajder (2016) follow Car-
nap (1980, sec. 14) in taking the Lebegue measure as a default mea-
sure over a conceptual space.4 Formally, let S be an n-dimensional
conceptual space and IT an indicator function for a subset T of S,
i.e. IT(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) = 1 whenever 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ T, and 0 otherwise.
We introduce a normalized measure µ∗(T) on subsets T of S, based
on the Lebesgue measure:
µ∗(T) =
∫ +∞
−∞ · · ·
∫ +∞
−∞ IT(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) dx1 · · · dxn∫ +∞
−∞ · · ·
∫ +∞
−∞ IS(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) dx1 · · · dxn
.
We can define such a normalized measure, because conceptual
spaces of measure 0, as well as infinite ones, were excluded by Car-
nap. Conceptual spaces used in inductive logic were assumed to be
finite.5 Moreover, Carnap (1980, p. 22) allowed only certain kinds
of regions as the basic regions in a conceptual space, one of the
requirements there being that every such basic region should have
a positive measure — which would be impossible in a conceptual
space of measure 0.
Furthermore, because normalized Lebesgue measures are proba-
bility measures, application of the γ rule can be straightforward: for
every predicate with a corresponding region P, the degree of expec-
3 This section presents some of the work in (Decock, Douven, and Sznajder 2016).
Refer to the full paper for more details.
4 To be more precise, Carnap suggested the Lebesgue measure as the default for
spaces which are subspaces of Rn. For conceptual spaces with a different struc-
ture, for instance discrete ones, or ones where points are organized into a tree
structure, a different kind of measure could be more natural. This is unsurpris-
ing, since the Lebesgue measure is a generalization of the concept of length, area,
and volume in R,R2,R3, respectively, and is not concerned with generalizing
those concepts to environments with a different topology.
5 “Furthermore, I usually assume that the region of an attribute, and even the
whole attribute space U, is finite. (Otherwise, a normalized width function for U
is not possible.)” (Carnap 1980, p. 21).
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Figure 8: Graded membership in a one-dimensional space
0
1
tation for observing a P object prior to gathering any evidence, that
is γP, should be µ∗(P).
However, as already mentioned in section 3.2, conceptual spaces
can be thought of as being carved up into regions with thick bound-
aries, that is into a collated Voronoi diagram (see section 3.2). In
such a space, whether a point belongs to a region, is a matter of de-
gree: clear cases of a concept belong to that concept to degree 1, clear
non-cases belong to it to degree 0, and the borderline cases have
varying degrees of membership. The rough shape of the graded
membership function MRed for the concept Red generated by a pro-
totype region (indicated by a curly brace below the conceptual space)
in a one-dimensional space is shown in figure 8, where each point of
the space is assigned a degree to which it belongs to the Red region
(for formal details on the function, see Decock and Douven (2014);
note however that the exact derivation of the function proposed by
these authors is not essential here). Note that the borderline cases —
indicated by the dotted areas in the space — belong to some degree
to both regions whose border they are on.
How should prior degrees of belief for predicates be derived from
the sizes of regions with such thick boundaries? The proposal of De-
cock, Douven, and Sznajder (2016) is to weigh each point’s contribu-
tion to the expectation for the first observation to fall in any given
region by that point’s degree of membership in that region. Another
way of looking at it is to note that in this form the γ rule still pre-
scribes matching beliefs to the sizes of the relevant regions in the
space, but the way in which the sizes of the regions are calculated
has been modified to account for the enriched structure of the space.
The points in the thick boundaries between regions contribute to the
calculated sizes in varying degrees, and in a way count as overlap
between the regions.
Going back to figure 8, the size of the Red region can no longer
be assumed to simply be its Lebesgue measure, since its borders
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are now vague and the whole region is something more than just a
sharp interval. The borders between Red, White and Blue are now
thick (as indicated by the curly brackets at the bottom of the space).
The new way of calculating the size of such a fuzzy region takes the
size to be equal to the area below the graded membership function
(after renormalizing). To put things formally, let MP be the graded
membership function of the concept P. Note that this function is
defined on all points of the space, not just the ones that belong to
P to some positive degree; it is just that clear non-Ps are assigned
degree of membership 0. Applying the above considerations, the γ
rule now prescribes that the degree of belief that the first observed
object will be an instance of P, a predicate associated with the region
TP, should be equal to:
γP =
∫ +∞
−∞ · · ·
∫ +∞
−∞ MP(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) dx1 · · · dxn∫ +∞
−∞ · · ·
∫ +∞
−∞ IS(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) dx1 · · · dxn
.
Decock, Douven, and Sznajder (2016) generalize the above even
further, in order to cover the application of the γ rule to product
spaces, that is conceptual spaces consisting of a number of sub-
spaces. Since the notion of a product space is not used in this dis-
sertation, I will not pursue that direction here.
It turns out, then, that Carnap’s simple idea: match your prior
for a predicate to how big the region corresponding to that pred-
icate is in a conceptual spaces, can be applied also to conceptual
spaces that have a slightly different structure than the original Car-
napian ones. As mentioned in section 3.2, the ultimate usefulness
of the above proposal to the inductive logic project will depend on
whether there are good reasons to assume that some scientifically
useful concepts are in fact vague, contrary to Carnap’s general as-
sumption that concepts used in inductive reasoning should always
be sharp. I do not think that vague concepts need be always out of
the question; sometimes we may choose to start with a vague con-
cept and aim at finding out the way to sharpen it in a useful way
by applying it to our inductive reasoning and studying the effects
of that.
3.5 the η rule on conceptual spaces
Another way that the insights from the theory of conceptual spaces
could be brought into the Carnapian inductive logic project, as men-
tioned in 3.3, would be to bring into the Basic System the way that
individuals are conceived of in conceptual spaces: namely as points
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in the space. More precisely, the theory of conceptual spaces as-
sumes that there is a location function that assigns to every object
a value on each of the space’s dimensions. Hence, individuals are
represented as points in the space. For Carnap, however, observ-
ing an individual amounted to recording its properties using only
the predicates of the chosen language; this is a more coarse-grained
view on making an observation, since to every predicate there cor-
responds a region in the space, consisting of many points, i.e. more
specific values of the quality in question.
In this section I will present a small-scale investigation of the
above idea of fine-graining the space of observations within the Ba-
sic System. The setting will be narrowed down to studying Carnap’s
η rule and η curve: the proposals he made regarding reasoning by
analogy based on similarity of predicates. I will show how Carnap’s
own η curve is readily interpretable into the fine-grained observa-
tions setting.
The η rule provides restrictions on degrees of expectation for ob-
serving an object of any kind, given that one observation has been
made already. For instance: given that Margaret has observed a peri-
winkle flower (and nothing else so far), what should her expecta-
tion be for observing a bright blue one? Carnap’s answer is that it
should be functionally dependent on the distance between the peri-
winkle and bright blue regions in Margaret’s attribute space. Hence,
the η rule’s prescription was that the analogical effect between two
predicates, P and Q, i.e. the extent to which making a P observa-
tion should positively influence the expectation of observing a Q
thing, should be governed by the distance between the correspond-
ing regions in the attribute space. And because distances in attribute
spaces reflect similarities between qualities, the η rule can also be
read as: the more similar two properties are, the more inductively
relevant they will be for each other.
The aim of this section is to generalize Carnap’s example of how
to make the application of the η rule precise in a one-dimensional
setting. His proposal for the one-dimensional conceptual space was
that the values of the confirmation function conditional on one ob-
servation made in that space, could be read off from a function
called the η curve, which represented the strength of the analogy
influence between predicates. The proposal I make in this section is
based on the η curve, hence I will discuss it in more detail before
discussing the idea of fine-grained observations in this setting.
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3.5.1 Carnap’s η curve
Recall that the prescription given by the η rule in the Basic System
was only comparative: different distances between predicates Pj and
Pl should lead to different values of ηjl, where:
ηjl =M (Pja ∩ Plb)/M (Pja)M (Plb).
Carnap (1980, sec. 17) discusses a simple example intended to
show how that general suggestion can be made more precise in the
case when the underlying space is one-dimensional. The idea is to
find a function (to be called an η function) such that, applied to the
distance between two predicates Pj and Pl, it will yield the value of
ηjl.
The question is what kind of function to choose, and the η curve is
a proposal to that end. Given a one-dimensional attribute space, the
η curve is a function that, given one specific observation, for each
point in the space returns the value of the η parameter for that point;
i.e. it tells us how much the expectation to observe an object falling
on that point has changed after making the first observation. If it is
more than 1, the observation was positively relevant for that point,
if it is below 1, the relevance was negative. The interesting thing
about the η curve is exactly that it is defined over the points of the
space rather than just the predicates; this is what makes it so readily
applicable to thinking about a fine-grained space of observations.
Figure 9: Carnap’s η curve






Figure 9 is a simplified version of the picture provided by Car-
nap (1980, p. 51). The example is based on a family of 2k + 1 predi-
cates P−k, . . . , Pk, partitioning a one-dimensional attribute space into
equally sized intervals. The distance function over the space is as-
sumed to be normalized. The expectation for any given predicate
prior to making any observations can be read off from the width of
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the corresponding region, in accordance with the γ rule. Function
C0 in the figure is the probability density function on the attribute
space prior to making any observations — the kind of flat density
that was postulated in my discussion of the γ rule in section 2.4.
An object of type P0 is observed and the η curve — C1 in the fig-
ure — represents the density function after making that observation.
According to the η rule, the closer to P0 a region is, the higher the
corresponding η value will be. This means that C1 has its highest
point right in the center of the observed P0 and it slopes down to-
wards the edges of the attribute space. At this point, however, there
are a number of decisions to be made regarding the shape of the
η curve. First thing to decide is how high should it get above P0
(the principle of instantial relevance will only tell us that the mean
value of the η curve over P0 will be above 1, that is that a P0 observa-
tion is positively relevant for another P0 one). Second, how slowly
should it descend to the left and right. Third, how low should the
η values get in regions far away from the one corresponding to the
observation, that is, what the value of η∗ in the picture should be.
Finally, related to the second question, is the issue of how far away
to the left and right from the maximum of the curve should the
curve flatten into a (almost) constant function (bearing in mind that
the fact that the curve does flatten out like this was also a decision
that Carnap made).
The idea behind the last question is the following. Some of the
predicates are so far away from the observed P0 — are so dissimilar
from it — that the expectation for them should not be positively
influenced by making that one P0 observation. Hence, after a certain
distance away from P0, the expectation for any predicate is the same
with and without having any similarity effects in play. That distance
— d∗ in the picture — is called the range of the similarity influence.
The η value for every predicate beyond d∗ is the same and equal η∗.
The choice of a particular value of d∗ was for Carnap a “matter of
subjective attitude” (Carnap 1980, p. 56), and could be influenced
for instance by how many predicates the space was divided into.
The question remains of what kind of functions could be an ap-
propriate choice for such η curves. Given the above description,
they should be unimodal, symmetric, normalized on the concep-
tual space (since the η curve is meant as a probability density) (see
Carnap 1980, p. 58). Carnap’s suggestion, pictured in figure 9, was
to use a normal distribution, with the mean falling over the center
of the observed predicate, lifted up by η∗ (and renormalized). Using
the normal distribution means having an easy control over the value
of d∗ (by manipulating the standard deviation); Carnap’s choice in
74 the basic system on conceptual spaces
example calculations was for d∗ = 1/6 and the standard deviation
σ = 3/10d∗ = 1/20.
For ease of calculations, Carnap assumed that the mean of the
η curve fell on point 0 in the space, the coordinates of the space
ranging from b− 1 to b (where b was the length of the space). With
this assumption, the η curve η f (x) is given by the following set
of equations (Carnap 1980, p. 60). The first one specifies that the η
curve is in fact a sum of two functions: a constant η∗ and the normal
distribution, rescaled to insure that the final result will normalized:
ηφ(x) = η∗ + (1− η∗)φ(0, σ, x).
The function f (0, σ2, x) is the standard normal distribution with
mean 0:







In the remainder of this section, I will generalize this proposal,
taking into account the fine-grained view on observations.
3.5.2 Moving the observations
One of the features of Carnap’s η curve presented above is that its
mode is assumed to be right above the center of the region corre-
sponding to the observed predicate. Carnap does not entertain any
other possibilities and does not give any reasons for such a choice.
In fact, it seems that this matter was either of no particular impor-
tance for him, or he considered such a choice to be an obvious one.
It is possible that it was simply because it made it easier to calculate
the numerical values in the examples.
Moreover, he was interested in calculating the ηjl values for pairs
of predicates, not pairs of points; the fact that the η curve could
be thought of as providing the η parameter values also for pairs of
points, was merely an artifact of the formalism. But in light of the
previous discussion on interpreting observations as points in the
conceptual space rather than propositions involving whole, larger
regions, this assumption becomes rather loaded. For, given the η
curve, we can easily think of its mode as the point that was in fact
observed — after all, the η value for that very point is the highest,
and what quality should be the most confirmed by a single observa-
tion if not that very same observed one.
To put things in a yet another way, we could actually accuse Car-
nap of not making use of the full evidence that he is given. His
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formal model of qualities allows for representing the observations
in the conceptual space at practically no cost: simply by recording
them as points of the space. Such fine-grained observations carry
more information with them than basic propositions of the language
(for instance, saying which particular shade of red was observed, as
opposed to only specifying a range of shades). Therefore, it would
be a wise thing to employ this extra information in our prediction
scheme.
As I already mentioned multiple times here, Carnap’s attribute
spaces are homogeneous: the boundaries between regions are sharp
and there are no prototypical points or areas in them. Hence there
is no salient difference between a point lying right in the center of
a region and one lying at the border between two regions: they all
have the same status. However, the lesson learned from the theory
of conceptual spaces was that we can differentiate between points
belonging to the same regions, by noticing that they differ in how
centrally they lie in the region of the space; whether they are more
prototypical examples of the given concept, or maybe more border-
line cases of it. Degrees of confirmation could be affected in differ-
ent ways depending on whether the quality that was observed was
a prototypical one or a borderline case of a concept.
Let us therefore entertain the following simple idea: how would
degrees of belief prescribed by the η rule via the use of the η curve
change, if we lifted the assumption that the peak of the curve always
falls in the center of the region corresponding to the predicate that
was observed? In terms of the η curve picture from the previous
section, introducing such a differentiation will basically amount to
allowing the curve to move to the side of Carnap’s point 0 in such
a way that the peak of the curve still falls above the observed pred-
icate. We can see right away that this will result in shifting more or
less probability mass on the neighboring predicates. Seeing some-
thing that is a prototypical P object and seeing one that is still P,
but relatively close to Q as well will have different effects on de-
grees of belief.
In the case of the original η curve there were two factors that
decided whether a region received any “analogy boost” from the
first observation, namely: which predicate was observed and the
range of the similarity influence. Once we allow for recording ex-
actly which quality was observed — and hence for placing the mode
of the η curve above any point in the conceptual space — those fac-
tors become: the range of the similarity influence and the exact point
that was observed.
This current investigation is related to the problem of recording
observations on the different levels of representation of concepts
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discussed in section 3.3. In the Basic System two levels of cognitive
representation, the symbolic and the conceptual one, are present.
Concepts are represented both as predicates in a formal language
and as regions in an associated conceptual space. However, the way
that the observations were represented was confined to the sym-
bolic level. The proposal below shows that this can be generalized
to match the double nature of concept representation in the Basic
System: we can start recording the observations directly on the con-
ceptual space, while still being able to talk about them in terms of
predicates.
3.5.3 Examples: observing non-prototypes
To illustrate the idea of allowing for the observed quality to fall
in any given place over the conceptual space, let us look at a few
toy examples based on Carnap’s η curve example. To begin with,
assume a one-dimensional conceptual space, this time partitioned
into five equally-sized intervals, like in Margaret’s blue-white color
space (see section 2.2.2). In the examples discussed in this section,
no problems will arise regarding the mode of the η curve being
too close to the edge of the space, so in what follows I will simply
consider the η curve restricted to the (0, 1) interval representing the
underlying conceptual space. I will come back to the case of the
observation falling on extreme points in section 3.5.5.
The first observation is made, corresponding to one particular
point in the conceptual space; the resulting η curve (with the exact
same shape as the one proposed by Carnap, differing only in where
its mode is) with the mode at the same point as the observed one,
prescribes what degrees of expectation we should assign to the next
— second — observation falling into particular regions. The only
difference now is that the observed point can be found at any place
in the conceptual space: no implicit assumption that the observed
individual was a prototypical case of any concept, is made.
For the sake of simplicity, in this section I keep most of the fea-
tures of Carnap’s example unchanged. Firstly, I keep the shape of
the η curve with its accompanying relatively small range of similar-
ity influence d∗ = 1/6, which (according to Carnap’s own prescrip-
tion) means σ = 0.05, and η∗ = 0.5.
The first example (figure 10) recreates the original η curve, in or-
der to supply the values to be compared with the ones from the
next example. The conceptual space is partitioned into five equal
intervals, corresponding to predicates B1 to B5. An observation is
made that corresponds to the point µ = 0.5, and the correspond-
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Figure 10: Observing a prototype in a uniform space.




ing η curve plotted over the space (the function f (x) = 0.5 + 0.5 ·
φ(0.5, 0.05, x)).
The expectation for B3, which, due to the γ rule and initial flat
density, was equal 0.2 prior to recording the first observation, went
up by nearly a threefold. The most important effect is that there is
more probability mass over B2 than B1. This is the desired analogical
effect: the expectation for the predicate that is close to the observed
one suffered less than the corresponding value for the region further
away.
The next example illustrates the fact that how much “analogical
boost” a given predicate will receive after making an observation
depends not only on whether that predicate is a (direct) neighbor of
the interval where the observation fell, but also on the balance be-
tween the size of the intervals involved and the value of d∗. In figure
11 we see the same conceptual space as in the previous example, but
this time it is carved up into four intervals of varying sizes. Instead
of five intervals of size 0.2 each, the sizes of the four regions, going
from left to right, are: 0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.2. Since this space is an effect
of merging B3 and B4 in the previous space, the new predicates are
called B1, B2, B34, and B5.
The observation once again is a prototypical one, i.e. falling into
the center of the observed predicate. However, since this time the
predicate is B34, the observed point is µ = 0.6. With the range of
the similarity influence the same as previously, but the observed
predicate being much larger, we can see that the expectation for B2 is
lower compared to figure 10; this is of course because the observed
point is now further away from B2 and the similarity influence does
not have the chance to reach it. Hence, in spite of the fact that both
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Figure 11: Observing a prototype in a non-uniform space.




B2 and B5 are direct neighbors of the observed predicate B34, their
posterior probability does not differ from what we would get by
calculating it without taking the similarity influence into account,
and simply using the rule provided by the λ− γ continuum, with
λ = 16.
In the next two examples we move further away from Carnap’s
proposal, considering observations that lie away from the center of
the observed predicate. First, consider again the conceptual space
with five equally-sized predicates. In figure 12 the shape of the η
curve is kept the same as in the previous examples, but now the ob-
served quality falls closer to the left border of the middle predicate
rather than to its center; µ = 0.42. Hence, the η curve is moved to
the left. The expectation for the predicate that the observed quality
belongs to once again goes up by a lot. However, more of the prob-
ability mass is shifted towards predicate B2 than it did previously,
due to the fact that right now the observed quality is much closer
to the interval corresponding to B2 than it did in figure 12. Notice
also that a part of the interval corresponding to B4 towards its right
end fell out the range of the similarity influence.
The last example concerns a non-prototypical observation falling
onto a predicate whose size exceeds the range of the similarity in-
fluence. In figure 13 the conceptual space is the one with unevenly
sized predicates. The observed point is once again lying close to the
border, this time it is the border between B2 and B34; again, µ = 0.42.
The η curve is the same as in figure 12, which means that the effect
that the observation had on predicate B2 is the same.
6 Confirmation functions specified by the λ− γ-continuum are precisely the ones
that do not take analogy into account, see Skyrms (1993).
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Figure 12: Observing a non-prototype in a uniform space.




However, in the previous example the ratio of the posterior to the
prior for B3 was 2.138, whereas for B34 it is only around 1.32. The
reason for this effect is solely the size of the observed predicate and
the fact that the observation was so peripheral in it, that the other
edge of the predicate fell right out of the range of the similarity
influence. This means that there were points in B34 such that the
observation at 0.42, in spite of belonging to the same predicate, was
not positively relevant for them at all. This means that there are
values of B34 that the agent now expects to encounter to the same
degree she would expect them if she did not take similarity into
account when computing her degrees of belief. At the same time,
more probability mass was shifted towards B2 in comparison to the
situation in figure 12. Right now there are values of B2 for which
making the observation was positively relevant.
Figure 14 summarizes the numerical values corresponding to the
above four examples. The top table represents the two examples
with the conceptual space divided into five equal predicates, and
the bottom table concerns the space with four uneven predicates. In
each table, the first row lists the prior for each predicate, as given
by the flat distribution over the space. The second row provides
posterior values for each predicate, calculated using the rule from
the λ − γ continuum, with λ = 1 and the corresponding priors,
under the assumption that, respectively, B3 and B34 were observed.
The bottom two rows summarize posterior values that are given by
the discussed η curves with varying modes.
We have seen that simply by allowing the observed qualities to
fall onto any point in the space, and without making any changes
to the shape of the η curve, we can already see a lot of changes
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Figure 13: Observing a non-prototype in a non-uniform space.




in the degrees of confirmation for predicates whose corresponding
regions overlap with the range of the similarity influence. The pos-
terior for the predicates lying next to the observed one will depend
on how close to their edge the observed quality lies. Moreover, the
degree to which we will expect to see another instance of an just
observed predicate depends on how close to the prototype the ob-
served instance was in the first place. Yet another way to describe
the phenomena that the above examples illustrate, is to remark that
observing a prototypical instance of one concept — an object that
is clearly a bright blue flower, say — has less positive effect on the
expectation for a neighboring concept than observing a borderline
case would: say, a flower that technically is still bright blue, but its
color is almost a case of medium blue. In this latter case, since the
observed flower is a little bit like the medium blue ones, some more
medium blue observations are to be expected.
3.5.4 Similarity, distances, and relevance
The above four examples showed that in this modified Carnapian
setting the strength of the analogical effect of observing a P object
on the expectation for Q depends on two factors: the range of the
similarity influence d∗ and the position of the observed quality in
the space relative to the border between P and Q. This second factor
is the novel part, in comparison to the Carnap’s original proposal.
The intuitive appeal of the fact that observing a prototypical P
should give less of a confirmation to Q than observing a borderline
P case lies in the idea that objects that are borderline cases of P, ly-
ing close to Q, are to some extent also cases of Q (which is an idea
3.5 the η rule on conceptual spaces 81
Figure 14: Posteriors given by the η curve: summary
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
Prior 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
No analogy 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1
µ = 0.5 0.1 0.1114 0.5772 0.1114 0.1
µ = 0.42 0.1 0.2723 0.4276 0.1001 0.1
B1 B2 B34 B5
Prior 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2
No analogy 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1
µ = 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1
µ = 0.42 0.1 0.2723 0.5277 0.1
made precise in the notion of graded membership, see section 3.4).
However, we should beware of taking this analogy too far. Since pro-
totypical cases (to be precise, all non-borderline ones) of P belong
to Q to degree 0, one might be drawn to the conclusion that maybe
observing a prototypical P should not be positively relevant for Q at
all. In order for the η curve to model that, the range of the similarity
influence would have to span no further than the distance from the
center of the P region to its border. However, that would mean that
the value of d∗ would have to be set for each predicate individually,
since different predicates can be assigned regions of different sizes
in a conceptual space.
The latter is something I want to avoid. To understand why it is
undesirable, let us consider how to interpret the range of similarity
influence. It seems to me that the best way to conceive of d∗ is as
a distance in the conceptual space such that when two qualities are
further than d∗ apart from each other, they are too dissimilar to be
positively inductively relevant for each other; observing one gives
us no reason to increase our expectation for the second (figuratively
speaking, for given the continuous nature of the conceptual space
and the assumed continuous probability density over it, no point
will actually have a positive probability mass over it). And as we
have seen in section 2.2.2, in the Carnapian setting, similarity con-
siderations are taken to be a factor in building up an attribute space
prior to it being partitioned into predicates. Hence it shouldn’t be
the case that the value of d∗ depends on the way that the space is
carved up into predicates.
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Carnap’s remarks about the choice of the range of the similar-
ity influence are consistent with such an interpretation. He admits
that “the choice of d∗ seems to be (. . . ) a matter of subjective atti-
tude” (Carnap 1980, p. 56). However, he suggests that the value of
d∗ should be stated in proportion to the (normalized) size of the
space, e.g. set as 1/6 of the size of the whole space, rather than
for instance relative to the size of the region corresponding to the
observed predicate.
The choice to require d∗ to be set for the whole space, the same for
all regions in that space, and prior to making any observations, also
ties in with the idea that conceptual spaces are part of the concep-
tual framework. After all, conceptual frameworks are chosen prior
to making any observations. The relative distances in the space rep-
resent certain similarity judgments that the conceptual framework
was based on, and changing those distances (which is what chang-
ing of d∗ relative to a predicate would be equivalent to) would mean
changing the framework itself.
3.5.5 η curve on the move
In order to define the new η curve, taking into account observations
falling at any point of the space, one more modeling decision needs
to me made. Recall that Carnap avoided the problems arising when
the observed predicate was close to the edge of the attribute space
(which, put informally, meant that there was not enough space be-
tween the observed predicate and the edge of the space for the η
curve to flatten out into η∗) by assuming that the observed predi-
cate lay roughly in the middle of the attribute space. I do not want
to make this assumption, instead deriving a fully general formula
for the η curve for a bounded, one-dimensional space.
The base function of the η curve was the normal distribution.
Hence, there are two possible ways in which one could adjust the
shape of the curve, given that the observed point was close to the
border of the space. The first one, schematically represented in fig-
ure 16a, keeps the η∗ as the value of the curve function for the edge
of the space, and rescales the left half of the curve to fit into the
distance between the observation and the edge of the space. The
second, as shown in 16b, would be to preserve the general shape of
the peak of the curve and simply cut it off at the edge of the space,
ended up with a curve shaped like a truncated normal distribution.
In what follows I will choose option B. Choosing A would be
equivalent to rescaling the distance measure over a part of the space.
It would be inconsistent with the position I assumed and elaborated
on in the preceding section, according to which the distances in the
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Figure 15: Analogical effects for a non-central observation
(a) (b)
space, once set up, should not be subject to any changes once the
observations are recorded.
After having made this last decision, I am now in a position to
define the new η curve. I will follow Carnap’s example on all points
on which it can be followed, and only make changes that are nec-
essary to accommodate the ideas of the preceding sections. To start,
assume a bounded one-dimensional conceptual space with a nor-
malized distance measure on it; that means that we can represent
this space as the [0, 1] interval on the real line. An observation is
made; the observed quality corresponds to a point µ ∈ [0, 1] in the
space.
In order to define the resulting new η curve, let us first remind
ourselves of how Carnap proceeded when defining his. Carnap’s η
curve was a sum of two functions, one a constant η∗, the other a nor-
mal distribution with mode 0. Because I am currently modeling a sit-
uation where the underlying conceptual space is bounded, the nor-
mal distribution in Carnap’s formula will have to be replaced with
a truncated one, ranging over the finite conceptual space. The trun-
cated normal distribution is normalized, so the resulting η curve
will also be normalized.
Hence, let f (x, µ, σ, 0, 1) stand for the truncated normal distribu-
tion with mean µ ∈ (0, 1) and the cutoff points 0 and 1. More pre-
cisely, for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 we have:




where φ(µ, σ2, x) is a standard normal distribution, this time rep-
resenting the “parent” normal distribution to our truncated one.
This is the distribution that the η curve would be based on, if the
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underlying conceptual space was infinite, and the observation fell
on the point µ. The Φ’s are the cumulative distribution functions of
φ.
The truncated distribution is the equivalent of the original nor-
mal distribution assumed by Carnap, but restricted to a bounded
conceptual space. This function can be plugged into Carnap’s orig-
inal definition of the η curve; and because truncated normal distri-
butions are normalized, so will be the new η function, the η′:
η′(x, µ, σ) = η∗ + (1− η∗) f (x, µ, σ, 0, 1).
Due to the continuous nature of the space and the η′ curve, no
point in the space will be assigned a positive probability. Hence, it is
impossible to provide probabilities for the second observation to fall
right on a given point. However, such expectation can be defined for
predicates, that is intervals of the conceptual space. Let sB stand for
the second observation falling into the interval B = (b1, b2). Given
η(x), the expectation P(sB|µ) for the second observation to fall into




η′(x, µ, σ) dx.
Note that this function will only give us actual predictions once
the value for σ is chosen. Unsurprisingly, σ and the range of the
similarity influence d∗ are strongly related to each other; Carnap’s
suggestion was to take σ = 3d∗/10.
We can see the above proposal for a modified η curve as repairing
some of the faults in Carnap’s original example. I took the sugges-
tion from the theory of conceptual spaces to represent individual
observations as points in the space rather than coding them using
the more coarse-grained predicate-based representation. This line of
thought does not lie that far from what Carnap already started him-
self, with the introduction of probability densities over the space.
Point-sized observations carry more information with them, which
allowed for distinguishing analogy effects of different strengths, de-
pending on the specific location of the observed quality in the con-
ceptual space. The assumption that the observation is always proto-
typical is no longer made. Moreover, I lifted Carnap’s assumption
that the first observation falls right in the middle of the space, rather
than closer to its edges. That assumption was obviously made for




The theory of conceptual spaces and Carnapian inductive logic do
not have very much in common when looked at from a distance. The
first of these projects is a proposal on how to represent concepts,
with a strong empirical component to it, claiming that this partic-
ular mode of representation can explain certain features of human
reasoning. Inductive logic, on the other hand, is a theoretical, norma-
tive proposal on how we should reason. What I tried to show in this
chapter is that, in spite of these differences, the two approaches can
nevertheless interact, and more specifically: that inductive logic can
be fruitfully modified to accommodate some of the developments
found in the theory of conceptual spaces, without compromising on
its normative character. In particular, I focused on how Carnapian
geometric rationality requirements can be reformulated in a setting
where attribute spaces found in the Basic System are reinterpreted
in order to match more closely the conceptual spaces known from
modern cognitive science.
The leading question of the inductive logic project is: what should
your beliefs be, given your conceptual framework? Some of the
developments in the Basic System stemmed from a reformulation
and specification of that initial question into something like: what
should your beliefs be, given that within your conceptual frame-
work the meanings of predicates are represented in conceptual spa-
ces? In this chapter I stayed within that second project, only slightly
modifying the underlying notion of a conceptual space. I showed
that Carnap’s notion of a conceptual space was much simpler than
what cognitive science has arrived at. This observation lead to a sim-
ple question of what would the prescriptions given by the Basic Sys-
tem look like, if conceptual spaces in the assumed framework were
more like the ones we know from cognitive science? Section 3.4 pro-
vided a part of an answer: it redefined the prescriptions given by
the original γ rule to also cover the case of regions having thick
boundaries.
The difference between inductive logic and conceptual spaces can
also be framed using the three-level conception of models of cog-
nitive representations, as I did in section 3.3. This observation pro-
vided the lead for the second part of this chapter’s proposal, namely
the introduction of the idea that observations could also be repre-
sented in the spaces, just as the meanings of the predicates were.
The proposal for the modified η curve was in effect a small case
study for this general idea.
However, the treatment of the η curve presented in the previous
section inherits the main shortcoming of Carnap’s own proposal,
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namely that fact that due to the way the ηjl parameters were defined,
tracking of the analogical effects in the Basic System is available
only when the sample size is 1. That is, only after collecting exactly
one piece of evidence the updating of beliefs takes into account the
similarities between predicates.
A curious feature of Carnap’s proposal on analogy was the use of
probability densities over the conceptual space. Again, though, he
only applied this idea to the prior and the posterior after making
one observation; his η curve discussion suggests that the prior cre-
dence of the agent can be represented as a flat distribution over the
space, and that after one observation, the posterior takes assumes
the shape of the η curve. A natural question arises of whether this
idea can be generalized further: whether we could find a principled
way of updating such probability distributions over the conceptual
space to represent posterior credences after any number of observa-
tions. As it turns out, the answer is yes, and it will be developed in
the next chapter.
4
I N D U C T I V E R E A S O N I N G O N C O N C E P T U A L
S PA C E S
4.1 reasoning on the conceptual level
In the previous chapter I discussed the three levels of cognitive rep-
resentation: the symbolic, the conceptual, and the subconceptual. I
observed that the standard Carnapian inductive logic belongs to the
symbolic level, where information and concepts are represented via
a formalized language. The addition of conceptual spaces to the
Basic System brings in an element of the conceptual level of repre-
sentation: some semantic information is now represented in those
geometric structures, and not in the formal language of inductive
logic. In this chapter I will investigate the possibility of modeling
inductive reasoning directly on the conceptual spaces. What would
that amount to?
Chapter 3 took one step down towards inductive logic on the con-
ceptual level: within the Carnapian setting, I suggested thinking of
observations as points in the conceptual space rather than as sen-
tences. This fine-graining of the observation space led to an exten-
sion of Carnap’s original proposal. However, the inductive reason-
ing itself was still recorded on the symbolic level of representation,
i.e. the rational degrees of belief were assigned only to propositions
(which were independent of the geometric representations of con-
cepts), rather than directly to the points of the space, i.e. the new
set of possible observations. Now the latter will also happen: the
credence of the agent will be represented primarily as a probabil-
ity distribution over the conceptual space, and degrees of belief for
propositions involving concepts (i.e., regions of the space) will be
calculated from that distribution.
Figure 17 is a schematic representation of the kind of model we
are after here. On the left, there is a flat prior (red) over a two-
dimensional, rectangular conceptual space (blue). Each observation
is represented as a point in the conceptual space, like the white star
on the left side of the figure. Observing a particular quality should
result in shifting some of the probability mass over that point and
its surrounding area. Finally, recording more and more observations
would cause more and more changes in the posterior, following the
spatial distribution of the observations over the conceptual space —
which is schematically represented on the right side of figure 17.
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Figure 17: Reasoning directly on the conceptual space
* observed quality * ** * * *
****
Prior Posterior
Another motivation for trying out this kind of approach lies in
Carnap’s own η curve which I discussed in section 3.5. The curve
is a probability density over the conceptual space, but the move
from the initial flat distribution to the η curve was not a result of
any principled form of updating. I will propose here a more elegant
solution to the problem of calculating posterior degrees of belief
which takes into account the structure of the conceptual space, and
relates it to a well-known form of updating, namely Bayesian updat-
ing. The model will start with a prior probability density over the
conceptual space — just as Carnap suggests, although not necessar-
ily a flat one — and have a natural update procedure that returns
a posterior distribution after each subsequent observation, and not
just the first one. The connection between the model developed here
and the η curve also gives rise to the more detailed discussion of the
problem of analogical reasoning in inductive logic, in section 4.2.
The model I will develop in this chapter draws heavily on the
tools of Bayesian statistical inference. It is a framework which allows
for a very natural implementation of the above general ideas. It also
makes explicit the inductive assumptions in a given reasoning set-
ting. Moreover, the connections between Carnapian inductive logic
and Bayesian statistics are well-studied (Romeijn 2005). As Skyrms
(1996, p. 321) notes, it turned out that it was Bayesian statisticians
who solved or at least approached the problems that Carnap posed
as most important open questions after his introduction of the Ba-
sic System. It is only natural that a further extension of Carnap’s
system, while inspired by developments in modeling of cognitive
representations, also uses this kind of formalism.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the
problem of modeling analogical reasoning in inductive logic, refer-
ring back to the existing work on that topic. I conclude that part
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of the chapter in section 4.3, formulating the principle of analogical
reasoning applicable to the spatial setting of this chapter. Section
4.4 presents the basics of Bayesian statistical modeling, in order to
introduce the machinery that I use to develop the simple model of
section 4.5. In particular, after setting up the scene in section 4.5.1,
I go on to derive formulas for calculating the posterior and pre-
dictions in the model (section 4.5.2). In section 4.6, applying these
calculations to the motivating example will lead to the discussion
of the interplay between the different ways of encoding similarity
relations in the model — which will follow in section 4.7. Finally,
section 4.8 concludes the chapter.
4.2 analogy in inductive logic
In this section, I will briefly review the literature on analogy in in-
ductive logic, starting with Carnap’s early and late proposals, and
arrive at an analogy rule that the model developed in the second
part of the chapter will follow. Before I move on, I should stress that
there is no single analogy principle out there that is or should be the
golden standard when we are designing an inductive system. This
fact is not an artifact of the plurality of opinions in the literature; it
rather stems from the features of analogical reasoning itself: it has
many possible forms, and there can never be one, context and goal-
insensitive standard for it (see also Spohn 1981, p. 51). There are so
many aspects to analogical reasoning, that it would be unrealistic
to want to account for all of them with just one formal principle.
Even analogy by similarity of predicates — regardless of how the
similarity is actually understood — is just one form that analogical
reasoning can take.
4.2.1 Carnap’s analogies
Carnap was concerned with the question of how to model analog-
ical reasoning well before he started working on the Basic System.
Already in Foundations (1950, p. 569) he claimed that the confir-
mation function proposed there, the c∗, can account for analogical
reasoning. Achinstein (1963) pointed out that Carnap’s function can
deal only with cases of perfect (positive) analogy, and not with im-
perfect (negative) analogy. In the case of positive analogy, from the
fact that two objects are known to share a number of properties
— and that there are no known differences between them — it is
concluded that they are also likely to share more properties in the
future. In the case of negative or imperfect analogy, the two ob-
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jects being compared are known to share some properties, but also
to differ in some respects. The question there is how much extra
confirmation should we infer from the existence of such a partially
similar analog.
Striving to account for that sort of analogical reasoning — i.e.
tracking the number of basic properties that two objects share, and
concluding how probable any further similarities are — can also be
seen as wanting to allow for statistical dependencies between differ-
ent basic attributes of the object language. To see that this is indeed
the case, consider the following simple example. Object a is known
to be big and round, and object b is known to be big. Suppose I con-
sider them having the same size a reason enough for them sharing
their shape as well: that is, object b is for me more likely to be round
as well (more likely: compared to how likely I would judge it to be
round without having the extra information about a). The last asser-
tion is equivalent to an assumption that big size and roundness tend
to occur together: that they are not statistically independent proper-
ties. It is this kind of reasoning that led Carnap to conclude that the
functions in his λ-continuum are suitable only for languages with
one family of predicates, since they did not account for such statisti-
cal dependencies between families (a fact that Carnap noted already
in the preface to the second edition of Foundations (1962, p. xxii);
see also Carnap (1963a, p. 75)).
The first attempt to solve what he then called the problem of
many families was presented in print in (Carnap and Stegmüller
1959, pp. 251–252). This first proposal concerns languages with two
binary families, that is essentially languages with two predicates.1
Assume a language with two binary predicate families F and G ,
i.e. a language with the following predicates: F0, F1, G0, G1 (which
means that F0, G0 are simply negations of F1, G1). The family Q
of the Q-predicates of this language consists of Q00, Q01, Q10, Q11
(the indices corresponding to the atomic predicates in the natural
way). Carnap proposed to add a new parameter η (0 < η < 1), and
have every unconditional probability function Mλ,η be a weighted
mixture of two other functions:
Mλ,η(E) = ηM
1|2
λ (E) + (1− η)M 1,2λ (E).2
The first of these two functions, M 1|2λ , treats F and G as proba-
bilistically independent. This means that predictive probabilities for
1 The extension of that suggestion to languages with multiple families, which Car-
nap worked on with Kemeny, was mentioned but never published. Maher (2001)
presents and criticizes Carnap and Kemeny’s proposal.
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members of the two families are derived from the λ-γ-continuum,
with equal λ for both families, and taking γF0 = γG0 = 1/2. This
function, upon making an observation Q11(a) = F1(a) ∩ G1(a), will
give probability 3/16 to Q01(b), but only 1/16 to Q00(b). The differ-
ence in predictions represents the desired analogy effects between
Q-predicates: since Q01 and Q11 share a property, they are more
similar to each other than Q00 and Q11. The second of the mixed
functions, M 1,2λ , takes Q to be a λ-family with equal priors for all
its predicates. No analogy effects of the above kind show up inM 1,2λ ;
the probabilities for each of the Qnm depend only on how many in-
stances of the same predicate were observed. Hence, the weight η
given to the first component can be interpreted as the degree of
analogy assumed in the system.
Thus, the kind of analogical reasoning that Carnap initially fo-
cused on, was based on objects sharing some basic properties, which
was tracked via the Q-predicates that applied to them. For instance,
in his reply to Achinstein, he wrote:
The principle of analogy says roughly this: the probabil-
ity that an object b has a certain property, is increased by
the information that one or more other objects, which are
similar to b in other respects, have this property. (Carnap
1963c, p. 225)
At first glance, such an understanding of analogical reasoning
seems radically different from the one developed in the Basic Sys-
tem, as I outlined it in section 2.4. Moreover, the parameter η intro-
duced in the above paragraphs is very different from the η of the
Basic System. In the Basic System, Carnap is no longer interested
in similarity on Q-predicates of a language with multiple families,
as the basis of analogy by similarity of predicates. The language is
assumed to contain a single family of at least three predicates. Nat-
urally, this assumption does not extend to the whole language of
inductive logic in general, but it is put forward when analogy is
discussed; statistical dependencies between predicates of different
families are not discussed, which constitutes another shift in per-
spective compared to the earlier work. Similarity is now a relation
on predicates belonging to the same family. Hence, similarity of
predicates can no longer be understood in terms of how many basic
properties they share, since they are themselves the basic proper-
ties in the language. Now, similarities are derived from distances
between the corresponding regions in the conceptual space.
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4.2.2 Two perspectives on analogy
However, it needs to be stressed that the above two accounts of anal-
ogy are not necessarily contradicting each other. Two predicates be-
longing to the same family can be thought of as being similar due
to them sharing some underlying properties as well, just as in the
case of Q-predicates, except that those shared properties are not
made explicit. Consider a family consisting of three predicates: Hip-
pie, Hipster, and Businessman, introduced in section 3.5. I might have
a good reason to use only those three labels when investigating
customers in a particular bar, without making the underlying pred-
icates explicit. Still, the reason that I consider hippies to be more
similar to hipsters than to businessmen, is probably because they
share some properties which I did not make explicit in my observa-
tion language. For instance, hippies and hipsters are very likely to
wear jeans, whereas businessmen tend not to do so. Hipsters and
hippies have beards, and businessmen do not; and so on.
There can be any number of such similarities in terms of some un-
derlying predicates, but exactly that might be the problem. Making
explicit all the possible aspects, in which hippies, hipsters, and busi-
nessmen are similar or different, could be a big task: which ones to
include, which ones to skip, are there any similarities we could have
missed? The three predicates I chose to use, together with a simple
information that hipsters and hippies are more similar than hippies
and businessmen, sum up all those possible underlying similarities
well enough, relative to the goals of the investigation. Moreover,
sometimes the similarity could be given perceptually, while making
the aspects of that similarity explicit in some other language could
be a chore. For instance, in the case of perceptual modalities like
color, the similarities between predicates are given to us almost di-
rectly via the senses, and making them explicit in terms of shared
properties could only complicate matters.
Another reason to focus on an account of similarity of predi-
cates within one family rather than on the similarity of Q-predicates
based on a number of families, is the richness of the language of in-
ductive logic, as it was conceived in the Basic System. Recall that
in its most general form, the language of inductive logic consists
of families that are not binary, but contain many predicates. This
means that there are many ways in which two objects can differ in
any given respect. For instance, two objects can differ not only be-
cause of one them is red and the other simply non-red; the other
can now be orange, or yellow, or blue, etc. In each of these cases the
second object differs from the first in color, but one might want to
say that those differences vary in degree — which is the intuition
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that Carnap seems to be guided by in the Basic System. Hence, Car-
nap’s new proposal can be seen as a natural continuation of the old
one, in terms of its general goals.
Figure 18: Three ladybugs.
To illustrate this issue, consider the three ladybugs depicted in
figure 18. The first one is big, red, and has seven dots. The second
one is big, orange, and has six dots. Finally, the third one is big,
blue, and has fifteen dots. The second and the third bugs agree on
only one predicate with the first one, namely on the size. However,
the second ladybug appears to be more similar to the first one than
the third one is. This is because 6 is closer to 7 than 15 is, and red is
closer to orange than to blue. Hence, it could be the case that before
we start comparing Q-predicates of our chosen language — like
“being big, red, and having 7 dots” — we first need an account of
similarity between the basic predicates, like red and orange. Only
then we could compute the similarities between the Q-predicates.
What could also be needed is assigning weights to the families of
predicates; some differences might contribute more than others to
the overall difference between Q-predicates. In the current example,
it could be the case that similarity of color of the first two ladybugs
is more salient than the similarity of their number of dots, and this
is what contributes the most to their overall perceived degree of
similarity.
Summing up all of the above, we can see the question of analogy
by similarity in inductive logic as one of the following:
1. How to reason from known similarities (shared properties) to
unobserved similarities? This is the question that Carnap ap-
proaches in his early work on analogy. On the level of con-
firmation functions, it can be seen as boiling down to: how
are different Q-predicates inductively relevant for each other,
based on how similar they are? Example: The first observed
ladybug is big, red, and has seven dots. The second one is big
and red. What should my expectation be for the second one
also having seven dots?
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2. How can a predicate be inductively relevant not only to itself,
but also to a different predicate from the same family? This is
the question that Carnap explicitly tackles in the Basic System.
Example: The first observed ladybug is red. What should my
expectation be for the next one being orange, and should it be
higher than the expectation for the second one being blue?
As I argued above, these questions are not that different from
each other, rather they approach the same issue from different an-
gles, focusing or not on making the aspects of similarity explicit in
the language. However, distinguishing between these two points of
view helps to relate Carnap’s early and late proposals — as I did
above — and to organize the subsequent literature on analogy in
inductive logic, which is what I will briefly discuss next.
4.2.3 Analogy after Carnap
The existing work on analogy tends to focus on one or the other of
the two questions that the previous section concluded with. For in-
stance, Maher (2000, 2001) and Romeijn (2005, 2006) focus on defin-
ing similarity on Q-predicates, via the number of shared basic prop-
erties. Romeijn goes as far as claiming that in every case of analogy
by similarity of predicates, the underlying shared predicates should
be made explicit. Other authors, for instance Kuipers (1984a, 1988),
Costantini (1979, 1983), Maio (1995), Festa (1997), and Skyrms (1993),
decide to concentrate on a language with just one family of predi-
cates, following the Basic System. Finally, Niiniluoto (1981) offers a
general account, in which the degrees of similarity between predi-
cates of a single family are combined into a measure of similarity on
Q-predicates — in a way that respects the intuitions I discussed in
relation with figure 18, giving different weights to different families.
In answering the analogy question they have chosen for them-
selves, different authors go for different formal means, and mod-
ify in different ways the existing systems of inductive logic to in-
clude analogical relevances. A popular approach is to start from
Carnapian prediction rules known from his continua. Working in
that vein, Kuipers (1984a) elaborates on the representation of the
functions in the λ-γ-continuum as weighted mixtures of their em-
pirical and a priori factors (see section 1.3). He introduces a third,
analogical factor. The weight of the analogy factor first grows to
some maximum, and then descends, so that in the end the empirical
factor dominates the distribution, just like in the original functions.
Costantini (1983) gives a different answer to the question of how
to update the predictive probabilities with a single observation. The
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update has two steps: first, probability mass is taken away from all
predicates. Then, what has been shaved off is redistributed in such
a way that not only the observed predicate Pn receives a boost, but
also its direct neighbors, where the direct neighbors are simply the
predicates with indices n + 1 and n− 1. This proposal is somewhat
close to Carnap’s ideas behind the η curve presented in the previous
chapter, but it also seems quite arbitrary, since Costantini doesn’t
have anything like the conceptual space, which would justify the
ordering of predicates and taking the direct “neighbors” as relevant
for analogy.
Finally, Skyrms (1993) and Festa (1997), who generalizes Skyrms’
proposal, consider mixtures of functions from the λ-γ-continuum,
with varying values of γi parameters, meant to reflect the similarity
relations between predicates. The resulting predictive functions are
known as hyper-Carnapian methods.
The axiomatic method has been less popular, being represented
only by Huttegger (2016) and Maher (2000). Maher’s system is es-
sentially an axiomatic version of the early Carnap’s proposal pre-
sented in the previous section. Huttegger develops a more unique
proposal. As noted by Skyrms (1993), Carnapian continua of in-
ductive methods had two characteristic features: they satisfied ex-
changeability (i.e. individual symmetry, see section 2.3.1) and John-
son’s Sufficientness Postulate. The latter says that the predictive
probability for observing an instance of A, should depend only on
the total number of observations, and the number of A objects ob-
served so far (see Zabell 2011).
Huttegger appreciates that both exchangeability and sufficient-
ness are connected to analogical reasoning: accommodating analogy
means giving up at least some of the aspects of the two principles.
He weakens them both, going for a version of partial exchangeabil-
ity (see Finetti 1980), and a modified sufficientness postulate. Hut-
tegger’s choice of axioms for his proposal has an important conse-
quence: the failure of the axiom of convergence (see section 2.3.1).
This means that in his system, analogy effects are present at any
point of the investigation, regardless of how much evidence has
been recorded. While for most authors that is an unwelcome conse-
quence, there are arguments, put forward by Niiniluoto (1988) and
Huttegger himself, for accepting it.
It might seem obvious that wanting to accommodate reasoning by
analogy would mean giving up the sufficientness postulate, since
we now allow the probability for A to also depend on, for instance,
whether an observation B was made. There exists, however, some
work concentrated on the search for analogy principles valid in the
unmodified Carnap’s λ-γ-continuum, that is principles that would
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not violate sufficientness. Hill and Paris (2014) investigate structural
analogy between sentences, and in a different paper (2013) they fo-
cus on the similarity of Q-predicates based on the number of shared
atomic predicates.
4.3 analogy on the conceptual level
Throughout the rest of this chapter, I will focus on the second ques-
tion of analogy, that is: how to model analogical reasoning based
on similarities between predicates that belong to the same family.
Not only is this project closer to the Basic System, which was the
starting point of my own investigations in this thesis, but it also
fits well with my focus on inductive reasoning done directly on the
conceptual space. In such a setting, it is the conceptual space that
provides the underpinning for similarities between predicates of the
same family. Via its metric, it encodes similarities between different
qualities, without the need to make them explicit in the object lan-
guage.
Consider the color space (see section 2.2.2). Red and orange are
more similar than red and blue, because the red and the orange
regions in the conceptual space are closer to each other. This sim-
ilarity could also be seen as a result of sharing some properties.
For instance, red and orange share properties like: being approxi-
mately this-and-this far out on the brightness dimension, or being
in this-and-this range on the hue dimension. Those latter proper-
ties, however, are not expressible in the object language chosen for
the particular investigation; instead, they are encoded indirectly in
the conceptual space. I can treat the conceptual space as the source
of similarity relations on qualities, and concentrate on looking for
the way in which those similarities should translate into inductive
relevance.
There is one last point to make here, which bears stressing. It is
definitely not the case that in choosing to read the similarities off
the conceptual space rather than from the language itself, I am in
some way circumventing the need to commit to a particular con-
ceptualization. Whether we are counting similarities between Q-
predicates, or using a conceptual space for a single family, or using
any other method for accounting for analogy-bearing similarity of
predicates, the results will always be language dependent. For in-
stance, if we quantify the similarity between Q-predicates in terms
of how many basic attributes they agree on, there will always be
expressively equivalent languages with a different set of basic pred-
icates, in which the properties described by the original pairs of
Q-predicates will turn out to be less or more similar than in the
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initial language.3 Maher (2000), who relies on such a similarity mea-
sure, circumvents this very problem by assuming from the start that
the basic predicates of his language are “natural”.
In case of similarities as distances in the conceptual space, this
language-dependence (or, rather, conceptualization-dependence) is
even more obvious. We can always choose a different conceptual
space for the same set of predicates, such that the resulting dis-
tances between the relevant regions will be different (see the exam-
ple of the color space sen as three or one-dimensional in section
2.2.2). This brings up once again one of the main themes of this the-
sis. I am investigating the question of: given your conceptual frame-
work, what should your beliefs be; for instance, given this particular
choice of a conceptual space to represent your concepts, what pri-
ors should you choose? It will always be the case that the resulting
prescriptions will be language — framework — dependent. I am
not trying to argue for a particular choice of conceptual framework;
rather, I am investigating the consequences of such a choice.
My goal in this chapter is to develop a simple, one-dimensional
model of inductive reasoning which takes place directly on the con-
ceptual space, as outlined in the first section. The observations will
be recorded as points in the conceptual space rather than as atomic
sentences of the original object language. As I also mentioned in sec-
tion 4.1, one motivation behind this project was Carnap’s η curve.
In that example, the extent to which the individual points lying
close to the observed one received an inductive boost, was indepen-
dent of the way in which the conceptual space was partitioned into
predicates. The analogy-related changes in posteriors for different
predicates were only a consequence of the change in the density
function defined over the points of the space.
In supposing similarity to be given by distances in the conceptual
space, Carnap makes a very non-trivial assumption about how sim-
ilarity on predicates behaves. As I already mentioned in section 2.4,
taking similarity to be a symmetric relation that satisfies the trian-
gle inequality, is perceived by some as too strong of an assumption,
especially in the context of inductive relevance. However, given that
in this dissertation I have committed myself to the use of conceptual
spaces, I will not try to weaken the original Carnap’s assumption.
Some of the possible negative effects of it might be ameliorated by
my use of statistical hypotheses as distributions over the conceptual
space, which will be introduced in section 4.5.
Analogical reasoning by similarity of predicates has the following
general form:
3 I owe this observation to Branden Fitelson.
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(Rel) If SIMILAR(A,B), then RELEVANT(A,B),
where A, B are predicates, and relevance is understood as induc-
tive relevance. All of the proposed analogy by similarity principles
for inductive logic follow this form, although there are multiple pro-
posals for how this general schema should be instantiated. While
there have been some attempts to systematize the discussion, most
notably by Festa (1997), there is no clarity nor agreement on which
particular instantiation of (Rel) should be favored.
In the current setting, what form should my preferred principle of
analogy take, following the general scheme (Rel)? Should the sim-
ilarity and inductive relevance relations hold between predicates,
i.e. the regions of the conceptual space, or the point-sized observa-
tions? Given that conceptual spaces can be partitioned into predi-
cate regions in multiple ways (which does not change the underly-
ing notion of distance in the space), and that the observations are
now considered to correspond to points of the space, it is fitting to
choose points of the space as the relata of similarity in (Rel). Hence,
the antecedent of (Rel) will have the form: “if two points in a concep-
tual space are close to one another”. This is significantly different
than all the previous proposals on analogy in inductive logic.
As for a fitting notion of inductive relevance, which could be
plugged into the consequent of the analogy rule, consider the fol-
lowing suggestion from Ferguson, regarding inductive reasoning in
cases where there are continuum-many possible outcomes:
One would like to have a prior distribution for P with the
property that if X is a sample from P and X = x, then the
posterior guess at P gives more weight to values close to
x than the prior guess at P does. (Ferguson 1974, p. 622)
What Ferguson suggests is that when we are reasoning about a
random variable with continuum many possible outcomes, upon
observing any of the outcomes, we should shift some of the prob-
ability mass not only over the observed outcome, but also over its
close neighbors. This will preserve the continuity of probability den-
sity over the space of outcomes. It also makes sense as a proposal
for the current setting, i.e. one in which the possible outcomes are
points in a conceptual space.
Moreover, the whole strategy illustrates well the general approach
of this thesis. I am looking for ways in which we should adapt
our inductive reasoning practices, given the form of our conceptual
frameworks. What we are seeing right now is that, once I changed
my idea of how the framework is structured (by giving more salience
to conceptual spaces, and deciding to label observations with points
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of the space rather than predicates of the accompanying language),
I am also led to reconsider my notion of analogy-inducing induc-
tive relevance — changing it into one that matches the assumptions
I made about the conceptual framework.
The model I develop below is essentially a Bayesian model with
continuum many outcomes: the fine-graining of the observation
space into the whole set of points of the conceptual space is in
practice equivalent to extending the set of predicates of the rele-
vant family to an infinite one. And in case of a continuous space,
which has been the assumption so far, we end up with continuum
many “predicates”. In the current model, what Ferguson mentions
as the closeness of values of the random variable, will be given by
the metric defined on the conceptual space. The model will have
the feature that probability mass will shift not only directly onto
the observed point, but also its direct neighborhood — regardless
of the position of that neighborhood relative to the (coarse-grained)
predicate partition of the space.
Hence, the form of (Rel) that I am working with is: if point a is
close to point b in the conceptual space, observing a will raise the
value of the posterior probability density for b as well (up until —
as we will see later — the posterior over the hypotheses converges
onto one of them and the probability mass over the space will no
longer be shifting). Later on in this chapter I will investigate how
this notion of analogy — analogy on points, so to speak — will
affect Carnap’s original concept of analogy on predicates, given the
conceptual space. But before I present the model, in the next section
I will briefly introduce the formal framework in which the model
will be set.
4.4 the bayesian model for predictions
As mentioned earlier, in this chapter I venture beyond the formal-
ism of the Basic System and make a first attempt at modeling induc-
tive reasoning directly on the conceptual space, using the tools of
Bayesian inference. Before turning to the actual model, then, I will
review the basic notions of this framework (for further details, see
Gelman et al. 1995; Press 2003).
Bayesian inference proceeds by assigning a probability distribu-
tion to a set of statistical hypothesis concerning the process that
generates the data. With each observation, that prior distribution is
updated into a posterior one with the help of Bayes’ theorem. Hence,
let M = {hθ : θ ∈ Θ} be a set of statistical hypotheses, labeled by the
members of a finite set Θ, and let S be the sample space, that is the
set of all possible samples of data s. Let P be the prior distribution
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over the hθ ∈ M. Every hypothesis hθ is associated with a probabil-
ity distribution on the sample space; i.e. for each possible sample,
the hypothesis assigns a probability for that sample: the likelihood
function, P(s|hθ). The Bayes’ theorem states that:
P(hθ|s) = P(s|hθ)P(hθ)P(s) .
Now, the probability of the sample, P(s), can be calculated using




In case the set of hypothesis is labeled by a continuous parameter,
the prior and the posterior over the hypothesis are probability den-
sities. The probability of the sample is also calculated in a way that





There is a close link between Carnap’s inductive logic and Bayesian
statistics. By De Finetti’s theorem, Carnapian exchangeable predic-
tion rules, such as the ones in the λ-γ-continuum, correspond to
priors over Bernoulli hypotheses that make the outcomes indepen-
dent and identically distributed (see Skyrms 1993).
4.5 a simple model
With the basics of Bayesian inference in place, I will now develop a
simple model of inductive reasoning on a conceptual space. Devel-
oping in full generality the guiding idea presented in section 4.1 —
that is, including all kinds of conceptual spaces and all kinds of pos-
sible prior probability distributions over them — goes far beyond
the scope of this thesis, if it is feasible at all. What I can do is to
make a small model and use it to illustrate some points about what
happens when we decide to model inductive reasoning directly on
conceptual spaces. Hence, in what follows the conceptual space in
question will be assumed to be a one-dimensional, bounded interval
of reals; i.e. the [0, 1] interval.
The motivating example in figure 17 did not specify the nature
of the prior distribution over the space, as well as the update pro-
cedure leading to the posterior. In filling in those details, the ideas
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from Bayesian statistics will come into the picture. Instead of hav-
ing a single prior distribution over the space, I will assume a set of
hypotheses — themselves distributions over the conceptual space —
with a common shape, and a prior over those. That prior will get
updated with observations, represented as numbers in [0, 1], in the
standard way, via the Bayes rule. The rest of this section develops
this idea in a simple, one-dimensional setting.
4.5.1 In the Alps
Let us once more go back to Margaret, the researcher in the Alps.
This time, she is interested in the actual distribution of different
shades of red, orange, and yellow among the ladybugs on a partic-
ular meadow, rather than the distribution of particular color predi-
cates within the population. She’s using a one-dimensional concep-
tual space, representing colors ranging from clear red to clear yel-
low, as shown in figure 19; the space is partitioned into five equally
sized attributes with labels B1 − B5. The goal of her study is no
longer to arrive at a probability for each of the predicates Bn in her
vocabulary, but a probability distribution over the space of all par-
ticular color shades she considers in the study, i.e. a distribution
spanning over an interval ranging from red to yellow.
Moreover, Margaret has a reason to believe that the process in
which particular ladybugs develop their color has a particular prop-
erty. While going through the literature on ladybugs, she learned
that they have a rather peculiar feature. Each population is genet-
ically programmed to produce individuals of one particular color,
but environmental factors influence this process. Ladybugs coming
from the same neighborhood will have the same genetic makeup
due to the way ladybug multiply, but small differences in their lo-
cation will cause their colors to vary. The locational factors rarely
overcome the genetics completely, which means that the majority of
the bugs at any given location will have a color very similar to the
genetically programmed one, and the more diverging colors will be
less likely to be found.
On the basis of this knowledge Margaret assumes that in the
Alpine population that she studies the actual distribution of particu-
lar colors among the ladybugs will be a unimodal beta distribution,
with the mode of the distribution corresponding to the color that the
population’s genetic makeup aims at. The conceptual space under
consideration is bounded and one-dimensional, which means that
it can be assumed to simply be the (0, 1) interval, which makes beta
distributions a particularly convenient choice for hypotheses. Mar-
garet considers three hypotheses as to how such a distribution looks
102 inductive reasoning on conceptual spaces
like exactly, as in figure 19, where the hypotheses are schematically
drawn over the underlying conceptual space. The three hypotheses
are: θ1 (a beta distribution with α = 3 and β = 20), θ2 (α = 30 and
β = 30), and θ3 (α = 20 and β = 3). She assigns an equal prior
probability of 1/3 to each of the three possible distributions. Note
that while the prior is a flat one with respect to the hypotheses, it
does not result in a flat probability distribution over the conceptual
space, since what is being weighted by the prior are various uni-
modal distributions.
Figure 19: Three possible targets — three possible distributions
θ1: α = 3, β = 20
θ2: α = 30,
β = 30
θ3: α = 20, β = 3
X B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
1
θ1 θ2 θ3
Margaret goes on to observe the ladybugs on a chosen meadow
and records their color as real numbers that correspond to particular
points in her one-dimensional color space.
4.5.2 The model
I am interested in calculating degrees of belief in a setting given
above, i.e. the probabilities that Margaret assigns to her different
hypotheses after having recorded some observations, as well as her
predictive probabilities for the propositions about the color of the
next observed ladybug. Therefore, keeping to the properties of the
example, assume a conceptual space S that is isomorphic to the
(0, 1) interval, partitioned into a series of sub-intervals B1 − Bn cor-
responding to predicates of the language that Margaret is using (I
use the symbols Bn to refer both to the predicate and the region
in the space, since it is always clear from the context which one is
meant).
The colors of the observed individuals are recorded by assigning
to them a point in the space rather than a predicate (fine-grained
observations). While it might not be entirely realistic from the per-
ceptual point of view, in the theory of conceptual spaces this kind
of idealization is made as well: it is commonly assumed that the lo-
cation function assigns points in the conceptual space to objects; e.g.
one specific point in the color space corresponding to an object’s
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color, rather than a larger region of the space (Gärdenfors 2000, sec.
4.8).
Let M = {hθ : θ ∈ Θ} be a finite set of hypotheses. More precisely,
the hypotheses hθ are unimodal beta distributions over the (0, 1)
interval, that is beta distributions with α, β > 1. Let the sample
space be S = (0, 1), that is each observed object is assigned one
point in the space (a particular color). Let P(θ) be the prior over
the hypotheses. The Bayes’ theorem in this setting (continuous data,
discrete parameter space) has the following form (see Press 2003, ch.
4):
P(hθ|x1, . . . , xn) = L(x1, . . . , xn|hθ)P(hθ)
∑ki=1 L(x1, . . . , xn|θi)P(hθi)
,
with L(x1, . . . , xn|hθ) the likelihood function of hθ. If the data are
taken to be independent, we have
L(x1, . . . , xn|hθ) = L(x1|hθ) . . . L(xn|hθ).
Similarly, in the case when the set of hypotheses is labeled by a
real-valued parameter, M = {hθ : θ ∈ Θ}. With P(hθ) a probability
density function over the parameter space, the posterior density is
calculated using the following form of the Bayes’ theorem:
P(hθ|x1, . . . , xn) = L(x1, . . . , xn|hθ)P(hθ)∫
θ∈Θ L(x1, . . . , xn|hθ)P(hθ) dθ
.
4.5.2.1 Likelihoods
In order to calculate actual values of the posterior, I still need to
supply the values of the likelihood function in the above formu-
las. Since the hypotheses are themselves distributions over the con-
ceptual space, it should be possible to read off how probable any
observation is given that the given beta distribution generates the
data. As long as observations are thought of as nonzero measure
regions of the space (e.g. the predicates), the integral over a region
tells us exactly that: the probability that the hypothesis assigns to
observing a point in that particular region. However, when the ob-
servations are points and not regions, that value will be 0 and we
have to find another way of calculating the values of the posterior
distribution.
To begin, assume that S = {sδ : [s− δ/2, s + δ/2] ⊂ [0, 1], δ > 0},
i.e. the elements of the sample space are small intervals of length δ
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(rather than points of the space). Consider a finite set of hypotheses
M = {hθ : θ ∈ Θ}.
Because the hypotheses are probability distributions over the in-






Hence, as δ goes to 0, the value of P(sδ|hθ) also goes to 0. However,
we can still calculate the posterior on hypotheses, P(hθ|sδ), even
for observations sδ with δ being practically 0, i.e. observations that
really are points in the space.
In order to do so, recall that the graphs of the hypotheses are
continuous curves with no singular points, which means that for
sufficiently small δ’s the hθ restricted to [s − δ/2, s + δ/2] can be
approximated by a linear function. This means that |hθ(s)− hθ(s−
δ/2)| ≈ |hθ(s)− hθ(s + δ/2)| and the area underneath the hθ over
the interval [s − δ/2, s + δ/2] can be approximated by a rectangle




hθ(x) dx ≈ hθ(s)δ.






With these values in place, Bayesian updating on sδ looks like the
following:




The above means that P(hθ|s) for s a point in our one-dimensional
space can be approximated with any standard of precision by:
P(hθ|s) = P(hθ)hθ(s)∑θ∈Θ P(hθ)hθ(s)
.
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4.5.2.2 Predictions
Again, given the continuous nature of the considered conceptual
space, both the prior and the posterior will always assign probabil-
ity 0 to observing any given point of the space; non-zero predictions
can only be formed for statements regarding observing a point be-
longing to a given region with a non-zero measure. Hence, we can
calculate the prediction that the next observation will fall into a re-
gion B.
In principle we could define the predictions for any subset with
nonzero measure (just like in the case of the prior and the γ rule
in section 3.4), but for the sake of simplicity I will only define it for
intervals. Such an approach is consistent with Carnap’s writing, for
whom the main, scientifically useful “building blocks” of a concep-
tual space were small, connected regions — in a one-dimensional
setting that means intervals (see Carnap 1980, sec. 15).
Let sB stand for an observation falling into an interval B = (b1, b2).
Then for every hypothesis hθ the probability of sB given hθ and the













As long as the chosen set of hypotheses is finite, the above model
will be consistent, i.e. Margaret will be guaranteed to end up con-
centrating her probability mass on the true hypothesis — provided
that that hypothesis belongs to her model. This follows from the
asymptotic theorem for a discrete parameter space (Gelman et al.
1995, Appendix B). It says that the posterior will converge on the
true hypothesis as long as the following conditions are met: the
data are iid and the likelihoods assume that as well; and there is
a true distribution generating the data which, moreover, belongs to
the set of hypotheses. All of these requirements are fulfilled in the
current model.
4.6 in the alps : updating
With the model all set up, let us go back to the initial example.
Margaret is now ready to record some observations and form pre-
dictions based on them. Recall that she considered three hypotheses
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concerning the distribution of colors in the studied population over
the conceptual space: θ1 (a beta distribution with α = 3 and β = 20),
θ2 (α = 30 and β = 30), and θ3 (α = 20 and β = 3). Her prior P
assigns equal probabilities to all three hypotheses.
Margaret then sets out to the meadow to observe specimens and
the first one she sees has the color corresponding to the point 0.5 on
her color space, i.e. it’s the most central variant of orange (B3 in the
conceptual space). Given her prior P and the evidence s consisting
of a single observation 0.5, Margaret updates her beliefs using the
rule derived above in section 4.5.2. The results (rounded up to or-
der of magnitude of 10−5) are presented in figure 21, where P(Bn)
stands for the probability of observing a point belonging to the re-
gion Bn.
Figure 21: Updating on 0.5




Prior Posterior Prior Posterior Difference
θ1 0.33333 0.00036 P(B3) 0.29467 0.88027 +0.5856
θ2 0.33333 0.99929 P(B4) 0.07083 0.05956 -0.01127
θ3 0.33333 0.00036 P(B5) 0.28184 0.0003 -0.28154
The difference between the posterior and prior distributions for
predicate B5 is -0.28154, while the corresponding value for B4 is -
0.01127. Not only are the absolute values different for these two
predicates, but also the relative ones: the ratios of prior to posterior
probabilities for these two predicates are very different as well. This
effect closely resembles what we saw in the η curve: the predicate
that is closer to the observed one suffers less than the one that is
further away from the observation. That means that in the present
model at least some of the analogical effects of the kind that the η
rule postulates are present.
This analogical effect becomes much less pronounced when the
second observation of the same color, that is 0.5, is made: com-
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pared to the posterior after the first observation, the probability for
B5 diminishes by approx. 0.0003 (with P(B5|0.5, 0.5) = 0.0000002),
and the probability for B4 by approx. 0.00001 (with P(B4|0.5, 0.5) =
0.05955). The analogy effect is still present — the posterior for the
further predicate suffers more — but to a much lesser degree. Even-
tually, due to the fact that after enough observations the agent will
concentrate on a single hypothesis, this sort of analogical effect will
vanish completely; again, following Carnap’s own desiderata for
his analogical confirmation functions. With all these similarities, a
question now arises whether the current model does in fact model
analogy by similarity of predicates in full generality, as it was con-
ceived of in the Basic System, and applying to all predicates on the
underlying conceptual space.
The distributions used as hypotheses in the model have a very
similar shape to Carnap’s η curve, which at the first glance suggests
that they might be good candidates for modeling Carnap-style ana-
logical predictions on predicates, just as the η curve was. However,
we have to keep in mind that there are important differences be-
tween the current model and Carnap’s way of modeling analogy by
similarity, even in its modified form developed in section 3.5.5. The
η curve was a representation of the agent’s credence over the con-
ceptual space directly after having made one observation. The mode
of the curve always coincided with that observation. Moreover, Car-
nap had no interest in representing further posterior credences in a
similar fashion.
Remember that my own desideratum for analogical reasoning on
conceptual spaces, discussed in section 4.3, concerned only points
of the conceptual space, rather than predicate regions. In the present
model, that desideratum is satisfied: observing a point a shifts some
of the probability mass onto the hypothesis that gives the highest
likelihood to it; and that in return shifts the resulting density over
the conceptual space towards the region surrounding a (due also to
the fact that all hypotheses were continuous). The question I will
investigate now is whether this feature of the model translates also
to the similar behavior of predictions for predicates, complying with
Carnap’s own η rule.
In the previous chapter, when proposing modifications to the η
curve, I introduced the possibility that the particular observed qual-
ity does not in fact fall in the middle of the observed predicate.
Naturally, these kinds of observations can be recorded in the cur-
rent model as well. Assume that the first observation that Margaret
noted down was in fact a color corresponding to 0.6 on the space,
i.e. the point lying exactly on the border between B3 and B4. Mak-
ing this one observation diminishes her probability for B4 by around
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Figure 22: Updating on 0.7





B3 0.29467 0.0687 -0.22594
B4 0.07083 0.1458 +0.07494
B5 0.28184 0.78092 +0.49908
0.0091, and the one for B5 by around 0.26209 — note that both of
these values are different from the ones in the original example
with one prototypical observation. B5 suffers a little less now, which
comes as no surprise, since the observation made now is closer to
B5’s region. The same is true for B4. B3 gains slightly less than it did
when the observed quality fell right in the middle of its region.
These last results, however, have a peculiar feature. Notice that
0.6 corresponds in the underlying conceptual space to a color that
could be classified as an instance to B3 as much as an instance of B4.
Yet, when we see the posteriors for these two predicates, it turns out
that the observation had a different effect on each of them; it was
inductively relevant for B3, but not for B4.
Something very similar happens when the first observation falls
on the point 0.7 in the space, as figure 22 illustrates. There the ob-
served color is moved further towards the right, right onto the center
of B4. There should be no question of which predicate was instanti-
ated, and yet the predicate that gets confirmed most is B5, instead
of B4. This directly contradicts Carnap’s ideas about similarity and
analogical reasoning: since every predicate is most similar to itself,
it should never be the case that observing an object of a particular
kind is more positively relevant for some other property than for it-
self. Carnap’s rule of self-similarity stated that no predicate should
be more similar to P than P itself. That means that no predicate
other than P should be more inductively relevant for P than P itself.
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One way to explain the failure of the self-similarity principle in
the current model is to look at the characteristics of the predicates
that are causing the trouble here. B4 differs from B3 or B5 in that
there is no hypothesis that strictly favors it. This means that B4 does
not carry a lot of information about which of the possible scenarios
might be true; it is not inductively very useful, given the statistical
model put over the space. The information that B4 does carry is
that the world is slightly more likely to be like θ3 — but the world
according to θ3 is a world where objects of the kind B5 are most
likely to be found; hence the significantly higher premium for B5
after observing B4.
In the present model, the probability distribution over the concep-
tual space is a weighted average of many similarly-shaped hypothe-
ses. The resulting distribution will tend to be multi-modal. While
it will still be the case that observing a point will shift the proba-
bility mass towards it and its neighborhood in a way that is, so to
speak, locally unimodal (following my own desideratum), further
away from the observation there might be other peaks and curves
that could invalidate the general pronouncement of Carnap’s own
η rule, i.e. “the further away you are from the observed predicate,
the lower your probability”. This is what happened in some of the
examples above, for instance when the observed point was the 0.7
in the conceptual space. After making that observation, the agent’s
posterior had three peaks over the conceptual space; none of them
coincided with the observation made.
All of the above is a part of a broader and interesting issue, namely
the interplay between the two notions of similarity effectively present
in the model: one given by the metric on the space, the other given
by the shape of the hypotheses considered in the model; and the
effect that that interplay has on the predictions for predicates. This
is what I will turn to in the next section.
4.7 statistical assumptions and similarities
Once we decide to represent inductive reasoning directly on the
conceptual space by putting a statistical model over that space, the
resulting model will have two moving parts: the space itself, and
the statistical hypotheses put over it. We will have to make model-
ing decisions about both of those parts; choosing the dimensionality,
shape, and metric of the conceptual space; and choosing the set of
statistical hypotheses, their shape and number. These two kinds of
choices can carry different assumptions and presuppositions with
them, in particular assumptions about inductive relevance: which
qualities are or should be inductively relevant for others. Those as-
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sumptions can sometimes conflict one another, resulting in different
notions of inductive relevance being put into one model. In this sec-
tion I propose one way of making sure that such conflicts do not
arise, by adjusting the way the conceptual space is partitioned into
predicates to match the chosen statistical model.
The conceptual space is one way of encoding inductive relevances;
it achieves that via its metric and the assumption that the distances
indeed coincide with inductively bearing similarities (on points or
also on predicates; the latter being an extra, stronger assumption).
However, there is another way of encoding that same kind of infor-
mation, namely directly in the statistical hypotheses. The shape of
the hypotheses expresses which qualities are expected to co-occur.
The latter is just another way of expressing similarity and inductive
relevance.
These two ways of building the relevances into the model can give
parallel results, but they can also be inconsistent with each other. As
long as I am interested in analogical reasoning on the level of point-
sized observations, there is no conflict between the two modes of
encoding relevances; the neighborhood of the observed point will
always receive the analogy boost, as long as the statistical hypothe-
ses used are continuous. However, problems can appear when we
also want to account for the kind of analogy by similarity of coarse-
grained predicates — regions — that Carnap was after, like the
above example of the violation of self-similarity showed.
What choices do we have in situations where there is a clash?
The first possible attitude is what the choice made in section 3.5.4
was motivated by, following the idea that the conceptual space and
its attribute partition are one of the basic elements of a conceptual
framework. That means that it should not be the case that the sta-
tistical model’s assumptions about similarities between predicates,
are contradicting the similarities that follow from the features of the
conceptual space. If we were to assess the current model with that
attitude in mind, it would have to be rejected as irrational: the sta-
tistical model that Margaret put over her conceptual space turned
out to be to some extent inconsistent with the assumptions carried
over by the space (together with the principle of self-similarity).
However, right now I do not want to treat the predicate struc-
ture on the space as given and unchangeable; quite the opposite, I
want to fully acknowledge the fact that the same space can be par-
titioned into predicates in many ways, without changing the metric
on the space itself. After all, my inductive reasoning no longer needs
the predicates; it just needs the underlying space. Furthermore, the
predicate structure of the space can be informed by the statistical
model. Thus, I am interested in the statistical model over the space,
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and what I can learn from it by looking at the posterior distribution
over the space. They will tell me how to partition the space into
useful, interesting predicates.
This is why here I would choose the opposite of the first sugges-
tion above, namely to treat the statistical dependencies encoded by
the hypotheses as primary, and force the attribute partition to fol-
low them. Just as in the previous case we would have told Margaret
to change her statistical model to match the conceptual space she
started with, in this case we would command her to modify the
space in some way in order for it to not clash with her statistical
assumptions. A problem arises of how exactly to achieve that.
The distance measure on each conceptual space is defined on
its points, and the similarities between predicates are then derived.
However, simply changing the way that the space is partitioned into
regions will change the similarities between the predicates that la-
bel those regions, without the need to change the whole underlying
space. Hence, one possible strategy for matching the similarities be-
tween predicates encoded in the space to the ones encoded in the
hypotheses, would be to force the partitioning of the space to re-
spect what is given by the hypotheses. It turns out that this can be
achieved, and that the prescription can be applied to any concep-
tual space and hypotheses over it, as long as the hypotheses are
unimodal. That means that with every set of unimodal hypotheses
(like the ones in Margaret’s model), there comes a predicate struc-
ture on the space, that satisfies Carnap’s self-similarity and hence
avoids the problems shown in the previous section.
Here is how the new predicate structure is motivated by the in-
ductive practice over a particular conceptual structure, i.e. the un-
derlying conceptual space. Take a look again at figure 22. The rea-
son that B5 profited much more than B4 did is that the hypothesis
favored by the observation at 0.7, namely θ3, happens to be the one
that puts the bulk of its mass on predicate B5 only. Through the
update, θ3 becomes the most confirmed one, but most of that boost
translates into confirmation for B5 and not B4. In that sense the way
that the space is partitioned into predicates does not follow the hy-
potheses: there is a mismatch.
Figure 23 shows the original predicate structure on the left, and
a new one on the right. On the left side we can see that indeed
there are predicates, namely B2 and B4, such that observing colors
that belong to them will greatly favor not those predicates, but their
neighbors. Moreover, observing the neighboring predicates will give
more inductive premium to them, compared to what they receive
from themselves.
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Figure 23: Predicates-hypotheses mismatch?





If the partitioning of the space into predicates, on the other hand,
follows the maximum likelihoods — like on the right side of the
figure — then this effect does not arise. It is now the case that ob-
serving a predicate is most relevant for that particular predicate. A
general prescription can be formulated as the following rule: choose
your predicate partition in such a way that the borders between
predicates fall on points such that the maximum likelihood given to
those points is given by more than one hypothesis. This will ensure
that observing an object falling under P favors the hypothesis that
gives a lot of its mass to P.
When that rule is not observed, we risk violating self-similarity.
Hence, predicates on the conceptual space are chosen to match our
ideas about inductive relevance. We choose predicates on the right
of figure 23 over the ones on the left, because using the latter, we
cannot do inductive reasoning the way we want to do it. This kind
of argument is actually familiar. In a way, we choose green over
grue for a similar reason: because with grue we cannot do inductive
reasoning in the way we imagine it should work.
Figure 23 also further illustrates the fact that the hypotheses are
another way of encoding similarities between predicates. On the
right side of figure 23 the three predicates are very dissimilar: they
have no hypotheses in common, so to speak. On the left side, what
makes B4 and B5 more similar, is that there is a hypothesis that
makes them both quite probable. And the more hypotheses two
predicates share in this way, the more likely it is that the predic-
tions regarding them will behave in a similar way, which is what
happened in figure 22. Hence, on the right side of figure 23 I can
expect little to no analogy effects on predicates — i.e. some pred-
icates being relevant not just for themselves, but also to others —
and on the left I can expect some. Which is indeed the case. How-
ever, this does not mean that following the above formulated rule
on dividing the space into predicates, will result in there being no
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analogy effects on predicates at all. Whether they occur depends on
the shape and the number of the hypotheses.
In order to conclude this discussion, let me recall the guiding idea
of this chapter, namely the project of modeling inductive reasoning
directly on the conceptual space. It was motivated by the conception
of the three levels for cognitive representations, and the aim to take
inductive reasoning entirely to the conceptual level, to some extent
circumventing the language, i.e. the particular choice of predicates
for a given conceptual space. Giving privilege to the statistical hy-
potheses over the similarities between predicates fits well into this
project. Now, the predicates turn out to arise from the interplay be-
tween the conceptual space and the beliefs about the distribution of
the qualities in the space. Moreover, the conceptual space no longer
needs to be partitioned into predicates at the very beginning of the
investigation. The hypotheses and the prior over them can be cho-
sen irrespective of that partition, and the same applies to making
observations. Only later on — say, when forced by the need to form
predictions — can the space be divided into predicates, following
the shape of the posterior. There, we are a small step away from
thinking of concept formation as a result of inductive reasoning on
a conceptual space, as suggested by Gärdenfors (1994).
4.8 conclusion
In this chapter I generalized Carnapian prediction on conceptual
spaces in one way, by effectively fine-graining, into continuum many
points, the predicates used to record the data. Still, the model used
is a standard Bayesian one, where the set of hypotheses is taken to
belong to a certain, parametrized family of distributions. I showed
how this new perspective leads to a new understanding of anal-
ogy by similarity, different to the approaches proposed so far. Tak-
ing that understanding, I defined and discussed a simple statistical
model on a one-dimensional conceptual space. I concluded with a
discussion of how the probability distribution over the conceptual
space could be used as a guide in differentiating between different
concepts defined on the space. The problem of concept formation
based on probability distributions over conceptual spaces deserves
more attention and studies on a more general level, not restricted to
such a one-dimensional setting considered in this chapter.
On the side of the theory of the conceptual spaces, a natural ques-
tion to ask would be: what kinds of regions will the partitioning
rule proposed in the previous section — or other possible rules of
that sort — lead to? Within the conceptual spaces community, a lot
of attention is given to convexity as a requirement for naturalness of
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concepts (see section 3.2). The rule proposed here was motivated by
ideas about inductive relevance and the role of similarity consider-
ations therein, rather than ideas about what kinds of predicates are
good for inductive reasoning. It would be worthwhile to investigate
what kinds of regions result from assuming that kind of perspective.
Possibly, convex regions can appear only in special cases, under spe-
cific assumptions about inductive relevance, or only when the shape
of the hypotheses over the conceptual space is of a particular kind.
5
I N C O M M E N S U R A B I L I T Y A N D T H E O RY C H A N G E
5.1 introduction
In the previous three chapters of this thesis I was working with Car-
nap’s notion of a conceptual framework, concentrating on the pres-
ence of conceptual spaces among the frameworks’ elements. Now,
we will switch the focus to a different way of incorporating concep-
tual spaces into the theory of conceptual frameworks; namely the
idea that the whole conceptual framework (of a particular scientific
theory) could be represented as a conceptual space. A proposal to
this end was recently made in the conceptual spaces community,
together with a bold claim that such a representation provides us
with enough means to alleviate Kuhn’s incommensurability chal-
lenge. This chapter analyzes that claim against the background of
Kuhn and Friedman’s work on theory change.
Thomas Kuhn is often taken to have maintained that in times of
scientific revolutions, proponents of radically different conceptual
frameworks cannot communicate fully, for their adherence to their
respective frameworks means that they live in different worlds and
are unable to see past that. Moreover, as a popular interpretation of
Kuhn’s incommensurability challenge goes, the practitioners of the
old, pre-revolutionary science cannot switch their framework alle-
giance to the new, revolutionary one in a way informed by rational
reasons, for no arguments can actually be formulated in the debate.
Since Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), the pic-
ture of science as a knowledge-accumulating enterprise has been
subject to a challenge, and, in effect, many revisions. In the process,
due to a large extent to Kuhn’s way of formulating his claims, a
lot of misunderstanding arose when it comes both to what Kuhn’s
actual position was and what the problem of incommensurability
really is supposed to amount to (and whether it is a problem at all).
A recent example of such a misunderstanding comes from pro-
ponents of conceptual spaces as a framework for representing sci-
entific theories. This new kind of answer to the incommensurability
challenge has been proposed by Frank Zenker and Peter Gärden-
fors, who claim that the whole problem can be dissolved once sci-
entific theories are thought of as based on conceptual frameworks
represented as geometric, multi-dimensional structures. Together
with claiming to have solved Kuhn’s original problem, these two
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authors also take issue with Michael Friedman’s project of address-
ing Kuhn’s challenge. However, a closer look at the authors’ claims
reveals that their proposal does not achieve exactly what they set
out to do.
This chapter has an exegetic and a systematic part. I argue that
Zenker and Gärdenfors’ claims about their alleged dissolution of
Kuhn’s problem of incommensurability rest on a misrepresentation
of Kuhn’s problem. The main upshot of the chapter, however, is a
systematic one. It is that conceptual spaces cannot solve the prob-
lem that Friedman sets up as the problem of rational theory choice,
due to an essential mismatch between the kind of answer that the
problem calls for and the kind of tool that conceptual spaces offer. In
short, Friedman’s problem calls for a way of providing arguments
about different conceptual frameworks that would not amount to
offering another definite framework to frame the discussion. And
conceptual spaces are precisely the opposite: a formal framework to
represent conceptual frameworks.
In order to pick up the different threads in this debate and to
organize its conceptual setup, I will start by discussing Kuhn’s orig-
inal statement and its subsequent clarifications, followed by Fried-
man’s proposal. Then I will discuss Zenker and Gärdenfors’ pro-
posal, focusing on the particular claims they make about Kuhn,
Friedman, and the incommensurability problem itself. I will show
that their understanding of Kuhn and Friedman is to a large ex-
tent misguided, resulting in Zenker and Gärdenfors pointing their
guns in the wrong direction when addressing the problem of incom-
mensurability. In the last section I investigate whether any constitu-
tive framework for representing scientific theories could answer the
problem of incommensurability that Friedman was aiming at with
his proposal.
Hence, the structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 sketch-
es the background of the debate, starting with Kuhn’s early views
on incommensurability of scientific theories (5.2.1) and proceeding
onto Kuhn’s later, revised position (5.2.2). I follow with Friedman’s
proposal of the dynamic, three-tired system for scientific theories
(5.3). Section 5.4 turns to a recent response to Kuhn and Friedman
by Zenker and Gärdenfors, offering a conceptual spaces account of
the dynamic of scientific theories. Section 5.5 offers a critique of
the way in which these authors approach incommensurability. In
particular, I discuss the issue of communication and the causes of
incommensurability (5.5.1) and the question of whether scientists
need to or do use philosophical arguments (5.5.2). Section 5.6 con-
tains the systematic part of the chapter. It starts with a discussion
of what it takes to be a rational option from the point of view of
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an older paradigm (5.6.1). I then move onto considering the indis-
pensability of philosophy in Friedman’s proposal, in order arrive at
the question of the nature of meta-frameworks needed to alleviate
incommensurability (5.6.2). Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.2 kuhn’s problem of incommensurability
Given the importance of the problem and how much debate it has
stirred since Kuhn first mentioned it, the remarks about the incom-
mensurability of scientific theories to be found in The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962) are rather scarce and vague. A lot
of the debate on incommensurability could be attributed to selec-
tive or incomplete readings of Kuhn’s own words, both in Structure
and in other places (Kuhn 1970a, 1977b). Moreover, Kuhn’s position
changed over time, starting from rather radical statements in Struc-
ture, which caused a surge of opposition and criticism, followed
by later refinements that significantly weakened the strong flavor of
the original formulation. In this section I present a short overview of
Kuhn’s early and later discussion of incommensurability. The early
statement of the problem in the first edition of Structure is the more
radical one. Kuhn’s work that followed, in the Postscript to the sec-
ond edition of Structure (1970) and the later papers, was more toned
down and focused on only one of the three dimensions or flavours
of incommensurability that he initially pointed out. A more detailed
exposition of Kuhn’s changing views on the matter can be found in
(Hoyningen-Huene 1993, ch. 6).
5.2.1 The early Kuhnian incommensurability
The popular way of spelling out the problem of incommensura-
bility goes along the following lines. In times of deep conceptual
change, i.e. scientific revolutions, proponents of competing scientific
paradigms or conceptual frameworks1 are unable to communicate
clearly and rationally about their respective theories. That means
that the proponents of the new paradigm cannot formulate argu-
ments for adopting their framework – that is, arguments that could
be considered rational by the adherents of the old paradigm – hence
the communication between the two sides cannot rest on proofs, but
rather on persuasion. This situation raises a serious threat to ratio-
nality of science on the whole: if the choice of a new paradigm
1 In this thesis, following the popular practice, the two terms are used as practically
synonymous. However, the actual meaning of the term “paradigm” is subject to
debate, see (Kuhn 1977b, ch. 12).
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cannot be reconstructed as based on legitimate reasons, and no
paradigm can be seen as superior to any other prior to its own ac-
ceptance, how can we argue that through its history science has
progressed towards better and better theories?
The above interpretation of Kuhn’s concept of incommensurabil-
ity, while quite radical and inviting strong opposition, could in fact
be seen as backed by some of Kuhn’s own words. For instance, the
following quote could be seen as implying that the proponents of
the two paradigms cannot communicate with each other:
the choice between competing paradigms regularly raises
questions that cannot be resolved by the criteria of nor-
mal science. To the extent . . . that two scientific schools
disagree about what is a problem and what a solution,
they will inevitably talk through each other when de-
bating the relative merits of their respective paradigms.
(Kuhn 1996, p. 109)
When Kuhn himself introduces the term ’incommensurability’ for
the first time, he does so in the following passage, suggesting that
incommensurability of theories comes from the different sets of stan-
dards for problems and their solutions that the two paradigms im-
pose:
But paradigms differ in more than substance, for they
are directed not only to nature but also back upon the
science that produced them. They are the source of meth-
ods, problem-field, and standards of solution. . . As the
problems change, so, often, does the standard that distin-
guishes a real scientific solution from a mere metaphys-
ical speculation, word game, or mathematical play. The
normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific
revolution is not only incompatible but often actually in-
commensurable with that which has gone before. (Kuhn
1996, p. 103)
Later on in Structure Kuhn lists three components of incommen-
surability between different traditions of normal science. First, in
line with the previous quote, frameworks differ in what they deem
to be essential problems to be solved by the framework, as well as
in standards for what counts as solutions to the problems. Second,
introduction of the new framework means a change in meaning of
some of the terms or concepts used in the previous one. Finally,
the proponents of the different frameworks “practice their trades in
different worlds”2 (Kuhn 1996, pp. 148–150).
2 A phrase which, unfortunately, Kuhn did not elaborate on in Structure.
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A number of authors have responded to Kuhn’s challenge, as pre-
sented above, trying to answer the question of how the change from
one paradigm to another can be seen as a rational choice rather
than an effect of persuasion not based on rational arguments. A lot
of those answers were aimed against a position that Kuhn took to
be a misrepresentation of what he meant to say (granted, a misinter-
pretation to a large extent grounded in imprecise and at times too
strong wording). In spite of Kuhn’s repeated clarifications (Kuhn
1970a,b, 1977b) and, recently, also others pointing to the deep mis-
understanding of Kuhn’s intentions (D’Agostino 2014), the above
picture remains for many the default way of thinking about Kuhn’s
incommensurability challenge and his own response to it. In real-
ity, though, Kuhn’s position did evolve over the years, to arrive at a
much milder place.
5.2.2 Late Kuhn: translatability and values
One of the things that from the very beginning Kuhn’s critics have
taken him to have said is that subsequent paradigms, because in-
commensurable, remain incomparable and no form of argumenta-
tion is possible when proponents of competing paradigms try to
convince each other of the merits of their respective frameworks.3
However, already in Structure Kuhn explicitly rejects such an inter-
pretation:
Still, to say . . . that paradigm change cannot be justified
by proof, is not to say that no arguments are relevant
or that scientists cannot be persuaded to change their
minds (Kuhn 1996, p. 152)
In a later paper Kuhn (1977a) presented a further elaboration of
what kinds of reasons can be given and what arguments can be
made in such a situation, based on rational criteria of theory choice.
That the choice of a paradigm cannot be justified by proof comes
from the fact that proponents of the competing paradigms do not
agree on what, in this case, would count as a scientific proof in
the first place. Hence, no hard rules for choice can be formulated.
Kuhn’s proposed solution, then, rested on an acknowledgment of
a set of values used in judging scientific theories and supposedly
shared by the community throughout science’s history. The values
– the well-known list that includes consistency, fruitfulness, accu-
racy and the like – need to be taken for what they are, that is as
3 See for instance Lakatos: “There are no rational standards for their comparison.
Each paradigm contains its own standards. . . . Thus in Kuhn’s view scientific revolu-
tion is irrational, a matter for mob psychology” (Lakatos 1970, 178, emphasis original).
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values and not strict rules specifying exactly what ultimate choice
one must make, which leaves room for a certain indeterminacy of
people’s judgments about subsequent theories. The fact that the dif-
ferent individuals and communities all apply those values in their
judgments of theories – albeit in slightly different ways – still en-
sures sufficient amount of rationality of scientific development.
Starting with the second edition of Structure, Kuhn kept on re-
fining the concept of incommensurability, arriving at a narrower
notion that reflected only one of the three aspects of it originally
present in the book (which led Richardson (2002, p. 264) to pro-
nounce that Kuhn “allowed philosophers to tell him that incom-
mensurability was a semantic notion” and drop the more interest-
ing part of the concept). The concept was narrowed down to regard
relations between languages rather than whole scientific traditions.
This meant dropping the insight concerning the incommensurable
practices, problems, and standards of solutions, as well as the claim
about scientists living in different worlds.4 What was left was incom-
mensurability as meaning change and the subsequent explications
of that notion (see Hoyningen-Huene 1993, pp. 212–215).
Incommensurability thus becomes non-intertranslatability (e.g.
Kuhn 1970a, sec. 6). Moreover, the change in meaning causing it is
not only an extensional one, resulting from the change of referents
of a term. The changes in meaning are also intensional, i.e. result-
ing from the change of relations that were constitutive to the main
concepts of the theory (see Hoyningen-Huene 1993, p. 210). Initially
Kuhn focused on the unavailability of a sufficiently neutral obser-
vation language that could bridge the empirical content of the two
theories. After that, he turned for inspiration to the work on radical
translation by Quine (1960). Two theories are not intertranslatable
when their lexicons have different structures, i.e. when there has
been a change in the similarity relations that are constitutive of con-
cepts (see Hoyningen-Huene 1993, pp. 217-218), which is what can
happen during a revolutionary shift.
We can conclude that more than one concept of incommensura-
bility can be found in Kuhn’s writing. Kuhn’s views on the subject
have changed through time, and quite a lot of the interpretations
and criticism was directed at things he either explicitly denied or
did not mean in the first place (although, arguably, did to some de-
gree express due to the strong and at times unclear wording). Just
as diachronically there are multiple Kuhns, there are also multiple
concepts of incommensurability of theories. Two facts noted in this
section will become relevant in my upcoming discussion of Zenker
4 The problem of the different worlds was approached later on by Hacking (1993)
and Kuhn (1993) himself.
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and Gärdenfors’ approach to incommensurability. The first one is
that Kuhn has over time distanced himself from the interpretation
of incommensurability as the impossibility of rational argumenta-
tion and communication between the proponents. The second is
that Kuhn insisted on the understanding of incommensurability as
non-intertranslatability of theories.
5.3 friedman’s meta-paradigms
One of the authors who have taken up Kuhn’s incommensurability
challenge was Michael Friedman. Friedman’s interpretation of the
problem and the details of his proposal are an important point of ref-
erence for both Zenker and Gärdenfors’ paper and my own critique
of their approach, hence a more detailed exposition of Friedman’s
view is in order. In particular, this section discusses how Friedman
understands the problem of rational theory change in case of incom-
mensurable theories, as well as shows what role does philosophy
play in his solution.
In Dynamics of Reason (2001) Friedman reinterprets the incommen-
surability challenge against his own conception of the structure of
scientific theories and the dynamics of their evolution. Friedman
does agree with Kuhn that there is a sense in which the two frame-
works are truly incommensurable. However, he still argues that, in
a sense, the new framework is also a rational continuation of the old
one – from the point of view of the old one, not just retrospectively.
He therefore aims to provide a solution for his own version of the
problem of incommensurability, the problem that could be called
the prospective rational theory choice problem: how to see the new
framework as a rational continuation of the old one, from the point
of view of the old one, without assuming that the new framework
has already been fully formed and accepted. This section presents
Friedman’s response to that problem in some detail.
In Friedman’s view, scientific theories consist of two parts or lev-
els, over which spans a third one, “the philosophical articulation
of what we might call meta-paradigms or meta-frameworks for rev-
olutionary science capable of motivating and sustaining the tran-
sition to a new scientific paradigm” (Friedman 2001, p. 44). The
first two layers of this three-layer system are well-known from the
work of Reichenbach (1965) and Carnap (1937). The first level in ev-
ery conceptual framework consists of particular, strictly empirical
statements and laws, whose establishment and updating makes up
most of the scientists’ work during stable periods of normal science.
The second level is the level of concepts and principles who ensure
the possibility of the expression and testing of the principles of the
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empirical level. The principles of the second level are constitutive
for the concepts used on the first level; without them no statement
of the empirical principles would have been possible. They simply
define the space of empirical possibility. For example, Newton’s sec-
ond law of motion would not even be possible to formulate without
Newton’s own development of the calculus for infinite limiting pro-
cesses and instantaneous rates of change (Friedman 2001, p. 35).
While the first two levels describe theories as static and self-con-
tained, the third level becomes salient in times when a new frame-
work is proposed and deliberation of whether to adopt it is in or-
der for the practitioners of the previous paradigm. Friedman argues
that on top of the two levels within a scientific theory or a concep-
tual framework there is a third one, the level of meta-frameworks
and meta-arguments. On that third level philosophical concepts and
essentially philosophical arguments are employed, rather than argu-
ments evoking the usual criteria such as simplicity or explanatory
power. These latter criteria can be used outside the context of deep
conceptual change and paradigm shifts.
The third level is a level of discourse on which the proponents
of the new paradigm can formulate arguments in a way recognized
as rational by both sides of the debate. True communication and
argumentation is impossible when the two frameworks look at each
other from their respective first and second levels, i.e. the strictly
empirical and the constitutive. The arguments to be used by the
proponents of the new framework to convince the proponents of the
old framework to switch allegiance cannot be spelled out so to speak
from the inside of either of the paradigms, for that would amount
to answering an external question about a framework from the level
of that framework itself (see Carnap 1956). Therefore another level
of discourse is needed, one that goes over and beyond the particular
constitutive frameworks.
In the same way that the formulation and revision of specific laws
on the empirical level requires the constitutive principles, the more
fundamental revision of the constitutive part cannot occur within
itself, but needs another level of discourse, one that goes beyond
the base framework: “reflection on the distinctively philosophical
or meta-paradigmatic level helps us to define, during the revolution-
ary transition in question, what we now mean by a natural, reason-
able, or responsible such continuation [of the concepts of an earlier
paradigm]” (Friedman 2001, p. 105).
The idea of the new framework being not just a responsible op-
tion, but also an actual responsible continuation of the old paradigm
(from the point of view of that paradigm), needs an explanation.
The main threat of Kuhn’s incommensurability challenge lies in its
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apparent ability to force us to see shifts in paradigm adherence as
merely irrational choices not based on actual reasons or admittance
of the actual scientific superiority of the new paradigm. For if there
can be no reason in the switches, the general rationality of science’s
progress cannot be defended, which opens wide the door to full
blown relativism. This is the dragon that needs to be slain in this
battle, and even Kuhn, who unleashed the beast in the first place,
made an attempt to overcome it.
Friedman took issue with Kuhn’s proposal, which was based on
evoking values shared by all scientific communities and used in the-
ory choice (see section 5.2.2). One of Friedman’s reasons was that
he found it highly doubtful that we could actually identify such a
historically stable set of shared values used in evaluating scientific
theories. As a replacement for this proposal, he introduced the idea
of an ultimate, ideal scientific community, which each actual com-
munity strives to approach (Friedman 2001, p. 65).
Friedman admits that the problem of semantic incommensurabil-
ity, stemming from the differences in constitutive principles of the
two theories, is essentially unresolvable (see section 5.5.1). There can
be no translation procedure between concepts that differ in status in
the sense of being constitutive or empirical; the difference in status
is unbridgeable. However, he does attempt to solve the prospective
rational theory choice problem, that is the problem of how the new
paradigm can be seen as a rational option to take up by the practi-
tioners of the old paradigm.
The constitutive principles of the old paradigm define or provide
the range of what is deemed empirically possible by the framework.
The new framework extends that range in a nontrivial way, which
means that it introduces certain alternatives as empirical possibili-
ties that were not alternatives before at all. In this sense, the propo-
nents of the new framework, in the eyes of the “old-paradigmers”,
are not talking about different things – for those “things” cannot
even exist from the earlier perspective – they are simply talking
pure nonsense.
However, the new framework can still be argued to be grounded
in other, also relevant forms of discourse, other than the discourse
on what is empirically possible; those other forms of discourse will
become the ways in which the new framework will be seen as after
all continuous with already existing practices and the old frame-
work in general: “In this way, the new constitutive framework is
a quite deliberate modification or transformation of the old consti-
tutive framework, developed against the backdrop of a common
set of problems, conceptualizations, and concerns” (Friedman 2001,
p. 101).
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The above means that whether the new framework can be seen
from the point of view of the old framework as its rational and
responsible continuation, depends on establishing conceptual conti-
nuity in a case where there is a radical discontinuity. The discontinu-
ity appears on the level of empirical possibility: the range of what
is deemed empirically possible by the new framework is strictly
greater than what was possible according to the old constitutive
framework. Moreover, the continuity needs to be established in a
way that does not refer to any constitutive frameworks: for the new
one hasn’t been accepted yet – it is not yet even fully developed
– and the old one renders the new one as complete nonsense. In
order for the new constitutive framework to be seen as a reason-
able option – an option that is worth giving a chance in empirical
testing, for instance, which requires precisely the admittance of the
new framework’s idea of what “empirical testing” now means – the
proponents of the old paradigm need to be given reasons for why
in spite of the empirical discontinuity, there is still enough of a con-
ceptual connection between the two paradigms. I will return to this
issue of reason-giving and the exploration of the yet unconceived
range of possibilities, in section 5.6.1.
Friedman (2001, p. 66) lists three conditions that the new frame-
work needs to fulfill in order to be considered such a reasonable
continuation of the old one. First, it must be possible to reconstruct
the old constitutive framework in the new one, and in such a way
that the old framework appears as a limiting case. The second crite-
rion is that the evolution from the old to the new constitutive prin-
ciples must proceed along a series of natural transformations, again
stressing the continuity between the subsequent paradigms. This
natural evolution is often ensured by the corresponding evolution
in the mathematical basis of the theories, i.e. in many cases what
counts as a natural conceptual transformation will be grounded in
a particular mathematical development. Finally, the transformation
should be motivated by “an appropriate new philosophical meta-
framework, which, in particular, interacts productively with both
older philosophical meta-frameworks and new developments tak-
ing place in the sciences themselves” (Friedman 2001, p. 66). That
is, the continuity between the two paradigms is ensured not just by
the relations between their constitutive parts, but also by a more
general, meta-theoretical continuity of ideas and arguments on a
level more general than the one of particular frameworks.
Philosophy supplies a space in which this kind of continuity can
be traced: it provides criteria for what it is to be an option in exist-
ing (communicatively) rational discourse without being an empiri-
cal option. Philosophy radically differs from the sciences in that it
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never reaches the state of normal science, where all (or at least the
majority) of its practitioners agree on a common framework. How-
ever, it does have a rather universal (within the discipline) standard
of what moves count as reasonable in debates or what the currently
important issues are. Moreover, philosophy allows for discussing
fundamental concepts outside of specific scientific frameworks. This
set of characteristics ensures for Friedman that philosophy has a spe-
cial status next to natural science, not as its part – contra Quinean
naturalism – but as a medium in times of deep conceptual change,
forming the basis of the meta-frameworks being formulated at the
third level of the dynamics of scientific theories.
Here are, then, the main elements of Friedman’s proposal, which
aims at the problem of prospective rationality of theory choice: the
issue of how any new framework can be seen as a rational and re-
sponsible continuation of a previous one, at a point when the new
constitutive framework is not yet in place and accepted. According
to Friedman, philosophy plays an indispensable role in tracing out
the conceptual continuity between the existing framework and the
new one under development, for the very reason that it provides
discursive means and concepts not governed by strict rules of any
particular constitutive framework. It is this view of the role of philos-
ophy in scientific revolutions that Zenker and Gärdenfors criticize,
aiming to provide an alternative mode of representing scientific the-
ories that would render philosophical discourse inessential in times
of deep conceptual change. In in the next section I will present their
proposal, and in section 5.6 I will consider the question of whether
Zenker and Gärdenfors proposal could solve the problem that Fried-
man set out to solve, i.e. the problem of prospective theory choice.
5.4 conceptual frameworks as spaces
The recent critique of Friedman’s proposal came from a rather un-
expected direction and was issued by proponents of the theory of
conceptual spaces as tools for representing scientific frameworks.
The aim of this chapter is a critical analysis of their proposal and
answering the question of whether the kind of answer they offer
to Friedman’s problem of prospective theory choice can be success-
ful at all. Before turning to those two topics in sections 5.5 and 5.6
respectively, I will first briefly introduce Zenker and Gärdenfors’
proposal.
The authors’ starting point is the theory of conceptual spaces, as
it was described here in section 3.2. They take this general theory
for representing concepts to provide a powerful meta-framework in
which every scientific theory, regardless of the language in which it
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is spelled out or the kinds of concepts it uses, can be represented.
The dimensions in the space represent the basic magnitudes intro-
duced by the theory or framework in question, such as mass or
the spatial dimensions. The laws belonging to the strictly empirical
level of the theory can be thought of as providing constraints on the
distribution of points over the space; stating that only certain com-
binations of values of the considered magnitudes can empirically
coexist (for more on conceptual frameworks as spaces see (Gärden-
fors and Zenker 2011; Zenker and Gärdenfors 2014b)). For exam-
ple, according to Gärdenfors (2000, p. 216), the conceptual space
of Newtonian mechanics consists of the following dimensions: the
three dimensions of the Euclidean space, time, mass, and the three
dimensions of force. Assigning values in all of these dimensions
to an object amounts to a complete description of it in the theory.
Moreover, specific laws, like for instance the laws of motion, render
some combinations of the points in this conceptual space empiri-
cally impossible.
Zenker and Gärdenfors (2014b) propose five kinds of changes that
a conceptual framework, represented as a conceptual space, can un-
dergo, ordered by their relative severity. The first kind of change
is addition and deletion of special laws, which means a change in
the constraints on the distribution of points in the space. This kind
of change belongs to the strictly empirical level and does not re-
ally constitute a change to the conceptual framework itself (Zenker
and Gärdenfors 2014b, p. 4.1). The second one is a change in met-
ric. Dimensions of a space come with metrics on them, and there
are several kinds of metrics. The reason that this kind of change
belongs to the empirical level, other than the fact that it doesn’t
change the dimensions themselves, is because we can think of the
change of metric as influencing the kind of empirical content that is
expressible in the theory. The third is a change in the importance of
dimensions; some dimensions can become more salient over time,
but this kind of change does not constitute any radical move in the
conceptual framework. The fourth kind of change is a change in sep-
arability of dimensions. Separable dimensions are the ones whose
value could be assigned to an object without necessarily assigning
values on other dimensions. Dimensions that are not separable are
integral, for instance the dimensions of hue and brightness in the
color space, since it is impossible to assign a value along the hue di-
mension to an observed color without also assigning a value along
the brightness dimension to it. If a separable dimension becomes in-
tegral or the other way around, it implies a change for measurement
methodology: features of objects that could be measured indepen-
dently now become correlated in some way. The final, fifth type of
5.5 incommensurability on conceptual spaces 127
change is addition and deletion of dimensions. According to the au-
thors, this is the kind of change that is involved in revolutionary
paradigm shifts.
In their recent paper Zenker and Gärdenfors (2014a) take issue
with Friedman’s proposal to alleviate the incommensurability chal-
lenge. Their claim is that the theory of conceptual spaces can pro-
vide precisely the discursive means that Friedman calls for in his
analysis of conceptual continuity needed for rational theory choice.
They argue that once scientific theories and frameworks they are
based on are represented as conceptual spaces, the incommensura-
bility brought about by referential divergence between the terms of
the two theories disappears and, moreover, no need is left for the
level of the philosophical frameworks to explain the communicative
success of scientists in times of deep conceptual change.
For Zenker and Gärdenfors the level on which proponents of dif-
ferent frameworks can communicate is precisely the theory of con-
ceptual spaces: they can describe their own frameworks in terms of
conceptual dimensions and constraints on them, and this will pro-
vide the necessary platform for arguments. The two theories can be
compared via a comparison of their respective conceptual spaces,
which can be done in a purely geometrical fashion, thereby eschew-
ing the problems that emerge for Friedman when two constitutive
frameworks are compared without the recourse to the geometrical
representation. Moreover, due to the new mode of representation,
the new paradigm can be seen as a rational option to consider from
the point of view of the old one, rather than unimaginable nonsense.
Since the semantics assumed by these two authors is cognitive,
there arises no problem of the terms in the theories referring to dif-
ferent extra-linguistic, out-in-the-world entities. Hence, according
to the authors, the communicative challenges do not arise and the
different parties to the conversation do not talk past each other, re-
ferring to different things with the same words. Instead, they use the
same words to refer to concepts in their respective spatial concep-
tual frameworks, and those, in turn, can easily be compared. How-
ever, as attractive as such a proposal sounds, it does not and cannot
deliver on its promises, which I will show in the remaining sections.
5.5 incommensurability on conceptual spaces
The problem with Zenker and Gärdenfors’ proposal is twofold and
the remaining sections will explore those two issues. The first one
regards the way in which these two authors present the position that
they are arguing against. It turns out that they simplify and misrep-
resent Kuhn’s and Friedman’s positions, which in turn makes their
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proposal appear more plausible. However – and this is the second
issue I will approach in the remainder of this chapter – the theory of
conceptual spaces cannot serve the same role that Friedman’s meta-
paradigms are supposed to serve, and hence cannot be part of the
solution for Friedman’s prospective rational theory choice problem.
Thus, I first turn to the problem of how they misrepresent Kuhn
and Friedman. Zenker and Gärdenfors conflate the positions of the
two philosophers, taking them to be addressing exactly the same
problem. They say that for Kuhn and Friedman incommensurabil-
ity is a matter of the same terms of the two theories extensionally
referring to different objects. In section 5.5.1 below I show that their
presentation of the problem does not match either Kuhn’s or Fried-
man’s writing.
Section 5.5.2 discusses the claims that Zenker and Gärdenfors
make regarding Friedman’s position on philosophy being the source
of meta-frameworks needed in times of paradigm shifts. Zenker and
Gärdenfors submit that Friedman’s position implies that scientists
cannot engage in communicatively rational discourse unless they
are able to engage in strictly philosophical debates, but that “there
are socio-empirical reasons to doubt Friedman’s account: [since] by
and large, scientists are not well-versed in philosophical discourse,
and it is not clear either that they need to be” (Zenker and Gärden-
fors 2014a, p. 271). Here again it turns out that Zenker and Gärden-
fors did not give Friedman’s writing a fair consideration.
A big part of their proposal is the claim that conceptual spaces
can replace Friedman’s philosophical meta-frameworks and argu-
ments at the third level of scientific theories. They say that their
proposal provides a “response to the Kuhnian challenge” (Zenker
and Gärdenfors 2014a, p. 271), by showing how the new framework
can be seen as communicatively rational in the sense introduced by
Friedman: “it is not necessary to deploy the entirety of philosophi-
cal discourse in order to explain that radical changes to a conceptual
framework can be communicatively rational” (Zenker and Gärden-
fors 2014a, p. 271). Philosophy is supposed to be no longer needed
to explain rational communication between proponents of different
paradigms: “communicative rationality appears to be available prior
to Friedman’s third level” (Zenker and Gärdenfors 2014a, p. 274). I
return to that issue in section 5.6, where it will turn out to be a
part of a broader problem of representation of conceptual frame-
works and its bearing on incommensurability and the problem of
theory change. It will turn out that conceptual spaces couldn’t solve
Friedman’s problem of prospective rational theory choice, due to
an essential and irrevocable mismatch in the kind of solution that
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the problem calls for and the means offered by the proposed frame-
work.
5.5.1 Communication and referential divergence
Zenker and Gärdenfors state that seeing conceptual frameworks as
conceptual spaces rather than sets of sentences (the latter being
what they interpret Friedman and Kuhn to be assuming) can ex-
plain the fact that scientists do seem to communicate successfully in
spite of subscribing to different paradigms: “such spatial objects, we
submit, form the basis of communication between scientists during
periods of what Friedman calls “deep conceptual change”” (Zenker
and Gärdenfors 2014a, p. 273). The authors appear to believe that
the problem of incommensurability is dissolved once the actual com-
munication is accounted for. However, already Kuhn himself has ac-
knowledged that fact, at the same time warning his commentators
that it was not equivalent to there being no deep incommensurabil-
ity problem whatsoever:
More important, critics often slide from the observed ex-
istence of such communication [between proponents of
different frameworks], which I have underscored myself,
to the conclusion that it can present no essential prob-
lems. (Kuhn 1970a, p. 267)
Both for the early and the late Kuhn the impossibility of perfect
translation remains a problem regardless of whether scientists do in
fact manage to compare meanings of their terms to an extent suf-
ficient for exchanging ideas about their respective paradigms. An-
swering the question of how a rational choice of a new paradigm is
possible is simply not a matter of noticing that scientists do in fact
seem to have productive conversations.
Zenker and Gärdenfors (2014a, p. 262) seem to be largely do-
ing exactly what Kuhn criticized in the above quote: they acknowl-
edge and claim to explain existing communication between scien-
tists while also arguing that, because of the way they explain the
communicative success (i.e. through conceptual spaces), incommen-
surability does not arise as a real problem: “Frameworks have to
be compared in scientific discussions, but this can be handled by
comparing their geometric or topological properties, instead of rely-
ing on meta-philosophical considerations” (Zenker and Gärdenfors
2014a, p. 275).
In criticizing their statements as too quick when it comes to in-
commensurability, I do not mean to say that conceptual spaces are
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incapable of providing a framework in which different scientific the-
ories could be represented and compared (although that claim still
remains to be instantiated by detailed, worked-out examples). How-
ever, the existence of that tool does not just by itself constitute an
answer to Kuhn’s problem – something that Kuhn himself, as shown
above, noted.
This brings us to the issue of what incommensurability means for
the discussed authors, that is: which problem are they claiming to
dissolve? The first thing to note here is that Zenker and Gärdenfors
fall into the popular pattern of interpreting early Kuhn’s presen-
tation of incommensurability as completely excluding the possibil-
ity of rational theory deliberation (see section 5.2.1): “to suggest, as
Kuhn (1970, ch. IX) did, that the conversion of “old paradigmers” be
a matter of merely assent-directed persuasion” (Zenker and Gärden-
fors 2014a, 266, emphasis original). However, as I already pointed
out above, even in the first edition of Structure we can find state-
ments that explicitly warn us against such an interpretation.5
According to Zenker and Gärdenfors, both for Kuhn and Fried-
man incommensurability is an effect of referential divergence:
“Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis derives from a view on seman-
tics that requires all concepts to have referents” (Zenker and Gärden-
fors 2014a, p. 262). That is, the reason that rational communication
seems impossible between proponents of different paradigms is that
the words that they use are assumed to refer to things out there in
the world and in fact the same words turn out to refer to different
things.
The authors believe that also Friedman subscribes to the above
view on incommensurability when he embarks on his project:
Friedman essentially accepts referential divergence as cap-
turing “a centrally important aspect of what he [Kuhn]
has called the non-intertranslatability or ‘incommensu-
rability’ of pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary the-
ories” (Zenker and Gärdenfors (2014a, p. 268), quoting
(Friedman 2002, 186, n. 14))
The main thrust of the semantics offered by conceptual spaces is
that words are taken to refer to concepts rather than things, and con-
cepts can be easily compared via their structural properties made
explicit in their spatial representations. A lot has been said already
in the initial sections of this chapter about what Kuhn took incom-
mensurability of frameworks to mean and what problem did Fried-
5 See also: “Still, to say . . . that paradigm change cannot be justified by proof, is not
to say that no arguments are relevant or that scientists cannot be persuaded to
change their minds” (Kuhn 1996, p. 152).
5.5 incommensurability on conceptual spaces 131
man set out to solve. I will now consider the question of whether
the problem of incommensurability can be reduced to referential di-
vergence between terms of the subsequent theories. Do Kuhn and
Friedman subscribe to the idea that the fact that the terms of the sub-
sequent theories are taken to refer to different things can be singled
out as the culprit of incommensurability?
In the first quote in section 5.2.1 above, Kuhn (1996, p. 109) brings
up the image of two scientists talking past each other: an essential
change in the meaning of words as the source of incommensura-
bility. However, a change in meaning can be taken to be many dif-
ferent things, only one of them being a change in referents of the
relevant words. Moreover, for Kuhn the change in referents – exten-
sional meaning change involved in revolutions – is a result of the
intensional meaning change, i.e. the change in constitutive concepts
of the theory and relations between them (Hoyningen-Huene 1993,
p. 211).
Friedman’s own position on incommensurability mirrors Kuhn’s
diagnosis regarding the meaning shifts of constitutive concepts. Con-
sider the following quotes from Dynamics of Reason, a book in which
Friedman develops his answer to the problem of incommensurabil-
ity:
We have here captured the sense, I believe, in which
the Kuhnnian claims of incommensurability and non-
intertranslatability between successive frameworks in a
scientific revolution are correct. The later framework is
not translatable into the earlier framework, of course,
simply because the concepts used in formulating the later
framework have not yet come into existence. (Friedman
2001, pp. 98-99)
This captures the sense, in particular, in which there has
indeed been a “meaning change” in the transition from
the old framework to the new: even if the same terms
and principles reappear in the new framework, they do
not have the same meaning they had in the old, for they
may no longer function as constitutive. (Friedman 2001,
p. 99)
The second quote above makes it clear that for Friedman the es-
sential aspect of the meaning change that terms undergo under a
paradigm shift is not necessarily the change in their referents, but
rather the change in the status of the terms, from constitutive to
empirical. This, and not the change in referents, is what presents
the challenge. In the first quote he talks about concepts of the sec-
ond paradigm not existing yet in the previous framework; not about
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words referring to different things, but about concepts themselves
being different between the two paradigms. In neither of the two
cases – concepts changing status or new ones emerging altogether –
does he reduce the problem to changes in reference.
That Kuhn did not take meaning shifts to solely be shifts of refer-
ence can also be seen in the dismissing response he gave to a propo-
nent of understanding the shifts involved in a paradigm change as
regarding reference rather than meaning (i.e. intension) shifts (Kuhn
1970a, 269, n. 3 and the subsequent remarks about essential prob-
lems with translation). What can be concluded at this point, then,
is that both in Friedman’s and Kuhn’s work we see that incommen-
surability can be seen as a real problem without it hanging on the
authors assuming referential divergence between the terms of the
subsequent theories to be the origin and sole cause of the problem.
It is rather the shifts in conceptual relations on the theoretical or
constitutive level that cause the extensional meaning shifts in times
of deep conceptual change.
One of the quotes in which Friedman describes the essence of
Kuhnian incommensurability (“simply because the concepts used in
formulating the later framework have not yet come into existence”)
especially shows that his understanding of incommensurability not
only does not have to stem from assuming a referential semantics,
but, on the contrary, it could be very well written by someone sub-
scribing to a cognitive semantics of the kind proposed by Zenker
and Gärdenfors. Moreover, the distinction between constitutive and
empirical concepts and principles – and hence the possibility of con-
cepts changing their status in that way – can be reconstructed in
conceptual spaces as well; something that Zenker and Gärdenfors
do themselves.
Contrary to Zenker and Gärdenfors’ diagnosis, then, neither Kuhn
nor Friedman accept referential divergence as the sole culprit of in-
commensurability. Even the problem that Friedman does attempt
to solve – the problem of prospective rational theory choice – can-
not be seen as stemming from a referential view on semantics. The
issue there is that the new, future framework introduces possibil-
ities – possibilities that are to be empirical possibilities – that are
strictly out of the realm of empirical possibility according to the
old paradigm’s constitutive principles. Does such a diagnosis of the
problem necessarily stem from assuming a referential semantics that
leads to the proponents of the two paradigms talking about differ-
ent things? Clearly not.
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5.5.2 Philosophical arguments in practice
Zenker and Gärdenfors took issue with Friedman’s postulate that
the level of meta-paradigms, required in times of changing the con-
stitutive frameworks, includes philosophical argumentation. Accord-
ing to the two authors, Friedman’s position implies that in order to
successfully go through periods of deep conceptual shifts, scientists
would have to be fluent in philosophical practice, which is a claim
that cannot stand given the facts about the scientific community.
To begin with, such a charge on Friedman stands at odds with the
way they view their own proposal. In their own paper, Zenker and
Gärdenfors make sure to stress that they do not postulate that in
actual practice scientists consciously employ the theory of concep-
tual spaces to discuss their chosen frameworks. Conceptual spaces
are in this sense merely posited to explain how communication be-
tween scientists is possible, not to put forward a thesis on how that
communication looks like in terms of actual words or theories used.
It seems unfair then to demand more of Friedman and claim that
using philosophy as the explanatory means in the incommensura-
bility debate amounts to assuming actual philosophical knowledge
and abilities in the scientists. Maybe, just as scientists do not need
to consciously entertain the theory of conceptual spaces in order
for that theory to be explanatory of their communications, they also
do not need to engage in explicitly philosophical debates in order
for the philosophical meta-frameworks to be explanatory for their
communicative success?
Even if there was some significant difference in the two proposals
that did in fact commit Friedman to attributing the scientists with
philosophical abilities, Friedman does actually deliver enough his-
torical proof to support his commitment.6 Firstly, most scientists are
not in the process of devising new paradigms; scientific revolutions
don’t happen every day and in the stable periods of normal science
there is no need for the use of Friedman’s third level. It is only in
periods of deep conceptual change that such debates become indis-
pensable (according to Friedman). This would explain why, by and
large, scientists do not tend to even be interested in philosophical
debates. Moreover, Friedman himself provides a detailed discussion
of how philosophical and meta-scientific debates were present in
times of scientific revolutions, discussing Newton and Einstein as
examples and showing how those scientists were well aware of and
influenced by existing philosophical debates (see especially ch. 4 of
part 2 of Friedman 2001). Granted, such dexterity with philosophi-
6 Something which, after having seen an early version of this manuscript, Zenker
and Gärdenfors did agree with (Zenker and Gärdenfors 2014a, n. 15).
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cal debates is not an everyday occurrence among scientists (“It takes,
to be sure, the genius of a Descartes, a Newton, or an Einstein to in-
terweave philosophical meta-frameworks with scientific paradigms
in this way.” (Friedman 2001, p. 67)), but neither are real scientific
revolutions.
5.6 can conceptual spaces be the third level?
So far I have shown that Zenker and Gärdenfors’ argument against
Kuhn and Friedman’s approaches to the problem of incommensura-
bility was founded on a misrepresentation of their opponents. How-
ever, there remains the systematic question: can conceptual spaces
help us in approaching the problem of incommensurability? In what
follows I will answer this question with respect to the problem of
prospective rational theory choice, that is the problem which Fried-
man sets out to deal with in Dynamics of Reason and which Zenker
and Gärdenfors claim to have dissolved with the use of conceptual
spaces.
5.6.1 Rationality and reasons
Zenker and Gärdenfors suggest that their proposal (i.e. conceiving
of conceptual frameworks as spatial structures whose dynamics fol-
low the given five kinds of changes) provides sufficient means to
show how the new framework can be seen as communicatively ratio-
nal from the point of view of the old framework – without the need
to evoke argumentation based on philosophical meta-paradigms.
That is, they claim that they can solve Friedman’s problem without
appealing to philosophy.
There are two ways of understanding what “rational” means in
this context. The stronger notion of rationality is about making a
choice between some options already given in the space of empirical
possibilities; that choice can be made with the help of empirical
testing and through an appeal to the values discussed by Kuhn.
In such a setting a rational choice will be a choice based on these
reasons and values. However, before such rational decision making
can be conducted at all, the new space of possibilities – the new
constitutive framework – must first be accepted as a possibility to
be considered: as a rational option, a reasonable continuation of the
old constitutive framework. And it is in this context that the weaker
notion of rationality is used.
Zenker and Gärdenfors seem to assume that only in the first case
reasons need to be given in the decision process, while in the sec-
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ond case the choice to include the new framework in the space of
possibilities does not have to be supported by reasons (Zenker and
Gärdenfors 2014a, 271, n. 15). And for them it is enough for the new
framework to be a rational possibility in the second sense if that
framework is presented through a spatial representation. No rea-
sons need to be given for why the new range of empirical possibili-
ties should be taken seriously by the practitioners of the old frame-
work, rather than as complete nonsense (which is exactly what it is,
initially, from the point of view of the old framework). Zenker and
Gärdenfors seem to believe that providing reasons and arguments
at this stage would amount to making arguments belonging to the
first, stronger type.
However, that is not the case. Before an argument can be given
for why the new framework is a rational all-things-considered (to
use their own phrase) best option to choose, that framework needs
to appear as an option to be considered at all. And the latter can-
not be done without an argument of some sort. The new frame-
work simply being there, spatially represented or not, would not
suffice for an argument for establishing it as a reasonable option.
Friedman finds himself facing this problem when he notes the gap
that appears when the old paradigm’s constitutive principles be-
come merely empirical in the new framework, therefore rendering
the new paradigm nonsensical from the point of view of the old
one. Making the new paradigm a communicatively rational option
is what it takes to bridge that gap. Simply pointing to the structure
of the theories and explaining to the adherents of the old paradigm
what has changed – the status of which of their principles, say – is
simply not enough.
The question now is whether conceptual spaces provide us with
means to bridge that gap. The authors give no arguments for that,
other than their discussion of the taxonomy of changes that spatially
conceived frameworks can undergo. Can describing the problem in
those terms be of any help here? Could it be the case that the new
paradigm can be seen as a sensible option to be seriously considered
from the point of view of the old paradigm – by virtue of describing
the way in which it relates to the old one via the spatial changes ad-
mitted by the theory of conceptual spaces? In other words, could the
required continuity between the old and the new paradigm simply
be captured by the continuity guaranteed by a sequence of spatial
modifications of the original constitutive framework, ending in the
new framework?
Unfortunately, as things stand now, such a notion of continuity
would be trivial. For, given the list of spacial changes to conceptual
spaces provided by the authors, every space can be seen as a result
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of applying a number of the described transformations to any other
space. That is, any space could be seen as a reasonable continuation
of any other space, were we to take that notion of spatial continuity
as a warrant for communicative rationality. Such a picture simply
does not capture the responsible option that according to Friedman
is an essential prerequisite of the later deliberation on what theory
should ultimately be chosen: being a geometrical possibility in the
proposed system is too weak to be a communicatively rational pos-
sibility.
A particular sequence of spatial modifications would still have to
be argued for by providing reasons for its choice that would go be-
yond the list of spatial transformations as it now stands. The space
of all possible conceptual spaces for scientific frameworks does not
have a metric on it yet, so to speak. There is yet no principled way
in which one way of deleting a dimension is deemed more rational
than another. Moreover, the choice of such a metric – the way of de-
ciding how far removed conceptually two frameworks are from each
other, of whether one of them is a rational modification of the other
– is a matter of decision, it does not follow naturally from the space
itself. Finally, such a decision has to be articulated on a different
level of discourse. Whether we choose to call that level philosophi-
cal or not, the fact remains that it needs to be there and it needs to sit
above and beyond the constitutive level of the particular paradigms.
I will come back to this thought in the next section. For now the
conclusion is that Zenker and Gärdenfors do not deliver on their
promise of providing an explanation for the communicative ratio-
nality of the new paradigm, solely via spatial considerations. They
underestimate the nature and strength of the arguments that need
to be given to establish said rationality.
5.6.2 Meta-frameworks
The previous section concluded that Zenker and Gärdenfors’ pro-
posal fails to establish the communicative rationality of the new
paradigm in the way meant for Friedman’s philosophical meta-pa-
radigms. In that sense the two authors have not proven that con-
ceptual spaces can do the job of Friedman’s third level of meta-
frameworks. This section investigates whether it can be achieved
at all, that is whether conceptual spaces can be the meta-framework
that does exactly what Friedman expects of philosophy in times of
deep conceptual change.
Zenker and Gärdenfors are not alone in claiming that Friedman’s
insistence of the indispensability of properly philosophical argu-
ments in times of deep conceptual change is misguided. Richardson
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(2002, p. 272) provides a different kind of argument for Friedman’s
failure to secure philosophy a necessary place as a source of meta-
paradigms and arguments for revolutionary science. According to
him, even from Friedman’s own historical narrative it becomes evi-
dent that it has been mathematics rather than philosophy that has
been supplanting revolutionary science with concepts and spelling
out of possibilities. Philosophy, although at times in fact used as
a source of inspiration, has not been employed in that way for a
long time,7 and it is not clear from Friedman’s own argument that
it must be used in this way whenever a radical change in constitu-
tive principles is proposed – especially since mathematics seems to
have been managing at least a big part of that role quite fine.
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that while there might be
reasons to dismiss Friedman’s third level as consisting of mainly
philosophical argumentation, it cannot be dismissed for what it pri-
marily was meant to be, i.e. a level of discourse beyond and above
the frameworks’ constitutive principles. Arguments about concep-
tual frameworks cannot be held from within those frameworks. Here
is where Friedman and the advocates of the conceptual spaces ap-
proach come together, willingly or not: they all admit that there
needs to be some sort of a higher level of discourse; a level from
which we look down on the different frameworks, that allows to
take a look at the new paradigm before accepting its constitutive
principles.
Can conceptual spaces serve as a so understood third level of sci-
entific theories; as a meta-framework in which paradigms can be
compared and reasons can be given for serious consideration of an
extended range of empirical possibility, of a different system of con-
stitutive principles? Zenker and Gärdenfors would probably want
to say yes, since conceptual spaces are supposed to deliver precisely
the meta-framework in which to represent and compare all other
theories. After all, conceptual spaces offer a more fine-grained rep-
resentation of conceptual frameworks than purely language-based
views and hence a tool for comparing them. It is a framework in
which the changes that the new paradigm offers can be expressed
in a way that at least in principle is understandable to the adherents
of the old paradigm – because it is spelled out in geometric terms
they can recognize. On the other hand, the theory as it now stands
provides too weak of a concept of continuity to really establish com-
7 Here Richardson’s opinion that post-Kantian philosophy did not serve that role
to anyone seems to stand at odds with Friedman’s historical discussion of the
introduction of relativity theory; just like Zenker and Gärdenfors, Richardson
seems here to disregard Friedman’s detailed historical narrative.
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municative rationality of the new paradigm, as shown in section
5.6.1.
But there is another, more serious problem, which is that even if
the analysis of conceptual continuity that they propose were to yield
a stronger and more useful notion of continuity, it would neverthe-
less fail to provide the kind of discursive means needed to solve
Friedman’s problem. For what Friedman is after – what is needed
to solve the prospective theory choice problem as he sees it – is a
notion of continuity of constitutive frameworks that would itself be
independent of any constitutive framework. Friedman (2001, pp. 56–
57) sees this problem as essentially the same as the problem of an-
swering external questions in Carnap’s philosophy of conceptual
frameworks.
Once there come up enough serious problems with the old consti-
tutive framework, the decision to modify it means having to explore
different conceptual possibilities without yet committing to a partic-
ular set of constitutive rules. The old framework cannot aid us in
this exploration, for its constitutive principles render the very pos-
sibility of such exploring moot. The new framework is not there
yet. There is no constitutive framework then to frame the problem
of where to go from there and this is why what Friedman wants
is something of a quasi-framework only: a platform that provides
discursive means to make arguments about conceptual continuity,
which however does not contain a stable set of constitutive, validity-
defining rules. Another reason for why this platform should not be
a second-level, constitutive framework is that if it were to be yet
another constitutive framework, we would have had to choose it in
the first place – which brings us back to the original problem.
The way in which Zenker and Gärdenfors situate their proposal
against structuralist approaches to scientific theories provides a good
illustration of this issue. One of the upshots of representing the-
ories via spaces rather than in the more standard set-theoretical
manner is meant to be that some inter-theory changes can become
less dramatic than in the structuralist approach: “the structuralist
account of noncumulative changes . . . may (falsely) suggest concep-
tual breaks when, in fact, conceptual continuity is the case” Zenker
and Gärdenfors 2014b, p. 1548. Yet in both cases the continuity is not
conceptual continuity simpliciter, but conceptual continuity relative
to the framework in which the different theories are represented. It
is an over-interpretation to pronounce as simply false the result that
two concepts are very different from each other according to the
structuralist representation, while also advertising the results of the
other approach as providing the real measure of the desired kind.
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The above example shows how, whenever we decide to represent
concepts of the two theories using yet another formal framework,
the resulting notion of continuity will end up being relative to the
chosen meta-framework. And the moment we try to argue for the
choice of that particular meta-framework as the best for the kind of
representation that we are after, the revenge theory choice problem
strikes back: how are we to choose the best meta-framework for rep-
resenting frameworks? What kinds of arguments can we use that
would not already assume the acceptance of the meta-framework
we are trying to argue for? Deciding to use a particular conceptual
meta-framework to represent other frameworks amounts to an at-
tempt to reduce an external question (how am I to judge another
paradigm from the perspective of my own framework and my own
constitutive concepts?) to an internal one within a different frame-
work (how do these two paradigms compare once I treat them as
objects of another, third theory?).
It is in this context that Friedman’s insistence on finding a way
of spelling out conceptual continuity that would be independent
of any particular set of constitutive principles (which means being
independent of any particular conceptual framework) becomes rele-
vant. This is where we see what the need is that Friedman is trying
to satisfy; what Friedman’s third level, and the postulated ideal of
a communicatively rational community, are meant to provide. It is
the need to be able to answer the problem of theory choice – to an-
swer external questions – from outside of any particular language,
particular formal framework.
The difficulty of the prospective rational theory choice problem
is that it calls for ways of rationalizing changes in a framework at
a point when we suspect that a new set of constitutive principles is
needed, but no candidate new framework is there yet. Hence, there
are no two frameworks to be compared yet; there is only one, being
modified. And the ways in which it can be modified have to be, first,
discovered, and second, argued for as reasonable – hence the need
for a level of discourse in which such arguments can be made.
That is Friedman’s problem of incommensurability as rational the-
ory development and choice: theory choice in presence of no frame-
work to shape the reasoning in the situation. Friedman’s answer
was to point to a resource of philosophical ideas precisely because
they do not tend to be organized in paradigms, they do not form
a single framework that shapes the questions asked within it, and
hence using them to aid the reasoning about the concrete paradigms
doesn’t push us back into any concrete meta-theory or framework.
Philosophy never reaches a state that would correspond to normal
science, that is a state where it converges on “a single set of gener-
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ally agreed upon rules of inquiry” (Friedman 2001, p. 20). On the
contrary, the permanent shift of issues and agendas within the same
periods and even schools is the name of the game. Hence philoso-
phy cannot be seen as a single conceptual framework with a clearly
defined language and the rules of formation and verification of its
statements. Moreover, notes (Friedman 2001, p. 107), while there is
no consensus on the results of philosophical debates, there tends to
be an agreement on what counts as important moves in the debates.
Philosophy turns out to have just the right amount of structure to it
without having too much.
Carnap’s stance on the same issue – his pronouncement that ex-
ternal questions can only be answered through pragmatic considera-
tions of the fit of the theory for its purpose – assumed that we under-
stand the purpose and can evaluate the fit outside of any framework.
What Kuhn taught us, however – to some extent inadvertently and
in spite of him arguing for there still being a historically stable set
of values that can be used to rate theories – was that even the ideas
such as subject matter or what counts as a good fit of a theory to its
subject matter are theory-dependent and change when paradigms
change. As Friedman (2001, pp. 56-57) rightly notes, Carnap did
not consider the relativism that his view of conceptual frameworks
committed him to to be an actual threat for the notion of truth in
science – for science could take care of itself.8 Even if science did
in fact take care of itself in terms of not falling prey to relativism –
something that Friedman doubts given the post-Kuhnian develop-
ments – the philosophical question that incommensurability poses
remains to be handled.
5.7 conclusion
I have presented three different positions on the nature of the prob-
lem of incommensurability of scientific theories, ranging from the
original statements by Kuhn, through the reinterpretation of the
problem by Friedman, to a recent critique coming from the propo-
nents of the theory of conceptual spaces as a framework for repre-
senting scientific theories. It turns out that the problem of prospec-
tive rational theory choice set up by Friedman cannot be alleviated
8 There is an issue here that goes past the scope of this chapter and thesis, but is
interesting to note nevertheless. In my brief comparison of Friedman and Carnap
here I disregarded an interesting difference between their approaches. Carnap’s
position on external questions was developed against philosophy understood as
metaphysical considerations. Friedman takes himself to be approaching the same
question, but he actually wants to argue for philosophy.
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by an appeal to conceptual spaces or, in fact, any other formal way
of representing frameworks.
The problem of incommensurability, when considered from the
perspective of the theory of conceptual frameworks, can be reinter-
preted as the issue of theory choice seen through the need to answer
external questions of a theory in the absence of another framework
that could frame the problem. That is not to say that the presence
of such a deep incommensurability between conceptual frameworks
renders successful communication between users of different frame-
works impossible: scientists do communicate and so far it has al-
ways been the case that a sufficiently shared observation language
could be found in times of paradigm shifts.
Zenker and Gärdenfors’ fresh voice on Kuhn and Friedman intro-
duced some new moves into the debate on rationality in times of sci-
entific revolutions. However, their starting point is a misrepresenta-
tion of what the problem of incommensurability was both for Kuhn
and for Friedman. In effect, their response underestimates and ulti-
mately leaves untouched the problem of how to conceive of the new
paradigm as a rational and reasonable option from the point of view
of the old one. Conceptual spaces cannot replace Friedman’s philo-
sophical frameworks as the third level of discourse required for the
possibility of arguments about different conceptual frameworks.
Still, this conclusion does not undermine the results that the the-
ory of conceptual spaces can bring as a framework for representing
scientific theories; it just points to the limitations of this approach
as an approach to the problem of incommensurability understood
as the problem of rational prospective theory change. Conceptual
spaces are a formal framework for, among other things, represent-
ing scientific theories and analyzing inter-theoretical relations, but
they cannot be the framework in which conceptual continuity of the
move from one paradigm to another can be traced, simply because
the nature of the problem does not call for this kind of solution.
If anything, this chapter shows that incommensurability contin-
ues to be a very elusive concept, an interpretation of whose essence
everyone seems to differ about. Could the right response to this
situation be simply to drop the subject? That would definitely not
do. For all the brevity and at times frustrating indeterminacy of his
statements, Kuhn gave us a real challenge: to defend rationality of
scientific progress, and within that, to explain the rationality of indi-
viduals who choose to change the constitutive framework they work
in.
In the previous chapters of this thesis, I explored the idea of
adding conceptual spaces as an element of conceptual framework,
providing an interpretation of the terms of the framework’s lan-
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guage. In this chapter I assumed a higher perspective, consider-
ing conceptual spaces themselves as a framework for representa-
tion of theories or frameworks. The results of this shift in perspec-
tive were not particularly revolutionary; the theory of conceptual
spaces turned out to be exactly what it is: that is, just another theory,
with its own limitations, unable to talk about itself from a theory-
independent standpoint. In a way, the conclusions of this chapter
provide an additional motivation for the main problem of this the-
sis; since we are always bound to using some conceptual framework
or other, the question of how to correctly reason with it, is particu-
larly important.
6
C O N C L U S I O N
The starting point of this thesis was the realization that conceptual
frameworks have a significant influence on inductive reasoning: our
choice of concepts for a particular investigation will bear on what
conclusions we will come to on the basis of the observations. While
this statement might sound almost trivial in post-Kuhnian times, the
answer to the question of how exactly that influence looks like, is far
from trivial. Hence, in my investigations, I narrowed down my in-
terest, concentrating on a particular way of representing conceptual
frameworks — as containing conceptual spaces — and a particular
way of representing inductive reasoning — in formal confirmation
theory, i.e. inductive logic.
Chapter 2 introduced in detail the formal machinery of inductive
logic, concentrating in particular on introducing conceptual spaces,
as well as on the assumptions on rationality and inductive reason-
ing brought in by the axioms for the confirmation functions. I pre-
sented Carnap’s two geometrical rationality constraints, that con-
nect some values of the confirmation functions to the features of the
conceptual spaces. These two rules were the main focus of chapter
3, where I built on Carnap’s proposal, enriching the structure of the
conceptual spaces according to the findings of the modern theory
of conceptual spaces. In chapter 3 I also argued that the conceptual
space can also be used as a base for representing observations. And
once we represent observations as points of the conceptual space,
we can start thinking of circumventing the original object language
altogether. This idea led to constructing, in chapter 4, the model of
inductive reasoning directly on the conceptual space, via a set of
inductive hypotheses in the form of probability distributions over
the space. Finally, in chapter 5 I took a step back, and considered
conceptual frameworks in their entirety, focusing on how they can
be chosen. I argued that conceptual spaces do not provide a suffi-
cient framework in which Kuhn’s problem of incommensurability
and theory choice could be dissolved.
The upshot of the thesis is that the way in which Carnap used
conceptual spaces to inform his confirmation functions, is not the
only way the spaces can be used in modeling inductive reasoning.
As we have learned from the developments in cognitive science, con-
ceptual spaces can be thought of as having a much richer structure
than the one Carnap had given them. Those additional features can
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be further employed in making predictions on the basis of the cho-
sen conceptual structure. The prior degrees of belief can take into
account vagueness of some of the concepts in the framework. Fur-
thermore, the space of possible observations can be fine-grained, in
order to maximally utilize the information encoded in the concep-
tual space. Analogical reasoning by similarity of predicates, based
on a single observation, can take into account whether that observa-
tion was a prototypical instance of a concept, or not. The subsequent
proposals made throughout the thesis, added to and culminated
with a new formal framework for inductive reasoning, i.e. what I
called inductive logic on conceptual spaces.
The work done in this thesis, while primarily intended as a con-
tribution to the theory of confirmation, can also be of use for the
theory of conceptual spaces. In order for the theory of conceptual
spaces to be a good, workable model of human cognitive represen-
tations, it needs an account of reasoning — including inductive rea-
soning — with the use of conceptual spaces. After all, reasoning is
one of the primary uses of cognitive representations, if not the most
important one. In this thesis, I have studied two ways of modeling
inductive reasoning in this context. The first one is Carnap’s own
proposal, where the conceptual space is used to inform some of the
values of the confirmation function, but the main “inductive work”
is done on the level of propositions, via the confirmation functions.
In the second one, we model inductive reasoning directly on the
conceptual space, by defining probability distributions over it. Seen
from this perspective, the proposals of this thesis are also a contri-
bution to the theory of conceptual spaces.
A significant open problem is to which extent conceptual spaces
can be a useful mode of representation when it comes to scien-
tific frameworks and theories, and whether they can help us in ap-
proaching any problems in philosophy of science. The conclusion of
chapter 5 was only negative: the theory of conceptual spaces is not
enough to dissolve the problem of incommensurability of scientific
theories. However, I did not engage with the more general claim,
namely that conceptual spaces are a good tool for representing con-
ceptual framework of scientific theories. I granted this assumption
to the authors whose work I was engaging with, but it still remains
to be seen whether it can be instantiated with more examples of ac-
tual scientific frameworks and their geometric representation. Fur-
thermore, it seems worthwhile to explore the connections with the
work on the semantic view of scientific theories, starting with Van
Fraassen’s use of spatial representations of intensions, which I only
briefly mentioned in the Introduction.
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The work done in this thesis is connected to the problem of in-
commensurability in another way, from the side of Bayesian con-
firmation theory. In that context, incommensurability resurfaces as
the problem of language change (see Earman 1992, ch. 8): when a
Bayesian reasoner comes to a point in which she has to change the
language in which she records her observations and predictions, as-
signing new degrees of belief to propositions of the new language —
ideally without losing the information she learned so far — cannot
be done via conditionalization, i.e. the update procedure cannot be
Bayesian. The problem arises of whether and how can such a change
be rational. This is where the model of reasoning directly on the con-
ceptual space could help in alleviating the problem in some cases.
In our setting, a change in language is not always a change in the
underlying space; as long as the conceptual space itself is not modi-
fied, assigning degrees of belief to propositions based on a new set
of predicates, i.e. a new attribute partition, is not problematic and
can be done on the basis of the agent’s current posterior. Hence, at
least some of the cases of language change could be seen as not
necessarily forcing a non-Bayesian update. This idea has not been
explored so far, and it seems worthwhile to do so.
The most important open question is the one I explicitly did not
approach in this thesis, namely the problem of how to choose a con-
ceptual framework. Throughout this thesis, I often stressed that I
am looking for prescriptions on reasoning given a particular con-
ceptual framework, and not for reasons for the choice of that frame-
work. Such a narrowing down of the problem was necessary here,
but it does not mean that the problem of choice is not an important
one. What does it actually mean for a conceptual framework to be
well-suited for its purpose? How do we know that a framework is
performing well? How can we compare frameworks, and what val-
ues are among the relevant criteria? The work I have done in this
thesis can form a beginning of an answer to these and related ques-
tions, by providing some grip on what beliefs a particular choice of
framework commits us to.
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S U M M A RY
This thesis investigates the question of how conceptual frameworks
influence inductive reasoning. A conceptual framework is a collec-
tion of concepts used for a particular purpose; we can think of it
as a semantic environment in which observations, or evidence, are
recorded, and beliefs are formed and expressed. How a conceptual
framework is structured, will influence the kinds of beliefs that can
be formed within it. Moreover, the structure of the conceptual frame-
work can be seen as a constraint on what beliefs it is rational to form.
In this thesis I study such framework-based rationality constraints
on beliefs, in particular beliefs about future observations. I show
how conceptual spaces can be successfully used in providing con-
straints on rational degrees of belief in inductive reasoning.
In modeling inductive reasoning, I use the tools of inductive logic:
a formal explication of the notion of confirmation. My starting point
is Rudolf Carnap’s “Basic System of Inductive Logic”, which was a
system of inductive logic based on a particular conception of con-
ceptual frameworks. In the Basic System, Carnap introduces geo-
metrical representations of concepts into conceptual frameworks. In
extending Carnap’s proposal, I draw from the modern theory of
conceptual spaces as a framework for cognitive representations.
Chapter 2 provides a critical overview of the Basic System. Chap-
ter 3 is dedicated to Carnap’s geometric rationality constraints; I
show how they can be reinterpreted in a setting where attribute
spaces are enriched with elements taken over from the theory of con-
ceptual spaces. In chapter 4 I model inductive reasoning directly on
the conceptual space, by placing probability distributions over the
space itself. I discuss a simple, one-dimensional model, based on the
Bayesian modeling of predictions. Finally, in chapter 5 I approach
conceptual spaces on a different level, namely as models for concep-
tual frameworks themselves. I argue that such an understanding of
conceptual frameworks does not dissolve Kuhn’s problem of incom-
mensurability, contrary to a recent claim made by the proponents of
the theory of conceptual spaces.

S A M E N VAT T I N G
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de vraag hoe conceptuele raamwerken
inductief redeneren beïnvloeden. Een conceptueel raamwerk is een
verzameling van concepten die voor een specifiek doel gebruikt
worden; we kunnen het zien als een semantische omgeving waarin
waarnemingen geregistreerd worden, en overtuigingen gevormd en
uitgedrukt worden. De wijze waarop een conceptueel raamwerk is
gestructureerd heeft invloed op de soort overtuigingen die erbin-
nen gevormd kunnen worden. Daarnaast kan de structuur van een
conceptueel raamwerk beschouwd worden als een beperking op
welke overtuigingen ratio-neel zijn om aan te nemen. In dit proef-
schrift bestudeer ik zulke raamwerkgebaseerde beperkingen op ra-
tionele overtuigingen, in het bijzonder overtuigingen over toekom-
stige waarnemingen. Ik laat zien hoe conceptuele raamwerken met
goed gevolg gebruikt kunnen worden in het opleggen van beperkin-
gen op rationele overtuigingsgraden in inductief redeneren.
In het modelleren van inductief redeneren gebruik ik de gereed-
schappen van de inductieve logica: een formele uitwerking van de
notie van bevestiging. Mijn vertrekpunt is Rudolf Carnaps Basis-
systeem van de Inductieve Logica, een systeem van inductieve log-
ica gebaseerd op een bepaalde opvatting van conceptuele raamw-
erken. In het Basissysteem introduceert Carnap geometrische repre-
sentaties van concepten binnen conceptuele raamwerken. In het uit-
bouwen van Carnaps voorstel baseer ik me op de moderne theorie
van conceptuele ruimtes als een raamwerk voor cognitieve represen-
taties.
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een kritisch overzicht van het Basissysteem.
Hoofdstuk 3 is gewijd aan Carnaps geometrische rationaliteitsvoor-
waarden; ik laat zien hoe deze opnieuw geïnterpreteerd kunnen
worden in een omgeving waarin attribuut-ruimtes verrijkt zijn met
elementen uit de theorie van conceptuele ruimtes. In hoofdstuk 4
modelleer ik inductief redeneren rechtstreeks op de conceptuele
ruimte, door middel van het leggen van waarschijnlijkheidsverdelin-
gen op de ruimte zelf. Ik bespreek een eenvoudig, eendimensionaal
model, gebaseerd op het Bayesiaans modelleren van voorspellingen.
Tot slot, in hoofdstuk 5, benader ik conceptuele ruimtes op een an-
der niveau, namelijk als modellen voor conceptuele raamwerken
zelf. Ik beargumenteer dat een dergelijke opvatting van conceptuele
raamwerken niet in staat is Kuhns probleem van incommensura-
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biliteit op te lossen, in tegenstelling tot een actuele bewering van de
aanhangers van de theorie van conceptuele ruimtes.
Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Diese Dissertation untersucht den Einfluss von konzeptionellen Rah-
men (“conceptual frameworks”) auf das induktive Schließen. Ein
konzeptioneller Rahmen ist eine Sammlung von Konzepten, die für
einen bestimmten Zweck verwendet wird; man kann einen konzep-
tionellen Rahmen als eine semantische Umgebung sehen, in der
Beobachtungen (z. B. bestätigender Natur) erfasst und überzeugun-
gen ausgedrückt werden. Wie ein konzeptioneller Rahmen struk-
turiert ist beeinflusst die Arten der Überzeugungen, zu denen man
in ihm gelangen kann. Außerdem kann die Struktur des konzep-
tionellen Rahmens als eine Rationalitätsbedingung für überzeugungs-
bildung aufgefasst. In dieser Dissertation untersuche ich solche Ra-
tionalitätsbedingungen für Überzeugungen, speziell für überzeu-
gungen über zukünftige Beobachtungen. Ich zeige dabei wie konzep-
tionelle Rahmen benutzt werden können, um Bedingungen für ratio-
nale überzeugungsgrade im induktiven Schließen bereitzustellen.
Ich modelliere induktives Schließen mit Hilfe der induktiven Logik,
einer formalen Explikation des Konzepts der Bestätigung. Mein Aus-
gangspunkt ist Rudolf Carnaps “Basic System of Inductive Logic”
(bsil), ein System der induktiven Logik, dass auf einer speziellen
Konzeption des konzeptionellen Rahmens aufbaut. Carnap verbindet
in bsil eine geometrische Repräsentation von Konzepten mit konzep-
tionellen Rahmen. Ich erweitere Carnaps Vorschlag unter Verwen-
dung der modernen Theorie der konzeptionellen Räume (“concep-
tual spaces”) als Rahmen für kognitive Repräsentation.
Kapitel 2 gibt eine kritische übersicht über bsil. Kapitel 3 ist Car-
naps geometrischen Rationalitätsbedingungen gewidmet; ich zeige
darin, wie die Rationalitätsbedingungen vor einem Hintergrund rein-
terpretiert werden können, in dem Eigenschaftsräume durch Ele-
mente der Theorie der konzeptionellen Räume angereichert sind.
In Kapitel 4 modelliere ich induktives Schließen direkt im konzep-
tionellen Raum, indem ich die Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung über
den Raum selbst lege. Ich diskutiere weiterhin ein einfaches, eindi-
mensionales Modell, dass auf der Bayesianischen Modellierung von
Vorhersagen beruht. In Kapitel 5 entwickele ich schließlich einen Zu-
gang zu konzeptionellen Räumen auf einem anderen Niveau, näm-
lich als Modelle für konzeptionelle Rahmen selbst. Ich argumentiere
dass ein derartiges Verständnis von konzeptionellen Rahmen nicht
Kuhns Problem der Inkommensurabilität löst, entgegen jüngster Be-
hauptungen von Vertretern der Theorie der konzeptionellen Räume.
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